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## ANTECEDENTS OF THE SPANISH MONOPOLISTIC OVERSEAS TRADING COMPANIES (1624-1728)<sup>1</sup>

The great European expansive movement of the sixteenth century not only greatly widened the horizon of political enterprise, but increased quite as remarkably its zones of trade. Commerce at a very considerable distance, to be sure, was far from unknown in the middle ages, nor was a sort of trading organization lacking. Such bodies as the Hanseatic League, with its "Steelyard" in London, or the great colonies of Venetians and other peoples in the ports of the near east, living in *fondachi* of their own, with varying privileges and often a sort of extra-territoriality, are well known. All these, however, were essentially individual traders, operating independently of each other except so far as they found it convenient to join together for the use of a joint warehouse or other common properties and privileges. All, moreover, enjoyed such freedoms and exemptions as were their lot as the result of municipal regulation and diplomacy, and all confined their activities to Europe, aside from such a slight extension as that into the Syrian and Egyptian ports.

<sup>1</sup> This article is essentially the first chapter of the writer's book, now over half written, entitled *Spanish Royal Overseas Trading Companies*, and comprising detailed studies of the Caracas (Guipuzcoa), Habana, Barcelona, and Philippine Companies, with briefer mention of various minor organizations not exclusively concerned with maritime commerce.

With the progress of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, all this was modified, until by about 1600, conditions were so materially different as to call forth a new type of trade, that by chartered companies. Many influences combined to bring this about. The growth of great centralized governments weakened the relative power of cities to protect their traders, at the same time that conditions were so changing in international life as to make the interests of a municipality that had previously guaranteed privileges to foreign merchants often very different from those of the national government to which the city belonged. Furthermore, the opening of sea trade with the east and with America completely dislocated the old trade routes, causing severe declines in the fortunes of many of the old commercial centers such as Venice, Augsburg, Constance, and others of interior Europe, with a corresponding rise in such ports as London, Lisbon, and many of those in western France. Growing wealth at home, and growing knowledge of opportunities abroad, constantly beckoned the aspiring trader onward, until by the beginning of the seventeenth century, merchant ventures were energetically under way, or at least considered, from the White Sea to the Indian Ocean and from New France to Zanzibar and the Malay Peninsula.

The requirements of such distant trade were far different from those of the earlier days, not only in the greater strength necessary for a protecting government, but in needing an invested capital so enormously increased as to be beyond the resources of a single merchant. As a result, beginning with some half dozen organizations in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, the next hundred years saw the establishment of a great number of the famous chartered companies, covering, in their inception at least, the whole world outside of Europe.<sup>2</sup> While there is no absolute unanimity in the terms

<sup>2</sup> See the excellent list in E. P. Cheyney, *European Background of American History* ("American Nation", I.), p. 137. Much of this introductory material is based upon his seventh chapter.



of these companies' charters, all show a remarkable similarity in certain large aspects. In return for operations which included not only indirect service to the government by building up trade and therefore revenues, but very commonly other direct functions such as shipbuilding, colony planting or even war upon rivals, the nation granted to incorporated bodies of merchants, with a large invested capital, not only aid and protection ranging from ships to subsidies, but a monopoly of the trade to a certain region, and commonly governmental privileges so extensive as to make them almost sovereign in their own geographical sphere.

Such companies as these were sometimes successful to an extraordinary degree, while others were quite as remarkable failures. None of them, however, are found in Spain in the seventeenth century, nor would one expect to find them there. Their fundamental principle was foreign to Spanish conditions and theories of trade. It is well known today that the expansive factors in Spain were barely, if at all, adequate for the successful colonization of its vast claims in the New World; certainly Spain could have spared neither capital to prosecute further expansion, nor men and ships to guard that expansion had it taken place. As for the trade of America, from the middle of the sixteenth century that was firmly established in a way that precluded, so long as it might last, any widespread application of the chartered company.

This remarkable system of trade<sup>3</sup> between Spain and its Indies remained essentially the same until the latter half of the eighteenth century, and therefore deserves some description not only as an explanation of the failure of chartered companies to appear in Spain at the same time as elsewhere in Europe, but as a background for the conditions that finally, in the eighteenth century, caused the establishment by Spain

<sup>3</sup> See C. H. Haring, *Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs* (Cambridge, 1918). A description adequate for many purposes, though much less thorough, appears in E. G. Bourne, *Spain in America* ("American Nation", III.), chaps. 15 and 19.

of the equivalent for those companies. By an ordinance of 1561, it was ordered that every year there be organized and equipped in the ports of Seville, Cadiz, and San Lúcar de Barrameda, two fleets, to carry on the trade with America; one of them, commonly called the *flota*, destined to supply most of North America, and the other, the galleons, to serve South America. Sailing together, escorted by as many warships as were thought necessary, or were obtainable, they separated on reaching the Antilles, the *flota* aiming for Vera Cruz and detaching on the way such ships as were destined for Cuba, Hispaniola, and other islands, while the galleons proceeded to Porto Bello in the isthmus of Panama, after stopping at Cartagena for trade with the provinces on the Caribbean coast.

From Vera Cruz was supplied all present-day Mexico, most of present-day Central America, and the Philippines, while from Porto Bello goods were carried across the isthmus to Panama by pack train, from there to Lima by another fleet, and from Lima distributed throughout South America even to Buenos Aires and other colonies situated on or near the Atlantic ocean. The return voyage was also made in convoy, over much the same routes, but gathering at Havana before standing through the Bahama Channel and heading back for Spain. With some small exceptions, all the overseas trade of the vast Spanish dominions in America was supposedly limited to these fleets and the ports named, though in fact *registros* or special licenses for individual ships were often granted.

To regulate this system the crown had two special bodies in Spain, the *casa de contratación* and the *consulado*, the latter also existing in Mexico City and Lima from about the beginning of the seventeenth century. The *casa de contratación*, or house of trade, was a governmental authority of last resort, subject only to the council of the Indies, for all matters concerned with the economic relations between Spain and



America. Through its warehouses all goods shipped to or from the Indies must pass for taxation and registration; its agents examined ships for seaworthiness and compliance with the law as to crews and equipment, it granted or refused licenses for voyages and for emigrants, examined and licensed pilots and shipmasters, gathered and corrected data concerned with navigation and cosmography, advised the crown on matters in its province, held civil and criminal jurisdiction over many disputes and infractions of the law, and in other ways watched over every smallest detail of trans-Atlantic trade and travel.

The consulado, on the other hand, though established and regulated by royal decree and exercising some governmental functions was, strictly speaking, an unofficial body or guild composed of the merchants interested in the American trade. In legal theory, its chief purpose was the election from its own number of a prior and two consuls, who formed a court before which was heard practically every civil plea growing out of the Indies trade, such as bankruptcies and collection of debts, and which had grown to such numbers by 1543 (the date of the consulado's creation) as to choke the casa's tribunal and to handicap business seriously. In actual fact, by virtue of loans and other aids to the crown which secured specific privileges and general favor, by unremitting attention to its own interests while advising the casa as to the crown's, and by such devices as causing to be increased the amount of capital required for a share in the trade, before many decades the consulado became practically a closed corporation of a few great Sevillian commercial houses, enjoying a monopoly of the traffic between Spain and America.<sup>4</sup>

The probable failing of such a system as the above can need little elaboration. Adequate supplies of most of the necessities of life were habitually lacking in the colonies, either from bureaucratic maladministration, the inability of

<sup>4</sup> See Haring, pp. 43-45, 136-137.

Spain either to supply wants itself or to obtain goods from foreign countries for the purpose, or, perhaps most commonly of all, from deliberate restriction by the merchants of the consulado for the purpose of maintaining prices. Smuggling was widespread, quite as much by the Spanish as by the foreigner, and carried on with at times a cynical openness almost impossible to believe, were it not so well attested by frequent accounts.

The actual conditions in certain regions in the eighteenth century will be mentioned later in connection with the founding of various companies intended to remedy them, but they might have been duplicated to a greater or lesser degree at almost any time after the middle of the seventeenth century, and even in some cases long before. For the present we need only notice that so long as the system described continued to satisfy the government at all, there was no place for the chartered company in Spanish economic life. The services rendered other states by their organized merchants might have been welcome enough to the Catholic kings—though in fact instances are by no means rare of great aids by the consulado acting as a unit—but the privileges were another matter. Of the three ordinary varieties mentioned above, defense was furnished by the convoy system, and for all practical purposes the merchants of the consulado had as much of a monopoly, so far as they could enforce it against the contrabandist, as any of the great European corporations. As for the semi-sovereign powers, the mention of their possibility would have been well nigh heresy in its literal sense, so firmly were absolutism and centralized power embedded in the Spanish mind by this time.

It would hardly be surprising, therefore, if no traces of the chartered company were to be found in Spain, prior at least to the advent of the Bourbons in 1700, but as a matter of fact several projects were advanced by responsible parties, and in some cases at least considered amicably by the govern-



ment, however unanimously they were finally rejected. A life time would hardly suffice to ensure anything like exhaustive treatment of these abortive schemes, and such a life would be ill spent in view of the great numbers of important problems still awaiting investigation. But a few of them, however incompletely presented as to antecedents and decision in some cases, may serve to show the extent to which the absorption of the rest of Europe in corporate trade was reflected in Spain.

The first instance so far discovered of a definite plan for these companies occurs in the spring of 1624, when, perhaps because of the growing incursions of the Dutch into the Spanish empire, three projects were brought before the *junta de comercio* by two men, two plans for an East India Company, and one for America. As the earliest known expression of Spanish views on the matter, the latter receives here a more careful summary than later similarly unsuccessful attempts. Probably early in March of 1624, one Manuel López Pereyra presented the junta with his scheme, prefacing it with the observation that experience showed that the trade to the West Indies was steadily deteriorating and would be impossible to save by means of the flotas, since the trouble was the carriage of too many goods, and therefore such low prices that the trade was discouraged, so that

infallibly the said commerce is going to eat itself up, giving opportunity to foreigners to enrich themselves and expand, making themselves masters of all the dependencies.

The cause of this, he said, was the vast extent of the trade, making it too great for private enterprise, with enormous costs and moderate sales.

<sup>8</sup> Paper, without title, signature or date, beginning, "*Senor. Manuel Lopez Pereyra dize. . . .*" It is enclosed in the *Oficio* of the junta de comercio of March 16, 1624, mentioned below in note 7. The paper is undoubtedly the original representation. As for its date, the Spanish advisory councils were generally prompt in beginning consideration of a new project, however long delayed their decision, so that the paper can hardly have been presented before February, at the earliest.

By carrying on the trade by a company, all this would be changed. The company would be permanent, to begin with, and would have many other advantages, due to economies from despatching only just sufficient stocks with resultant savings in freights, from the more prompt clearing of the fleets, and from the possibilities of buying and selling in large lots. Moreover, the crown would directly benefit, since the company could defend itself, duties would not so readily be evaded, fewer officials would be required for their collection, and even on occasion the king could avail himself of the company's craft at slight cost for his shipments. The writer continues at length, pointing out that as foreigners and "rebels" [the Dutch] have found companies very useful, Spain should also. A further argument, probably more effective—to say nothing of intelligible—in the days of mercantilism than now, concerns the way in which gold from the Americas poured through Spain to buy goods from foreigners to supply the colonies. He fails to make clear wherein he expected the company to improve this condition, but may have thought it apparent that the improved trading power would aid.

By his plan, a company was to be formed with thirty persons as deputies, or administrators, each one to put in one hundred and fifty thousand pesos in money or goods, understanding that cities might be included as a "person" by choosing someone to act for them. In addition, persons native to Spain or the Indies, and married foreigners residing in Spain, might invest money with the group. Each year, a general balance was to be struck and division made, with a final settlement at the end of ten years, after which a new company might be established. Two fleets annually and single ships, all well armed and equipped, were to be dispatched. Merchandise for New Spain was to be sold at Vera Cruz, or failing a market,<sup>6</sup> to be stored and less sent the following

<sup>6</sup> One of the difficulties complained of in the survey of conditions was that the *feria* did not last long enough for disposal of all the goods.



year. Supplies for the rest of America would be handled similarly at Porto Bello, with a previous stop at Cartagena. All goods were to be sold at fixed prices with only a moderate profit, and fair values were to be paid the producers in the Indies for their goods.

A further interesting feature called for the formation by the *vecinos* of New Spain of another company for the trade between Acapulco and Manila, with the company for the Spanish trade holding one-third of the stock, in order to interest both in the other's welfare. Still others provided for shipment by the company, without cost to the crown, of gold, silver, cochineal, and other produce on the royal account; for carriage by the company's warships of gold and silver under registro for private parties; and that the company should pay no *averia*, since the guard ships were its own, unless the king should order extra ones to go for greater safety, in which case it would pay proportionately.

On the sixteenth of the month, the junta de comercio reported<sup>7</sup> on this, to the effect that

the trade of the West Indies is well systematized, and it would be undesirable to create private companies for it, as this paper says.

Previous contracts for parts of the navigation had shown that private enterprise could not handle it on that basis, and great damage would result to the many merchants already engaged in the trade by giving it to a few. The low prices in the Indies, the junta pointed out, were due to a surplus of goods, which in turn was due to the rapacity of the merchants themselves, who had rushed into the trade on seeing the profits obtained when fewer were concerned. As for admitting foreigners, the harm was easy to see, since despite the fact that it was understood and believed that much of the capital then used was foreign, at least it must be invested secretly, using Spaniards as agents and thereby giving them the train-

<sup>7</sup> *De oficio*, junta de comercio; March 16, 1624.—Archivo General de Simancas, Estado, [hereafter referred to as A.S., Est.] 1102 [antiguo 2847].

ing that was so desirable, as well as a share of the profits. The final decision, therefore, was

that as Your Majesty has been advised various times, it be seen if there can be companies formed in Spain for the trade with the regions of Europe, and in Portugal for that of India.

The king indicated his approval of this by the usual formula, "*Está bien*", with his rubric.

The bundle of papers in which the above appears is full of documents concerning efforts to find a way to stop the trade of the "rebellious" Dutch, without hurting the loyal parts of the Low Countries. Remembering that at this time Portugal (and therefore its colonies) was part of the Spanish empire, it becomes easier to understand the reference to companies for trade with the East Indies from Portugal. Just how much is meant by the junta's mention of several previous advices on the matter is uncertain, but at least one instance is found in the other two projects noted above.

These consist of a paper by the same Pereyra, again lacking signature and date, and another by one Francisco de Retama, a vecino of Jérez, both advocating the advantages of forming companies in the loyal provinces of Flanders to trade with India, as a means of blocking the trade of the Dutch there, or, lacking this, pleading for allowing it freely to the rebels if they would pay the duties. To this the junta replied<sup>8</sup> that it was impossible to agree to opening the India trade to rebels, since shutting off their trade was one of the ways that Spain was waging war upon them. After this decision, theoretically sound even if somewhat lacking in contact with the realities, it went on to say that it would be very bad to open the India trade to the loyal provinces, since it would be impossible to distinguish the resulting activities from the Dutch trade that would proceed under its cover. The best thing, said the junta, would be to form a company

<sup>8</sup> Junta de comercio; March 13, 1624.—A.S., Est., 1102 [antiguo 2847]. The representations of López Pereyra and Retama are enclosed.



of Portuguese, with the possibility of later accepting in it some capital from Flanders or other obedient parts of the empire, for which purpose the Spanish representatives in London and Flanders should be asked to forward information on the constitution of the English and Dutch East India companies, and others. To this the king agreed, noting that all nations except the Dutch should be admitted in the company.

Just what happened to this idea is unknown, though not hard to guess in view of conditions in Spain at that time. Perhaps it was the stimulus for the projected companies of 1628. At any rate, in that year Philip IV. formed a committee of qualified persons experienced in manufacturing and commerce, to advise as to needed reforms in Spanish economic life. After various *consultas* and long deliberation, they adopted the scheme of erecting five companies, to carry on the trade of the levant, the north, Newfoundland, and the East and West Indies, endowing them with suitable powers and special privileges. This proposition was mentioned to the council of Castile as late as June 4, 1631, but broke down, according to a modern writer, "through attending to maxims of mercantile liberty which other nations did not scruple to trample under foot", and especially because of the agreement made with England, on signing the peace of 1630, to refrain from interference with the free buying and selling of goods at current prices.<sup>9</sup>

Once more, however, the proposal of a company for trade with the East Indies appeared, independently of the previous plans so far as the antecedents are revealed at all. By the

<sup>9</sup> M. Colmeiro, *Historia de la Economía Política en España* (2 vol., Madrid, 1863), II. 455; papers of Manuel García de Bustamante, dated August 15 and September 10, 1705, included in the *Cinco papeles . . . de Bustamante y uno de . . . Dubenton tocante a la Ydea de la Compañía Universal para Indias . . . 1705*. —Archivo General de Indias [hereafter referred to as A.I.], 148-6-18. Bustamante and Dubenton were advisers of the first Bourbon king in economic affairs, and the former, at least, would have had access to the official documents in virtue of his membership in the Council of the Indies.

chief record<sup>10</sup> of the proceedings, as a result of a representation on December 19, 1639, by a special junta concerning the stringencies of the affairs of India, and means of aid, the king resolved that in order to provide for the defense and preservation of the state, and lead his vassals both of Spain and of Italy and Flanders to enjoy the commerce and profits of India with which other nations enriched themselves, there be formed companies for that trade, admitting Portuguese and other subjects of the crown, on conditions to be drawn up by another junta, thus adopting the other nations' methods for their destruction. To carry this out, an enlarged junta was formed, which on the twenty-seventh of February, 1640, reported, and the king so decided, that it would be well to write to Miguel de Salamanca and Presidente Roos to see what disposition there might be among the Flemish to participate in a trade to India involving Lisbon as a mediary point. Similar enquiries were to be put in Castile, Genoa, Naples, Sicily, and Catalonia.

One resulting letter exists<sup>11</sup>—that of Salamanca. The writer tells us that on speaking to Presidente Roos on the matter, the latter told him that he had referred the matter to his brother, so Salamanca proceeded to Antwerp, where he consulted the most prominent merchants. These told him that many of those who traded to India did so already by means of Portuguese merchants at Lisbon, some even having gone to live at Lisbon with only that end, so that it would be difficult to augment the trade by the proposed means. They suggested that the desired effect could be attained if direct trade were permitted without a stop at Lisbon, which Sala-

<sup>10</sup> Copy of a report, without title, signed by Francisco Leiton at Madrid, August 23, 1640.—A.S., Est., 840 [antiguo 2055]. The junta at this time was composed of Sebastian Cambrana for Castile, Melcher Cisternes for Aragon, Antonio Buldel for Flanders, Francisco Pereira Pinto for Portugal, and Leiton as secretary. It is impossible to tell from the report when it was so constituted.

<sup>11</sup> *Copia de carta de D. Miguel de Salamanca, Bruselas*, May 20, 1640.—A.S., Est., 804 [antiguo 2055]. By its text, this replies to one from the crown dated April 9.



manca held to be too full of danger. He was therefore continuing his investigations, at Lille and other cities. According to the consulta of August 23, 1640, already cited, this was the only reply so far elicited.

As the junta pointed out, earnestly requesting diligences in gathering the needed information, including this time Portugal as well as the others, the success of the proposed venture was so dependent on the participation of traders from the different parts of the empire that it was useless to proceed with plans until the possible wishes of the said subjects were known. To this the king agreed,<sup>12</sup> and nothing further is heard of the project. Whether it still remained impossible because the only persons likely to be interested were already enjoying the trade profitably though illegally, or because of the beginnings of Portuguese revolt, is unknown. It is interesting to observe, however, that at least for a while the Spanish government had been willing to open the trade of one part of the empire to all its nationals, a fact with almost no parallels in earlier or later history.

For some years there is a gap, whether of projects or of information the present writer does not know. Then sometime after 1672 the idea was once more brought forward. In response to a report by the Marqués de Mancera, one of the best of the Mexican viceroys (1664-1673), apparently treating of the low state of the American trade, Charles II. ordered a junta composed of six ministers and the presidents of Castile and the Indies, to concert a remedy. After this junta had reported, the king decided to hear secretly the advice of Manuel de Lira, *secretario del despacho*. Lira, in a carefully detailed paper, proposed as the only panacea for the miserable state of the commerce, the establishment of a general company at Seville or Cadiz, open to all subjects of the empire, and to English, Germans, Dutch, or others of nations

<sup>12</sup> Crown to Andres de Rosas, Madrid, August 28, 1640.—A.S., Est., 804 [antiguo 2055].

friendly or allied to Spain, conceding to it great and permanent privileges. This, says our authority, himself an economic historian of importance,

was founded on grounds of no slight solidity, taking into account all the circumstances of the time, and the state of our commerce; but despite the fact that admitting foreigners to it was only doing by Spanish action in a public and legal manner what was already practised with secrecy and fraud, our government did not consent.<sup>13</sup>

The same late source that has served us before gives a brief mention of the fact that a company was also under consideration from 1678, but was still unperfected six years after that.<sup>14</sup> Three years later, in 1687, a writer on political economy once more advocated the idea,<sup>15</sup> suggesting that all the evils might readily be remedied by forming a company, all of Spaniards. This, he says, without giving offense to any nation, would benefit Spain a hundred per cent, the latter buying its textiles abroad until they could be manufactured at home. He gives no further details, promising them later.

<sup>13</sup> R. Antuñez y Acevedo, *Memorias Historicas sobre la Legislacion y Gobierno del Comercio de los Españoles con sus colonias* . . . (Madrid, 1797), p. 276. He is discussing the long followed policy of Spain in excluding foreigners from the Indies, using this as an illustration, so that the government may have had other motives for rejection than merely the proposed admission of foreigners.

<sup>14</sup> *Cinco Papeles etc.*, as cited in note 9. Perhaps this is the plan which Colmeiro tells us Charles II. ordered D. Luis Cerdeño y Monzón to formulate for a company to be organized in Castile for the exclusive commerce of the Americas.—Colmeiro, *op. cit.*, II. 455-456, citing the manuscript *Planta que de orden del rey ha formado D. Luis Cerdeño y Monzon para la institucion de una compañía en los Reinos de Castilla, por cuya direccion corra el comercio privativo de la America*. Note that all the information given by Colmeiro is in this title. He gives no location for the paper, and probably had not seen more than its title in some catalogue.

Anyone having access to Juan Cano's *Reformacion moral, politica y christiana del comercio en doze estatutos* . . . (Madrid, 1675) might find some suggestion of this project included. Cano had been some years in Peru and New Spain, and treats of American commerce in his work, but the book is apparently excessively rare, and I have been unable to obtain a copy for use.

<sup>15</sup> M. Álvarez Osorio y Redin, *Extension política y económica* [in volume one, *Apéndice a la Educacion Popular de Campomanes* (Madrid, 1775-1777)], pp. 139-140. Álvarez Osorio's work is signed at the end on October 11, 1686.



As this promise is unfortunately not fulfilled, it is impossible to be sure even how far this organization was aimed at overseas trade, and there is no surety whatever if there is more than a coincidence in the fact that a proposal was definitely made to the crown in that year.

At any rate, in 1687, a serious attempt was once more made to convince the government that its true interests lay in a company, with all vassals admitted, this time for the trade of Hispaniola and Porto Rico, and based in theory at least on grounds far wider than mere economic benefit. Sometime probably in June or July, 1687, various Flemish merchants headed by Manuel de Fonseca, presented a most intriguing petition<sup>16</sup> to Governor Gastanaga at Brussels. In this document, the petitioners point out the great recent growth of French marine power, the known French aims at colonial empire, France's already large possessions in the Antilles, the probability that it will bring the buccaneers of northern Hispaniola under its rule, its sugar trade, already so enormous as to be likely to exhaust the possibilities of its present possessions soon, and the "well known fact" that France had been conducting naval expeditions in the Caribbean to discover the weaknesses of the Spanish islands. Moreover, they go on, France was now at peace with England, and though assurances had been given that the treaty of 1686 contained no secret article, and that La Salle's attempt to colonize the bay of Sanctus Spiritus was unauthorized, such assurances meant nothing. But, they go on, if Spain had found it impossible to put down the pirates by force, how much less useful would it be to think of that against England and France.

The best remedy for this, they say, would be the peopling of Porto Rico and Hispaniola by opening them to the trade

<sup>16</sup> Paper without title, signature, or date.—A.I., 56-2-14. Reference to it in other documents conclusively proves its nature, though it is not certainly the original. It was forwarded to Spain on July 11, 1687, so was presumably written about then.

of all the king's vassals without exception, especially those of Flanders and Brabant. They realized that this was against all tradition, and that the admission of Flemings into the Indies could be dangerous, but conditions were far different now since Colbert's work began, from what they had been in the previous century.

This proposal was forwarded by the king on August 3 to the council of the Indies, which body decided a few days later that the opinions of the Sevillian traders should be sought. Such opinions were far from difficult to obtain, but were more notable for energy than enthusiasm. The consulado, for instance, proved voluminously that such a proposition was detrimental to the interests of the royal treasury, the American trade, the state, and everything Spanish, that the peopling of the islands would be easy by transporting colonists from the Canaries as had already been done at times, and that the Dutch were probably behind the whole scheme anyway.<sup>17</sup> Other papers show similar sentiments.

Meantime, Gastanaga had received a request for a clearer statement of the proposition, and on October 29 forwarded three new papers by Fonseca, noting as he did so that the latter was a capable and experienced trader, well acquainted with English, Dutch, and other conditions, of good repute among the Flemish, and zealous for the service of the king. In the papers themselves<sup>18</sup> we learn that he had served the crown for twenty-two years in England and the Low Countries, mostly in England as the consul and resident, learning there much about trade. Concerning the projected corporation, he desires the right to form, for such period as the king sees fit, a royal company in the Spanish Netherlands for trade with Santo Domingo and Porto Rico, open to all Spanish vassals including officials and nobles, with privileges like those of the English and Dutch companies. He offers an in-

<sup>17</sup> Consulado de Sevilla, October 18, 1687.—A.I., 56-2-14.

<sup>18</sup> *Representacion que hace Manuel de Fonseca*, etc.—A.I., 56-2-14.



teresting desideratum. It was well known, he says, that the troops in the Low Countries were very costly, since so many officers and men were married that three hundred soldiers required lodging for two thousand, with proportionate expenses when moving. If the company were established, it would agree to transport all the married soldiers to the islands at its cost, thus populating them and reducing the expenses of the Flanders troops. In a third paper he requests permission to form a company in the Low Countries for a term of thirty to forty years, for trade to such parts of the East Indies and the Guinea Coast as were not subject to England, Holland, France, or Denmark.

A third trial elicited a specific set of terms,<sup>19</sup> of which the more important clauses were as follows. The company was to be known as the *Compañía Real de los Payes Bajos tratante en la America*, to admit all vassals of the king without any derogation of nobility, to have shares at not less than one thousand reals each, and a life of thirty years with right to petition for renewal. The crown was to defend the company's ships and naval stores from requisition, and to trade with the islands (though this was not to bar the present right of the fleets to stop at Porto Rico), was to give complete freedom from duties to all goods for the company's ship building or repairing, promise absolute freedom for the company's trade against all competition, to grant it the sole right to guarantee any shares held by foreigners, whether gained by inheritance, marriage, sale, or any other method, against seizure even in case of war against the holder's country. Moreover, governors for the regions where the company traded were to be appointed by the king from three men nominated by the company, and to be paid by the company and subject to its will as to tenure. On the whole, in regard

<sup>19</sup> *Condiciones y Privilegios que se suplica a S.M. sea servido conzeder, para el establecimiento de una Compañía que se pretende establecer en el Pays Bajo para la Isla Española, vulgarmente llamada Santo Domingo, y para la Isla de Puerto Rico, January 30, 1688.—A.I., 56-2-14.*

to duties, adjudication of captured ships, and criminal jurisdiction, Fonseca asked only for the present status of private traders in similar circumstances, but the company was to have civil jurisdiction over all cases concerning that body, even though they also involved a private person outside it. In return for these, the crown was apparently to benefit only by the improved condition of the islands, except that the company was to transport there free of charge such married soldiers and their families as the king ordered sent from the Low Countries. This was later changed to include families from the Asturias, Galicia, Montañas de Burgos, and the Canaries, if desired.

Though in fact these were not unreasonable terms judged by those of similar companies, the Spanish monarchy must have been desperate indeed even to consider them, as it did to some extent for years. There was the same objection to the scheme at once. The president of the casa de contratación argued that the islands would become mere storehouses for goods used in New Spain and Peru, like Jamaica and Curaçao,<sup>20</sup> while the consulado, after pointing out that the Flemish always had been foreigners so far as concerned the Indies, and ought to remain so, said that the proposition

reduced itself to the ambitious pretension of Manuel de Fonseca desiring, by a fantastic company, to take from His Majesty the absolute empire of the Indies.

To say nothing, it went on, of the danger of letting in such Lutherans, Calvinists, and other heresiarchs as would compose the crews of the ships.<sup>21</sup>

Nevertheless, various notes show fairly constant consideration of the idea for more than a decade. A paper by the fiscal of the council of the Indies in 1699<sup>22</sup> sums these up. It

<sup>20</sup> Calzada to Ortiz, June 9, 1688.—A.I., 56-2-14.

<sup>21</sup> Consulado to Calzada, June 5, 1688.—A.I., 56-2-14.

<sup>22</sup> *Dictamen*, July 29, 1699.—A.I., 56-2-14. Most if not all the papers mentioned by it appear in the same legajo.



appears that the council was rather in favor of it, since it hesitated what to do about ending the matter despite constant representations against the plan by various individuals. Fonseca had repeated the proposition in 1695, this time joined with Juan Vandermeulen, *fiscal del Almirantazgo de la Marina de Flandes*, and drew an extremely unfavorable *informe* from the duke of Montalvo on September first of that year. Even in 1700 there is frequent mention of the project, mostly unfavorable, as though it was still under consideration by the council, but with little actual life. There appears to have been no final decision of the matter; a fact not strange in view of the events connected with the displacement at this time of the Hapsburgs by the Bourbons, with the attendant flood of new ideas to care for, and many new royal advisers.

Just how far this accession to the Spanish throne of the young Philip V., of only moderate ability but trained at the court of the greatest European nation of that day, and possessed of the usual Bourbon faculty of choosing good advisers, directly caused the numerous reforms in Spanish administrative and economic institutions that took place in the eighteenth century, can be known only after a detailed critical study of the period has been made, but it must have been of very great influence, to judge merely from the changes before his death in 1746. From the viewpoint of the general economic historian, for instance, these include the establishment of *intendentes* for Spain in 1718, transference of the casa de contratación to Cadiz in 1717, revision in customs duties and the fleet system by the *Proyecto* of 1720, suspension in 1735 of the galleons, made permanent five years later,<sup>23</sup> constant encouragement of industries in Spain, and

<sup>23</sup> This, like other mention of such matters as a background for the present study, is based largely upon voluminous notes gathered by the author from archival material for a forthcoming study of general Spanish American trade under the Bourbons. There is as yet nothing satisfactory in print. Some information, comprising little more than the dates above, appears in Antúñez y Acevedo, *op. cit.*, William Robertson, *History of America* (2 vol., London, 1777,

more especially the creation of three companies<sup>24</sup> directly in line with this present study, and consideration of others.

The earliest of these last was the project of 1705, curiously enough with Manuel García de Bustamante as its chief sponsor, though he had been opposed to Fonseca's proposal above as late as 1700.<sup>25</sup> Bustamante's first paper is missing. It appears from other references that some members, at least, of the "junta concerning the reëstablishment of commerce", a body created by Philip as soon as he felt stable enough on his throne to divert any attention from the primary problem of remaining there, had suggested that it would be well to allow freer trade to the Indies by means of single ships. To this Bustamante evidently objected. In his "second paper"<sup>26</sup> he draws from the Romans, the Popes, and Spanish history from the middle ages, to show that traders in all nations had always received special privileges; and mentioning specifically the English, French, and Dutch companies, as well as some of the previously suggested Spanish ones, says that the Indies trade is lost if Spain refuses to form a corporation now.

As contemplated by him, the company was to comprise Spaniards, whether or not traders, without any derogation of nobility, and Flemings and [Spanish] Italians were also admissible, though they might not navigate. All guilds or private makers of silks, wools, and other stuffs, in Spain, might also participate, and others could invest money in sums not less than one thousand pesos each. The company was to be organized in three parts, caring respectively for the galleons, the flota, and register ships for Buenos Aires, Honduras, Campeche, Venezuela, Tierra Firme, and the

and other editions), book VIII.; G. N. Desdevizes du Desert, *L'Espagne de l'ancien régime*, (3 vol., Paris, 1897-1904), especially III., chapter 3; and any of the general Spanish historians such as Lafuente or Altamira.

<sup>24</sup> E.g., the Honduras Company of 1714, and the Caracas and Havana companies.

<sup>25</sup> *Dictamen de D. Manuel García de Bustamante*, Sept. 24, 1700.—A.I., 56-2-14.

<sup>26</sup> *Papel Segundo en que se propone la forma . . .*, August 15, 1705; in the *Cinco Papeles* cited in note 9.



presidios of the Windward Islands.<sup>27</sup> These three parts in turn, operating on the joint-stock principle, were to be divided into ten shares distributed as follows:

Two were to be in money, necessary for operating expenses, and might be contributed by any one who wished, be he Spanish or foreign. Another must be in Spanish produce such as oil and wine, and three more, also to be furnished by Spaniards, were to be in clothes, tobaccos, cinnamon, spices, paper, etc. Two more shares were to be French and composed of any sort of commodities, and the remainder were for friendly foreigners, but to be used by French or Spaniards when war was on. All these goods were to be rated at fixed prices, and those not suitable for the trade could be barred.

To this and Bustamante's first paper Ambrosso Daubenton replied in great detail a month later,<sup>28</sup> saying that the convoy system had been unable to save ships from attack during the war, and had greatly harmed commerce by delays and other evils consequent upon its use. Peru, for instance, had had no ships from Spain for ten years, nor New Spain for six, forcing the inhabitants to illicit modes of supply. Thus, he tells us,

A modern author, among the best that have written on the commerce of Jamaica with the coasts of Porto Bello and Cartagena, assures us that taking one year with another, it has been computed that England derives six millions of pesos, half in gold and silver, and the other half in produce.

Single ships could sail without public knowledge and therefore more safely, and would go much more frequently, sell more cheaply due to rapid turnover, and adjust themselves

<sup>27</sup> Note this clear foreshadowing of later events, both as to formation of the great companies and the successive grants of freer trade, in the eighteenth century. These enumerated regions are the ones which suffered most under the existing fleet system, and therefore were the greatest haunts of the foreign contrabandist and the areas of earliest experiment by Spain.

<sup>28</sup> Paper without title, dated September 10, 1705, in the *Cinco Papeles* already cited.

better to the needs of the country. And there was no reason to suppose, he said, that the Peruvians would not buy from Spain were they able.

As for the suggestion of a company, in view of the long delays and failures involved in previous propositions of the kind, he thought it should be held even more difficult to form one that would succeed, on a basis like Bustamante's requiring twenty million pesos to begin with. Companies could flourish only in countries like England and Holland, where they could have absolute control of their own funds, operations and ships. Holland was a republic, he remarked, and England practically one, since the king could not settle important matters without consent of the two houses. The French companies had none of them prospered, because the crown could not give them the freedom of the other two.

Bustamante apparently found himself—as well he might—unable to controvert so clear an exposition of the defects in his scheme, and contented himself with stubbornly iterating his general statement that commerce could not be revived without a company, and that single ships would not serve because they would not in the first part of the sixteenth century. He added, chiefly, that it was better for a company to rely on the

most righteous heart of his majesty, his religion, his justice, his constancy, the obligation of his word, the decision of his councils, the aid of the duties which are being established, the consideration and reflection of their importance,

etc., than on a republic or a king bound down by a parliament. That this eulogium was part of the very sentence that admitted that the wise and gracious Spanish monarchs sometimes availed themselves of their subjects' treasure; that Daubenton had pointed out that the Dutch and English companies were successful partly because of immunity from such seizures even in grave emergency, seems to have lessened its

effectiveness but little, for on January 8, 1706, he was ordered to confer with a representative of the junta.<sup>29</sup>

A week later Bustamante reported to the junta that they had conferred as ordered, and were of the opinion that the king should be recommended to erect a company. The most important papers, including the consulta or official summary of the whole proceedings, is unfortunately missing. From documents available,<sup>30</sup> however, this decision was added to the consulta along with other individual papers. Among these is one<sup>31</sup> which indicates clearly that when the junta, on March 13, sent the record of proceedings to the council of the Indies for final decision, it recommended some kind of company for establishment. After long consideration the council decided<sup>32</sup> that each member should read all the papers and write an individual opinion on so important a matter, and therefore advised printing them. A marginal note, presumably by the king, says that printing would be too dangerous, lest the public learn of the project, and with that the company fades from the present writer's knowledge. Whether because of inherent difficulties in the scheme, or internal troubles in Spain, probably little more was done.

Finally, however, we come to a project that was actually consented to by the crown, and put into execution, though it hardly ranks as one of the great chartered companies founded in Spain. That is the species of company set up in 1714 for trade with Honduras and Caracas, under Diego de Murga, Marqués de Monte Sacro, who described himself as cavalier of the order of Santiago, gentleman of the royal bedchamber, and member of the consejo de hacienda and of the junta de

<sup>29</sup> Junta de Establecimiento to Bustamante, January 8, 1706; in the *Cinco Papeles*.

<sup>30</sup> A.I., 148-6-18.

<sup>31</sup> *Presupuestos para la execucion de lo discurrido, y propuesto en la Consulta de la Junta de Comercio, segun el dictamen del Señor Nicolas Mensuager, cerca de la navegacion, y nueva forma de Comercio de Indias, en el interin hasta que se puede formar la Compañía que la misma Junta propone.*—A.I., 148-6-18.

<sup>32</sup> Council of the Indies to the Crown, May 20, 1706.—A.I., 148-6-18.



comercio, size y millones of the city and province of Madrid. He was evidently a prominent figure in trading matters of the day, as seven years earlier he had successfully obtained a contract<sup>33</sup> for despatching six frigates per year to the Indies as postal ships, doing so amid the loud wails of the consulado and even despite the council of the Indies sending its fiscal to present their objections personally to the king. He gave this up of his own accord after sending the first two ships, finding that it would meet with opposition at every step.<sup>34</sup> Now once more he appears with a plan, this time for a joint-stock company.

By this proposal<sup>35</sup> he offered to charge himself with the despatch of two ships and a tender (*patache*) to Honduras, and one ship to Caracas, the four totalling one thousand tons, and to lie at Cadiz taking cargo from all persons till February 20, after which he might himself use any remaining space. For this purpose, a capital of four hundred thousand silver pesos was to be formed, divided into one hundred shares.<sup>33</sup> The crown would take twenty-five of these, furnishing the ships at a fair valuation in part payment, and the rest would be offered in lots even as small as an eighth share, in exchange for cash or goods having sure sale in the Indies. Profits, or losses "if there be any, the which may God forbid", would be divided pro rata, after public auction of the goods brought back in return. In addition, those who did not wish so to invest might ship goods as freight, assigning an agent to carry on negotiations for them, but of course having no part in the company's profits. That is, this was still the early type of mercantile association; a joint-stock company, not a corporation.

<sup>33</sup> Real Cedula, July 23 and October 26, 1707.—A.I., 146-5-4.

<sup>34</sup> Undated paper by Monte Sacro, ratified by the crown on January 2, 1708.—A.I., 146-5-4.

<sup>35</sup> Paper without title, signed by Monte Sacro at Madrid, January 27, 1714.—A.I., 41-6-62/5. Printed copy of the same—A.I., 57-5-15.

<sup>36</sup> One hundred twenty-two shares were actually sold, the king holding thirty and one-half.

Any commodities desired might be brought back from the Indies. On both the outward and the homeward voyages, all goods, whether belonging to the association or carried as freight, were to pay only the usual sales tax, an export customs of five per cent and an import of two and a half, upon the value at the time of embarkation, and no others whatever, whether claimed for foreign ships, port officials, or on any other pretext. The ships were to need no inspection for artillery, munitions, and other such details. Foreigners could buy shares freely, which were exempt from seizure even in time of war, and though they could not go to the Indies as commercial agent for themselves or others, even though trading in Spanish goods, they might do so as a member or officer of the crew if Spaniards were unavailable, so long as they refrained from trading while there. The king approved this February 1, 1714.<sup>37</sup>

There are no less than four large bundles of documents concerned with this venture,<sup>38</sup> so that it might be supposed that its exact outcome would be easy to determine. As a matter of fact, it was Monte Sacro's ill fortune to become involved in a jurisdictional quarrel only slightly related to him or his trade, and it is to that, rather than the economic aspects of the voyages, that the records are devoted.

Perhaps as part of the price offered to gain the concession, perhaps as an afterthought, Monte Sacro had agreed to carry out in each ship an *oidor*, an *alcalde*, a scribe, and their servant, the first two to be treated and fed as passengers eating at first table with the captain, and the scribe and servant like passengers who ate at second table, all without cost to the crown. These officials were to watch over the loading and unloading of the ships, but primarily they went out charged

<sup>37</sup> According to a note by Grimaldo on the project itself. The formal *cedula* seems to have been delayed till February 27.—A.I., 41-6-62/5; 57-5-15.

<sup>38</sup> A.I., 57-5-15, 57-5-16, 57-5-17, and 153-3-41.

by secret instructions<sup>39</sup> with the general duty of reëstablishing legitimate trade and stamping out the omnipresent contraband, by seizing and condemning all contraband goods and ships, and severely punishing culprits whoever they might be. In addition, they were to investigate and minutely report on all officials necessary from *tenientes* to viceroys, as to which ones connived at the trade, how they lived, their conduct in office and other particulars. It can readily be supposed that such a task would hardly make them popular in America.

Under such circumstances, one ship and the patache sailed for Honduras, and a second for Caracas, on December 1, 1714. Their subsequent history emerges only with difficulty and vagueness from a tangled mass of legal verbiage caused by the mission of their passengers, but greatly affecting the commercial enterprise. So far as can be made out,<sup>40</sup> the ship for Honduras arrived at Puerto de San Tomás early in February, 1715, and trouble at once began. The quarrels of the oidor and alcalde with the audiencia and governor are of little importance as such, but it may be well to note that the audiencia refused to acknowledge their powers on the grounds that the council of the Indies had not passed on them. The council later agreed that this was good law, but the suspicion was freely expressed on the other side that any pretext was only too welcome in order to bar the exercise of powers that would seriously have interfered with the officials' own illicit trade. Meantime, according to the company's factor, commercial aspects of the voyage suffered. The royal officials and the audiencia certainly did strenuously protest the terms of the contract as to taxes, and the oidor did insist, under what he

<sup>39</sup> *El Rey, Madrid, 9 de Noviembre 1714. Instruccion reservada que debeas observarvos.* . . .—Archivo Histórico Nacional, Estadó. 2889.

<sup>40</sup> Papers notably in A.I., 57-5-15, especially an *Apuntamiento de todas las Cartas* . . . recibido en 23 de Junio . . . 1716. Most of the original letters summarized by the *Apuntamiento* are in A.I., 153-3-41. Documents good for the company's side of the difficulties are Simon de Larrazabal to the council, Guatemala, September 10, 1715, and various representations by Monte Sacro.



claimed to be his orders, on opening every bundle of goods instead of merely samples. Whether there was, however, any actual interference with the trade, or departure from the terms of the contract, except what may have been incidental to the general confusion, is doubtful. At any rate, the fiscal of the council later decided that there had not been, after careful examination of the evidence.<sup>41</sup>

Much the same thing happened at Caracas. There, on the arrival of the ship, the governor and royal officials denied the powers of the *oidor*, and refused to agree to the terms of the contract, sequestrating the goods, on the grounds partly that the council of the Indies had not passed on the papers, and partly that much cargo was outside the register. According to a representation by Monte Sacro, however, their real reason was a desire to perpetuate foreign trade, and to allow the inhabitants to continue their production of great quantities of *aguardiente* from sugar cane. The *oidor* in this case happening to be the later well known lawyer and writer Antonio Alvarez de Abreu, immediately started legal measures, which finally resulted in releasing all the cargo and performance of the commercial agreement.

Whatever the actual truth between the conflicting stories may be, it is quite certain that the trading venture was a complete failure. There was little market in either Central America or Caracas, undoubtedly due to foreign trade. Factor Larrazabal reports in regard to Honduras, that there was no gold or silver in the province because the ordinary supply from Peru was lacking. Two ships in the Peruvian trade had arrived at Sonsonate late in 1714, it is true, with oil, *aguardiente*, and wine, and a later one brought another sixteen hundred bottles of the last commodity, but neither carried much gold or silver, because of the trade of the French ships in Peru which sold at prices equal to those in Spain itself.

<sup>41</sup> Opinion of the fiscal, August 14, 1716, appended to Larrazabal's letter of September 10, 1715.—A.I., 57-5-15.

Transference of the goods to Guatemala City seems to have aided little. Similarly in Caracas even after the freedom from legal embarrassments, on December 20, 1715, the ship's cargo was

in the same state as at the beginning, on account of continued manufacture of rum (*aguardiente de caña*) and the importations and commerce of foreigners, who remain with twenty-nine ships in this province, selling and profiting on all sorts of produce and fabrics, with freedom to buy and carry on board all the cocoa that they desire in preference over this [company's] ship.

The governor and royal officials, the factor charged, refused to aid the company's ship to get a cargo before them, or to allow it to carry a load to Vera Cruz, though the factor pointed out that the king had a quarter share. As a result, he was selling barely enough goods to maintain the ship's crew.

In August, 1716, goods worth sixty-six thousand pesos remained from the cargo sent to Caracas, and it was estimated that thirty months would be required to complete the sale. Two years later there was still unsold twelve thousand four hundred and sixty-two pesos' worth, but as sales had been made on credit against crops, there were no less than one hundred and eleven thousand pesos owed the company.<sup>42</sup> Meantime, in an effort to offset the tremendous losses faced by the stockholders, including of course the royal treasury, a special grant<sup>43</sup> permitted the company to use its ships to carry cocoa to Vera Cruz—commonly a profitable trade—and at least two such trips were made, the second transporting seven thousand seven hundred and eighty-six *fanegas*. This ship appears finally to have been allowed to return to Spain direct from Vera Cruz.<sup>44</sup> This would also generally be decidedly profitable, as there was no flota that year to compete

<sup>42</sup> Álvarez y Abreu to the crown; Caracas, August 21, 1718.—A.I., 57-5-15.

<sup>43</sup> Real Cedula, November 13, 1717.—A.I., 57-5-15.

<sup>44</sup> Real Cedula, March 22, 1719, according to a note.—A.I., 57-5-15.

with, but it is very improbable that it made up for the other misfortunes of the company.

At any rate, a few years later a writer on economics quotes it as a disappointing experiment<sup>45</sup> along with another contract that had not yet been settled. This man, a theorist of considerable brilliance, was opposed to the whole proposition of trading companies, basing his objections on a decidedly clear understanding of the difficulties. According to him<sup>46</sup> companies could not succeed: first, because Spain could not grant them the semi-sovereign status of others like the Dutch East India Company; second, the Spanish temperament was not adapted to a venture in which losses were certain for some years; third, they would not provide speedy enough relief for Spanish needs; and fourth, they would not benefit Spain, since foreign goods would still be necessary in view of the lack of Spanish manufactures.

No doubt some such argument as this accounts for the fate of a general company proposed by a Frenchman in 1723, not only for the trade with America, but for the complete economic rehabilitation of Spain, and rejected as too audacious and impractical by the council.<sup>47</sup>

It was at any rate sound reasoning and brilliant analysis, though the Caracas Company was to prove it wrong within a few years as to a corporation with a properly limited scope operating in a favorable environment. As that organization, created in 1728, naturally had a great influence on the history of the movement, it will be well to reserve several subsequent unsuccessful schemes for consideration after the Caracas Company has been discussed.

The facts gathered together in this present paper, despite their occasional volume, are too fragmentary and discon-

<sup>45</sup> G. de Uztariz, *Theory and Practise of Commerce and Maritime Affairs*, (Translated by John Kippax, London, 1751), I. 181.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, I. 180 ff.

<sup>47</sup> A. Mounier, *Les Faits et la Doctrine économique en Espagne sous Philip V.: Geronimo de Uztariz (1670-1732)* (Bordeaux, 1919), p. 173.



nected to justify much generalization. It should, however, be clearly apparent that the projects included both joint-stock and corporative bodies, that the government several times showed a strong tendency to favor some such plan, and that what definite opposition we know about came largely from those already engaged in the trade under the old system, and for personal reasons desirous of no change. There was then a fair background laid for the eventual trial of one of these corporations when the situation somewhere should finally become so desperate that almost nothing could make it worse. Such a situation we find in Venezuela, and the Caracas Company resulted, ending at last the period of theory, and supplanting it with a half century of experiment and fair accomplishment.

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## THE SOUTH AMERICAN COMMISSION, 1817-1818

By the early months of 1817 the revolution of the Spanish-American colonists against the mother country had been in progress seven years. Starting as an indirect consequence of the invasion of Spain by Napoleon in 1808, the movement had assumed in its early stage the guise of an attempt at temporary self-rule in the interest of Ferdinand VII., the legitimate ruler of Spain, prevented by the French emperor from occupying his throne. The colonial policy of the patriot junta in Spain and the activities of the royalist troops in America, joined to other influences, led to the gradual development among large numbers of the Spanish-American people of a desire for complete independence. Accordingly, here and there at various times were issued declarations of independence. Subsequently the movement became an open struggle on that basis.

By 1816, the revolutionists everywhere, except in the region of the Rio de la Plata, had been defeated and their armies dispersed, and the revolution bade fair to end in failure almost, if not entirely, complete. However, early in the following year the Buenos Aires patriot, José de San Martín, successfully executed his slowly matured plan for the invasion of Chile, winning over the royalist troops February 12, 1817, the important battle of Chacabuco. With this victory the revolution in South America assumed a new aspect and friends of the revolutionists conceived a new hope that they might eventually achieve success.

It was at this stage in the revolution that President Monroe determined a commission should be sent to visit various regions of the Atlantic coast south of the United States. The original intention of the administration, inferred from a letter of the president to Joel R. Poinsett under date of April 25,

1817,<sup>1</sup> was to send a single individual on mission, but in May it was determined a plural commission should be sent.<sup>2</sup> The motives for the decision at this time were probably the new turn of affairs in Chile, the demand of a certain group of opponents of the American administration that some action be taken regarding the revolutionists more favorable to their cause, the necessity of having more reliable information before taking any definite step, and the wish to keep in the good graces of the new governments to the south. Though the membership of the commission was partially provided for and instructions drawn up in July,<sup>3</sup> the execution of the plan was delayed. The factors contributing to the delay were the "swing around the circle" which the president took in the spring and summer during which communications between him and the department of state were slow and imperfect, the difficulty in securing the desired number of properly qualified commissioners, and illness and other circumstances delaying some of them after they had consented to serve.

The project seems actually for a time to have fallen into abeyance in the mind of the president, or its wisdom to have been questioned, for he is found issuing to his cabinet in late October a series of questions for discussion, among which appears this one:

Is it expedient to pursue the measure which was decided in May last, but suspended by circumstances, of sending a public ship along the Southern coast, particularly that of the Spanish Colonies, with three citizens of distinguished abilities and high character, to examine the state of those colonies, the progress of the revolution, & the probability of its success, and to make a report accordingly?<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> William R. Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations* (New York, 1925), I. 39, 40.

<sup>2</sup> James Monroe, *Writings*, Hamilton's edition (New York, 1901), VI. 31, 32.

<sup>3</sup> Manning, *op. cit.*, I. 42-45.

<sup>4</sup> Monroe, *Writings*, VI. 31, 32.



The question was decided in the affirmative and soon thereafter additional instructions were issued and definite steps taken looking to the early departure of the commission.<sup>5</sup>

What reasons can be advanced for the sending of this commission? It is possible to suggest several.

One was the pressure of public opinion. From the beginning the generality of the people of the United States regarded with sympathy the efforts of their Spanish-American brethren to gain their political independence. This was true of both people and government.<sup>6</sup> Aside from the vague feeling of kinship due to geographical contiguity they saw in the Spanish-American revolution a repetition of their own struggle for independence. This could not fail to challenge their lively sympathy. The course of events in the United States—chiefly the War of 1812 and its aftermath—prevented for some years the development of a united or strongly expressed body of sentiment which looked toward active assistance for the Spanish Americans or recognition of their new governments. But, beginning early in 1817, there developed on the part of the North Americans a great accession of interest in Spanish American affairs.<sup>7</sup> Several factors operated to produce this result. Patriot victories in Chile have already been mentioned. Henry Clay came forward definitely as champion of the revolutionists in his attack on the neutrality law of March 3, 1817, and gave his great oratorical powers to assailing the administration's South American policy and rallying sentiment in congress and in the nation to the support of

<sup>5</sup> At this same cabinet meeting of October 30 were discussed a number of questions relating to the power of the executive to recognize a new government, the sending and reception of ministers, etc.

<sup>6</sup> See Madison's instructions to Joel R. Poinsett in Manning, *op. cit.*, I. 6, 7, on the occasion of his appointment as special agent to South America, June 28, 1810.

<sup>7</sup> This statement may be substantiated by an examination of the files of such leading newspapers as the *National Intelligencer*, Washington, *Niles' Register*, Philadelphia, and the *Richmond Enquirer*; by reading the debates of the period in the *Annals of Congress*, and the diplomatic correspondence of the Department of State.

Spanish American independence.<sup>8</sup> Early in 1817 Don Manuel Hermenegildo de Aguirre was commissioned by the governments of the United Provinces<sup>9</sup> and Chile<sup>10</sup> as agent to the United States. On arriving at his post in July of that year<sup>11</sup> he began persistently to argue with the secretary of state for recognition of the United Provinces and to agitate that question in the press. The body of public sentiment thus aroused began to exert upon the executive some pressure for action. The need of seeming to satisfy this clamor and still the opposition in congress may be said to have been one reason for despatching the commission.

Another reason, as the instructions to the commissioners indicate, was the wish of the executive to gain explicit and correct information regarding conditions among the revolutionists. Though the United States had had agents at various places in Spanish America since 1810 there were few among them who were able to interpret correctly the course of revolutionary affairs and keep the administration at Washington informed with respect to them. Other conditions contributing to exaggerate this situation were the slowness and uncertainty of communication and the exceedingly limited number of periodicals published in the Spanish American centers of population. A group of capable commissioners would be able to furnish President Monroe and his advisers

<sup>8</sup> On Clay and the South Americans see Halford L. Hoskins, "The Hispanic American Policy of Henry Clay," *THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW*, VII. (November, 1927), 460-478.

<sup>9</sup> The provisional government of the revolutionists in the old viceroyalty of Buenos Aires from 1810 to the declaration of independence in 1816 styled itself the government of the "United Provinces of Rio de la Plata"; after the declaration of independence the style was altered to the "United Provinces of South America"; on the adoption of a constitution in 1826 it became officially the "Argentine Confederation".

<sup>10</sup> Norberto Piñero, *La política internacional argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1924), pp. 49, 50.

<sup>11</sup> Alberto Palomeque, *Orígenes de la Diplomacia Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1905), I. 39.

with first-hand information, comparatively recent and as accurate as local conditions would admit of its being.

The desire to retain the good will of the Spanish Americans no doubt was influential with the administration. Clay asserted that the neutrality laws discriminated against the patriots and if he believed so it was not unnatural that the patriots likewise should think so. In his correspondence with Secretary Adams, Aguirre accused the United States government of being "indifferent"<sup>12</sup> to the cause of the patriots. Feeling thus he doubtless reported to his government that such was the case. Another matter that perhaps was misunderstood and undoubtedly caused disappointment to the Buenos Aireans was the action of the United States in the matter of the Devereux loan treaty. One Col. Joseph Devereux, a citizen of the United States, going to Buenos Aires on personal business, had been commissioned commercial agent by his government—for his protection, as a letter issuing from the department of state declares.<sup>13</sup> Supported by Thomas L. Halsey, United States agent for seamen and commerce at Buenos Aires, this individual, in January, 1817, made an agreement with the revolutionary government for furnishing it the sum of \$2,000,000, the loan to be guaranteed by the government of the United States. A treaty to this effect was signed by Halsey on the part of the United States and by Supreme Director Pueyrredón for the United Provinces.<sup>14</sup> Since Devereux and Halsey were not authorized to take such

<sup>12</sup> Palomeque, *op. cit.*, I. 82. This writer believes that a strong reason for sending the commission was that it might clear the government of this imputation of indifference: "Ante la actitud circumspecta y enérgica de Aguirre, que nada dejaba que decir al señor Monroe ni á su secretario de estado, el señor Adams, cuyos argumentos habían sido analizados y destruidos, como se ha visto, un pensamiento se les ocurrió á lestos, como medio de demostrar que no eran *indiferentes* ante la sangre que derramaban sus *hermanos*, como decía de Aguirre, ó sus *amigos*, como decía Monroe. Ese pensamiento consistió en el envío, en 1818, de una misión".

<sup>13</sup> Monroe to Devereux, Washington, January 12, 1816. MSS. Department of State, Despatches to Consuls, I. 370, 371.

<sup>14</sup> Pueyrredón to Madison, Buenos Aires, January 31, 1817. Manning, *op. cit.*, I. 349.



a step and since to accept it would have been contrary to its policy of neutrality, their government repudiated the act and directed that explanations be made.<sup>15</sup> Misunderstandings due to these causes might be cleared up by full explanations such as a commission could make.

Another motive for sending the commission—perhaps the strongest one—was the desire to gain an excuse for further delay in making a change in the government's policy toward the Spanish American embroglio.<sup>16</sup> Neither President Monroe nor Secretary of State Adams, who between them determined the foreign policy of their government, believed it advisable in 1817 to depart from the existing policy of strict neutrality in the war between Spain and its colonies, though neither was then, or at any time, opposed to the cause of the latter. Recognition was not considered expedient at the time. Monroe believed the cause of the patriots would be best served by continuing neutrality and promoting a like policy on the part of other powers. He feared that by granting recognition the United States might give offense to certain of the European powers and cause them to join Spain against the American revolutionists.<sup>17</sup> As to Adams, he had returned to America from Europe in the summer of 1817 firmly convinced that the nations of Europe were moved by a strong feeling of hostility toward the United States and he had noticed that they showed a tendency to interfere against the American insurgents. He thought it would not be difficult to precipitate a general conflict with monarchist Europe arrayed against republican America. Such a conflict he desired by all means to avoid, hence he felt it necessary to exercise great caution

<sup>15</sup> Rush to Worthington, Washington, April 21, 1817. MSS. Department of State, Despatches to Consuls, II. 25.

<sup>16</sup> "These commissions, as a rule, were usually used as a device to postpone as long as possible a recognition which the political situation rendered for the moment inadvisable. This was certainly the case with the commission which was despatched to South America"—Julius L. Goebel, Jr., *The Recognition Policy of the United States* (New York, 1915), pp. 119, 120.

<sup>17</sup> Monroe, *Writings*, VI. 176.

in dealing with the Spanish American situation.<sup>18</sup> Sending a commission, one of whose tasks it was understood would be to secure information that would form a basis for deciding whether or not recognition was advisable, would delay a decision and enable the administration to continue its policy of "watchful waiting" with a minimum of criticism from the friends of the Spanish Americans.

Summarily stated, it may be said that the motives of the government in despatching the commission were: the desire to keep abreast of rapidly developing public interest in the course of the revolution; the need of correct information regarding its course and conditions; the wish to retain the good will of the new governments; and, finally, the need of an excuse for delay in adopting a new policy with respect to the lengthening struggle.

The decision to send the commission may be regarded as indicating the probability of a more active policy toward the South Americans and that external pressure on the administration was making itself felt.

It has been stated that the commission was decided upon in May. A letter found in the Monroe Papers indicates that originally the intention of the administration had been to send a single commissioner, Joel R. Poinsett, of Charleston, S. C., being invited to serve in that capacity.<sup>19</sup> Poinsett had traveled widely in Europe<sup>20</sup> and had been the first of a series of agents appointed to various places in South America on the outbreak of the revolution.<sup>21</sup> He had spent several years

<sup>18</sup> J. B. Lockey, *Pan-Americanism: Its Beginnings* (New York, 1920), p. 167.

<sup>19</sup> Poinsett to Monroe, Charleston, May 7, 1817. MSS. Library of Congress, Monroe Papers, Writings to, XVI. 2017.

<sup>20</sup> "Hombre de fortuna que había viajado á través de toda Europa, y otras partes del mundo y que había tomado parte en la emancipación de Grecia".—Martín García Merou, *Historia de la Diplomacia Americana; Política internacional de los Estados Unidos* (Buenos Aires, 1904), I. 260. Further personal details concerning Poinsett may be found in Charles Janeway Stillé, *The Life and Services of Joel R. Poinsett* (Philadelphia, 1888).

<sup>21</sup> Smith to Poinsett, Washington, August 27, 1810. MSS. Department of State, Despatches to Consuls, I. 399, 400.

at Buenos Aires and with the revolutionists on the Pacific coast. Because of his abilities, and because of his experiences with the South Americans and his knowledge of them Poinsett was ideally fitted for the mission. However, he declined it on the plea of having been elected to the legislature of South Carolina in which body he wished to advance certain works of public utility.<sup>22</sup> He did, however, later consent on the request of the president<sup>23</sup> to make a report on South American affairs from the knowledge he possessed. Poinsett declining, the administration turned to the idea of a plural commission. In this connection was considered John B. Prevost.<sup>24</sup> He was not, however, asked to serve, as the administration found it had need of his services just then for another purpose.<sup>25</sup> An invitation was extended to a Mr. Jones, who, after some hesitation declined on the plea of pressure of private affairs.<sup>26</sup> By mid-summer two of the commissioners, Caesar Augustus Rodney and John Graham, and the secretary of the commission, Henry M. Brackenridge, had been definitely placed on the commission. The third commissioner, Theodorick Bland, was not added until shortly before the sailing of the group some months later.

Of these men the most prominent was Mr. Rodney, of Delaware. He had been in congress during the latter half of Jefferson's first administration and was attorney general of

<sup>22</sup> Poinsett to Monroe, Charleston, May 7, 1817. MSS. Library of Congress, Monroe Papers, Writings to, XVI. 2017.

<sup>23</sup> Adams to Poinsett, Washington, October 23, 1818. Manning, *op. cit.*, I. 79.

<sup>24</sup> Rush to Monroe, Washington, June 26, 1817. MSS. Library of Congress, Monroe Papers, Writings to, XVI. 2039.

<sup>25</sup> Prevost left in the early fall in the ship *Ontario* to voyage to Astoria at the mouth of the Columbia River to receive at the hands of the British authorities the restoration of the fort at that place occupied by them during the War of 1812, and to be restored according to the terms of the Treaty of Ghent. He was then to return to a station in South America. See Manuscript Letters of J. B. Prevost, 1817-1825, department of state, for papers relating to this incident.

<sup>26</sup> Rush to Monroe, Washington, July 20, 1817. MSS. Library of Congress, Monroe Papers, Writings to, XVI. 2051.



the United States from 1807 to 1811.<sup>27</sup> A man of solid attainments and pleasing personality, he seems to have been somewhat deferred to by the other members of the commission.<sup>28</sup>

Graham, of Virginia, had had an extended period of service with the department of state. He had served with credit as secretary of legation and then as chargé at Madrid from 1801 to 1804,<sup>29</sup> and, under Secretaries of State Madison and Monroe he had served until 1817 as chief clerk of the department of state. He had been then for a few months acting secretary of war.<sup>30</sup> Madison, writing to Monroe, says of his "purity of character", "delicacy of sentiment", and "amenity of temper and manner" that they were exceeded in no instance to which he could refer.<sup>31</sup> Adams, in his *Memoirs*, says of him, however, that he appeared "to have formed an idea of responsibility somewhat timid".<sup>32</sup>

Bland was a Baltimore man. There he had served as judge of the county court. Brackenridge described him as "a man of plain unaffected yet agreeable manners, of a sound judgment and excellent discrimination", possessing "the very cast of mind" adapted to the work of the commission. He asserted that Bland had besides "turned his attention to the subject for several years past in a very particular manner".<sup>33</sup>

Brackenridge, the secretary of the commission, was likewise a Baltimorean. Graham had been anxious for the appointment of Brackenridge because he had a good knowledge of Spanish, an important qualification, since of the commis-

<sup>27</sup> Francis Drake, *Dictionary of American Biography* (Boston, 1874), p. 778.

<sup>28</sup> Mr. Rodney was later appointed the first minister of the United States to the United Provinces of South America where he died June 10, 1824, a few months after his arrival at Buenos Aires (Forbes to Adams, Buenos Aires, June 14, 1824. MSS. Department of State, Despatches from Argentina, II.).

<sup>29</sup> Monroe, *Writings*, VI. 17, 18.

<sup>30</sup> John Quincy Adams, *Memoirs* (Philadelphia, 1875), IV. 15.

<sup>31</sup> March, 1817. Published in the *National Intelligencer* of August 29, 1820.

<sup>32</sup> IV. 341.

<sup>33</sup> Brackenridge to Rush, Baltimore, July 28, 1817. MSS. Department of State, The South American Mission. This was written before the commission departed.

sioners themselves only Graham understood that language, and he—by his own statement—imperfectly.<sup>34</sup> Brackenridge had spent some years in Louisiana as deputy attorney and state judge.<sup>35</sup> That fact partially explains, as he himself stated,<sup>36</sup> his great interest in the cause of the South Americans and his strong sympathy for them. Richard Rush, acting secretary of state, recommended him to Rodney as

a gentleman of great merit . . . who to other accomplishments adds that of being a master of the Spanish language.<sup>37</sup>

The instructions drawn by Rush and Adams for the guidance of these gentlemen state clearly the policy of the government toward the Spanish American revolutionists as well as the matters with which the commissioners were to concern themselves. They began by declaring that

as inhabitants of the same hemisphere, it was natural that we should feel a solicitude for the welfare of the colonists.

The duty of the United States to maintain a neutral attitude was asserted. The instructions continued:

In other respects we have been made to feel sensibly the progress of this contest. Our vessels have been seized and condemned, our citizens made captives and our lawful commerce, even at a distance from the theatre of war, been interrupted. Acting with impartiality towards the parties, we have endeavored to secure from each a just return. In whatever quarter the authority of Spain was abrogated and an independent government erected, it was essential to the security of our rights that we should enjoy its friendship. Spain could not impose conditions on other powers incident to complete sovereignty in places where she did not maintain it. On this principle the

<sup>34</sup> Rush to Monroe, Washington, June 28, 1817. MSS. Library of Congress, Monroe Papers, Writings to, XVI. 2042.

<sup>35</sup> Brackenridge to Adams, Baltimore, August 11, 1819. MSS. Department of State, Miscellaneous Letters, LXX.

<sup>36</sup> See introduction to his work, *Voyage to South America Performed by Order of the American Government in the Years 1817 and 1818, in the Frigate "Congress"* (London, 1820).

<sup>37</sup> July 29, 1817. MSS. Department of State, Despatches to Consuls, II. 49.

United States have sent agents into the Spanish colonies, addressed to the existing authority, whether of Spain or of the colony, with instructions to cultivate its friendship and secure as far as practicable the faithful observance of our rights.

The contest, by the extension of the revolutionary movement and the greater stability which it appears to have acquired, becomes daily of more importance to the United States. It is by success that the colonists acquire new claims on other powers, which it may comport neither with their interest nor duty to disregard. Several of the colonies having declared their independence and enjoyed it some years, and the authority of Spain being shaken in others, it seems probable that, if the parties be left to themselves, the most permanent political changes will be effected. It therefore seems incumbent on the United States to watch the movement in its subsequent steps with particular attention, with a view to pursue such course as a just regard for all those considerations which they are bound to respect may dictate.

Under these impressions, the President deems it a duty to obtain, in a manner more comprehensive than has heretofore been done, correct information of the actual state of affairs in those colonies. For this purpose he has appointed you commissioners, with authority to proceed, in a public ship, along the coast of South America, touching at the points where it is probable that the most precise and ample knowledge may be gained. The Ontario,<sup>38</sup> Captain Biddle, is prepared to receive you on board at New York, and will have orders to sail as soon as you are ready to embark.

It is the President's desire that you go first to the River la Plate, visiting Buenos Ayres and Monte Video. On your way thither, you will call at Rio Janeiro delivering to our minister at that court the despatches which will be committed to your hands. . . .

In the different provinces or towns which you visit, your attention will be usefully, if not primarily, drawn to the following objects.

1. The form of government established, with the amount of population and pecuniary resources and the state and proportion as to numbers intelligence and wealth of the contending parties, wherever a contest exists.

2. The extent and organization of the military force on each side, with the means open to each of keeping it up.

<sup>38</sup> This ship was replaced by the *Congress*.



3. The names and characters of leading men, whether in civil life or as military chiefs, whose conduct and opinions shed an influence upon events.

4. The dispositions that prevail among the public authorities and people towards the United States and towards the great nations of Europe, with the probability of commercial or other connections being on foot, or desired, with either.

5. The principal articles of commerce, regarding the export and import trade. What articles from the United States find the best market? What prices do their productions, most useful in the United States, usually bear? The duties on exports and imports; are all nations charged the same?

6. The principal ports and harbors, with the works of defence.

7. The real prospect, so far as seems justly inferrable from existing events and the operation of causes as well moral as physical in all the provinces where a struggle is going on, of the final and permanent issue.

8. The probable durability of the governments that have already been established with their credit, and the extent of their authority, in relation to adjoining provinces. This remark will be especially applicable to Buenos Ayres. If there be any reason to think, that the government established there is not likely to be permanent, as to which no opinion is here expressed, it will become desirable to ascertain the probable character and policy of that which is expected to succeed it. . . .

Your stay at each place will not be longer than is necessary to a fair accomplishment of the objects held up. You will see the propriety, in all instances, of showing respect to the existing authority or government of whatever kind it may be, and of mingling a conciliatory demeanor with a strict observance of all established usages. . . .

You will . . . not go further south than Buenos Ayres. At this point it is hoped that you may be able to obtain the means of obtaining useful information as respects Chili and Peru. . . . Your observation and enquiries will not be exclusively confined to the heads indicated, but take other scope, keeping to the spirit of these instructions, as your own view of things upon the spot may suggest.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Richard Rush, secretary of state ad interim, to Caesar A. Rodney and John Graham, Washington, July 18, 1817. Manning, *op. cit.*, I. 42-45.

After the appointment of Bland and shortly before the commission sailed (Secretary Adams had previously assumed his duties) brief supplementary instructions were issued:

Since the circumstances occurred, which prevented the departure of Messrs. Rodney, and Graham, at the time first contemplated, another destination has been given to the Corvette Ontario, and you are now to embark in the Frigate Congress Captain Sinclair, which has been ordered to Annapolis to receive you. . . .

Among the objects, to which it is desired that you will call the attention of the existing revolutionary authorities, with whom you may have occasion to enter into communication, will be the irregular, injurious, and it is hoped unwarranted use of their flags and of Commissions real or pretended derived from them. . . .

It is expected that your absence from the United States will be of seven or eight months. But if while in the execution of your Instructions at Buenos Ayres you should find it expedient, or useful with reference to the public service, that one or more of you should proceed overland to Chili, you are authorized to act accordingly. Should only one of you go, he will there co-operate jointly with Mr. J. B. Prevost, whom it is probable he will find already there, and a copy of whose Instructions is herewith furnished. . . .<sup>40</sup>

Everything being finally in readiness, the United States Frigate *Congress* weighed anchor at Norfolk December 4 and the long and no doubt wearisome voyage was begun.<sup>41</sup> With the officials went William T. Reed, private secretary of Mr. Rodney, and Thomas Rodney, son of the commissioner.<sup>42</sup> Brackenridge states that the arrangements were comfortable.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>40</sup> J. Q. Adams, secretary of state, to C. A. Rodney, John Graham, and Theodorick Bland, Washington, November 21, 1817. Manning, *op. cit.*, I. 47-49.

<sup>41</sup> Rodney, Graham, and Bland to Adams, Norfolk, December 4, 1817. MSS. Department of State, South American Mission.

<sup>42</sup> This statement in Brackenridge's book, *Voyage to South America, etc.*, I. 79, gives an interesting sidelight on the voyage: "There were several lieutenants, and a number of midshipmen on board, beyond the usual complement; the voyage being considered an interesting one, it was a desirable object among the naval gentlemen to engage in it."

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.* In those days in ordinary sea travel the passenger provided his own supplies for the voyage and it was evidently incumbent on the members of the

En route to Buenos Aires, the *Congress* paused at Rio de Janeiro where the commissioners were entertained by Sumter, American diplomatic representative to the Portuguese government at that place. President Monroe writing to former President Madison some time later said that the diplomatic corps and the court at Rio were thrown into some degree of alarm, the report having been circulated that the commission was empowered to announce to Pueyrredón, supreme director of the United Provinces, that his government was to be recognized by the United States. He stated as well that the officers of the frigate and the commissioners saw few in authority and were curtly received by them. He remarked:

This experiment, so far, shews that if a step, involving no very serious consequences, is viewed with such unfavorable eyes, in what light one of a bolder character would be seen. I have no doubt that it will produce a strong sensation among the allies.<sup>44</sup>

Continuing the voyage from Rio the commissioners arrived at Buenos Aires, February 27, 1818,<sup>45</sup> having been almost three months en route. Thomas L. Halsey, the American agent, gave up his house to the commissioners. On March 3, at noon they were received at the Fort by Don Gregorio Tagle, secretary of state,<sup>46</sup> and two days later they were presented to the supreme director, Don Juan M. Pueyrredón, and were, as a local paper reported,

commission in this case to do likewise. In MSS. Department of State, Despatches to Consuls, II. 62, 63, appears a list of the supplies provided for the voyage. The first ten entries suggest that good cheer need not be lacking, be the voyage ever so long: 15 gallons Cogniac Brandy, 10 gallons old Jamaica Rum, 2 quarter casks Madeira Wine, 2 quarter casks Sicily Wine, 20 dozen first quality Claret, 20 dozen second quality Claret, 12 bottles lime juice, 12 dozen American Porter, 12 dozen Brown Stout, 12 dozen Cider.

<sup>44</sup> Washington, April 28, 1818. Monroe, *Writings*, VI. 50, 51.

<sup>45</sup> Rodney, Graham, and Bland to Adams, Buenos Aires, March 4, 1818. MSS. Department of State, The South American Mission.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*



received with the most particular attention and consideration: there were present at this act of the government, all the generals and military chiefs of the nation who were at or near the capital.<sup>47</sup>

On this occasion the supreme director replied to the greeting of the commissioners by declaring that for his country and for himself he entertained the highest sense of the honor conferred by this friendly notice on the part of the government of the United States. He continued in these words:

We have long since been aware that the most friendly feeling and wishes existed toward us, on the part of your country and government. We have ever regarded your country with enthusiastic admiration. We appreciate fully its high character for justice, disinterestedness, and sincerity, and it is beyond the power of words to express, how gratifying to us all, is this proof of its good wishes. That there should exist a real and unfeigned friendship and sympathy between us is natural. We inhabit the same portion of the globe, our cause has once been yours, and we are in pursuit of the same objects, which you have so happily achieved.

You will see many things amongst us, to excite your surprise. *We are a people who are just beginning to be.* We have had great difficulties to encounter, and have laboured under extraordinary disadvantages. I feel confident, however, that when you come to be better acquainted with our country, you will find that the most ardent love of liberty and independence, pervades every part of this community; that in pursuit of these great objects, we are all united, and that we are resolved to perish, sooner than surrender them. At the same time, we must confess with deep regret, that dissensions still prevail between different sections of this republic, and which have unfortunately placed one of the most important portions of our country in the hands of a stranger.<sup>48</sup>

With respect to the objects of the mission, I am anxious to meet the wishes of the commissioners in every particular. I hope all forms

<sup>47</sup> The *Gazette* of March 7, 1818; reprinted in *National Intelligencer* of July 4, 1818.

<sup>48</sup> The reference is to Montevideo which was then in the hands of the Portuguese of Brazil.

of diplomacy may be waived; that all communications may be held as between friends and brothers. . . .<sup>49</sup>

A commissioner reported to President Monroe<sup>50</sup> that the visit was one of harmony; that of course little was said on the subject of business but from that little he concluded it was the intention of the government to manifest in every way it could its respect for that of the United States.

The visit of the commissioners excited a great deal of attention and comment. The secretary says in his book<sup>51</sup> that it was everywhere the subject of conversation, and gave rise to much surmise: for some days it in fact engrossed all the public attention.

One of the official group in a letter written March 3 and printed later in *Niles' Register*,<sup>52</sup> makes the magnitude of the event even greater:

In consequence of our arrival only, it is that the present supreme director has been suffered to remain in office; he has either done wrong or the people have got tired of him; and I have been assured would certainly have been turned out in three days more had we not arrived.

With the necessary formalities of the official reception completed, the commissioners were at liberty to apply themselves to their investigations. It was desired to gain reliable information on every phase of the life and government of the people—population, products, trade, social conditions, military strength, foreign relations, and other matters. Gaining reliable information was not an easy matter as this statement of one of the official group indicates:

As to civil government and municipal regulations, all seems as yet to be disorder, darkness and confusion. It is difficult to procure information of any sort as to the state of things, and that which you do

<sup>49</sup> Brackenridge, *Voyage, etc.*, I. 273, 274.

<sup>50</sup> Graham, Buenos Aires, March 5, 1818. MSS. Library of Congress, Monroe Papers, Writings to, XVII, 2131.

<sup>51</sup> *Op. cit.*, I. 269.

<sup>52</sup> XIV. (1818), 289.

get has seemed to me to be, all of it, more or less discolored or distorted by prejudice, passion or animosity.<sup>53</sup>

It may be that Clay was right when on the floor of congress he asserted that such a commission as was sent could not obtain correct information, that it would be misled and deceived. "The proper course to have adopted", said he,

was to despatch an individual unknown to all parties; some intelligent, keen, silent, and observing man, of pleasant address and insinuating manners, who, concealing the object of his visit, would see & hear everything and report it faithfully."<sup>54</sup>

While the commission remained at Buenos Aires engaged in its work the reactions of its members to conditions they discovered there found their way back to the United States in letters to individuals and newspapers. One writes:

I do not hesitate to say, that the moment we acknowledge them, they will adopt every feature of our government and constitution, and such is the idea which they have of the justice, wisdom, and disinterestedness of our country, that they will be guided by our advice in everything.<sup>55</sup>

Another (or perhaps the same) member of the group says of the people:

They know more of us and our institutions than I had imagined—they *read, think, and observe*, and hence we are received by them as brethren—But they have doubtless much yet to learn, and I fear much to suffer, before they arrive at the enjoyment of that state of political tranquility and security which we so fortunately possess.<sup>56</sup>

Bland felt no enthusiasm for the people and their situation. In a letter to the president he mentions the great obstacles to recognition as being the hostilities existing in

<sup>53</sup> Buenos Aires, March 3, 1818, *loc. cit.*, p. 288.

<sup>54</sup> Thomas H. Benton, *Abridgment of the Debates of Congress* (New York, 1861), VI. 134, 135.

<sup>55</sup> To a friend at Lexington, Va., March 3, 1818; printed in the *National Intelligencer* of June 15, 1818.

<sup>56</sup> *Loc. cit.*, May 13, 1818.



different parts of the region of the United Provinces and the unsettled state of political life. But he says the people are fully resolved to preserve their independence and that reconquest by Spain is wholly out of the question. He asserts:

Political science and general information are, however, spreading very fast; many of the useful arts and trades have been introduced, and Religious intolerance is rapidly crumbling away.<sup>57</sup>

Before the commission had sailed from Norfolk Bland had written the president that he believed

the public interest would be much promoted by correct information on the state of affairs on the coast of the Pacific,<sup>58</sup>

and volunteered, if the president should be of the same opinion, to make the journey alone to that region if it were disagreeable to the other commissioners to go so far. It has been noticed that the instructions left such a visit to the discretion of the commissioners. In his letter to the president of April 14,<sup>59</sup> he informed him that, since it was the opinion of the commissioners that the public good would be promoted by a visit to Chile, he had determined on crossing the Andes, trusting he would be able to obtain such information and render to the government such views as might be deemed useful.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>57</sup> Buenos Aires, April 14, 1818. MSS. Library of Congress, Monroe Papers, Writings to, XVII, 2140.

<sup>58</sup> Bland to Monroe, Baltimore, November 15, 1817. MSS. Library of Congress, *loc. cit.*, XVI, 2097.

<sup>59</sup> See note 57.

<sup>60</sup> The insistence of Bland on going to Chile caused a sharp misunderstanding between him and Rodney and Brackenridge. On his return to Washington Rodney stated Bland left for Chile against his consent. Graham said that though Rodney had at first thought the measure unnecessary it was finally agreed to unanimously. A certain Purviance, returning to Washington from Baltimore, told Adams it was currently reported there that Bland was concerned with Skinner, the postmaster at Baltimore (Bland's son-in-law), in South American privateering and that he went to Chile on that business, upon the pretense of his public trust. (Adams, *Memoirs*, IV. 158-160). Brackenridge, two years later, when both he and Bland were candidates for appointment to a federal judgeship at Baltimore, told

Accordingly, when on April 24, Rodney and Graham with the others of the party left Buenos Aires for the United States, Bland crossed to Chile.<sup>61</sup> The former group reached the United States in July.<sup>62</sup> Bland, after spending some time in Chile, returned from Valparaiso, arriving at Philadelphia in late September.<sup>63</sup>

The consummation of the voyage and investigations of the commissioners—the rendition of a report on their findings—was delayed for some months after the return of the *Congress*. This was doubtless necessary as affording time for the evaluation and putting into intelligible form of the mass of information secured, but newspaper comment indicates that at least a certain portion of the public endured the delay with impatience.<sup>64</sup> When the work of the commissioners was completed early in November it was found, consider-

Adams the same story, in more circumstantial detail, connecting Bland with the Carrera brothers, political outlaws from Chile. Brackenridge said he and Rodney had at Buenos Aires given Bland their opinion on the matter. (Adams, *Memoirs*, V. 56, 57). It is true that Bland was, after the return of the commission, very bitter toward Brackenridge. Adams seems not to have had confidence in Bland since he opposed his appointment to the Baltimore judgeship, but Bland must have retained the president's confidence for he received the appointment. (See letter Bland to Adams, Baltimore, November 26, 1819, MSS. Department of State. Miscellaneous Letters, LXX. acknowledging receipt of commission from the president as judge of the district court in and for Maryland district).

<sup>61</sup> Halsey to Adams, Buenos Aires, April 25, 1818. MSS. Department of State, Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I.

<sup>62</sup> Adams to Rush, Washington, July 30, 1818. Manning, *op. cit.*, I. 74.

<sup>63</sup> Adams, *Memoirs*, IV. 155.

<sup>64</sup> The *National Intelligencer* published on August 25, 1818, an account of a "Journey over the Andes", written no doubt by Judge Bland, and originally printed in the *Franklin Gazette*. In the introduction the editor makes this comment: "Of the resources of the new government, the political condition of the people, we have a great many conjectures and assertions, and hopes, and expectations, and predictions, and prophecies, but there is a lamentable deficiency of facts. On the return of the Commissioners it was anticipated that we should, upon all interesting points, be enlightened: in this expectation we have as yet been disappointed, and the public is as ignorant of the frame of the new government, the extent of its authority over the people, and the guards which are placed around the rights of the inhabitants, as we were when the Congress sailed from the United States."

ably to the president's displeasure,<sup>65</sup> that instead of a single report—two with Poinsett's—there were no less than four.

When Rodney and Graham left Buenos Aires they thought they were in accord and it was agreed between them that the former should prepare a report which both would sign. But when Rodney came to Washington in October with the product of his labors Graham found therein some things of which he did not entirely approve and, since Rodney declined to change them, Graham decided to make a separate report.<sup>66</sup> Since Bland went to Chile he, of course, prepared a separate report; and even if he had returned with the others his estimate of the state of affairs at Buenos Aires differed so broadly from those of the other two commissioners that he would have been unable to get on common ground with either of them.<sup>67</sup> As the reports were made separately they will be thus considered.

The president was in advance apprehensive of the content of Rodney's report. He suspected him of being under the influence of Brackenridge,

a mere enthusiast, and so devoted to South America that he had avowed the wish to unite all America in conflict against all Europe.<sup>68</sup>

When, in October, he learned something of the nature of Rodney's forthcoming report he feared that it would be purposely adapted to the views of Clay rather than those of the administration, else Rodney would have submitted it privately with an offer to modify anything that might counteract the views and policy of the administration.<sup>69</sup> He suspected that the

<sup>65</sup> Adams, *Memoirs*, IV. 155, 156.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> Bland made a separate report on Chile, not unfavorable to that country (Palomeque, *Ortígenes*, etc., I. 125), but since this study is chiefly concerned with the United Provinces no further mention will be made of it.

<sup>68</sup> Adams, *Memoirs*, IV. 155, 156; the reference is to Brackenridge.

<sup>69</sup> This attitude of the president argues that the commission was sent as a mere ruse to gain time and to confirm the views of the administration rather than as an honest effort at arriving at a true policy.



report when made would paint everything at Buenos Aires "as he saw it, couleur de rose", and that it would be used as a party weapon.

Rodney's report<sup>70</sup> was presented on November 5. It begins with a summary of the colonial history of the Rio de la Plata region, the injustice and misrule of Spain being emphasized. The writer then proceeds to give the information he had gained on the extent, population, government, and resources of the United Provinces, with their productions, imports and exports, trade and commerce. Most of his statements concerning these subjects are accompanied by tables of information annexed to the document as appendices, of which there are some ten or twelve. He declares the effects of the revolution are visible in the changes produced in the state of society and draws a very complimentary picture of the changes effected and in progress. "The spirit of improvement", he says, "may be seen in everything".<sup>71</sup> He shows that much interest is taken in education, in books and newspapers, and asserts that religious tolerance and the spirit of freedom are growing apace, that political tumults are infrequent. On the whole, it may be said that President Monroe's fears were realized—the state of society and politics at Buenos Aires is painted "couleur de rose". The Chilean historian, Barros Arana, speaks truly when he says the report was favorable to the state of the country and the

<sup>70</sup> The reports of the three commissioners (minus the appendices) and Mr. Poinsett are to be found in Manning, *op. cit.*, I. 382-515. The reports of Rodney and Graham are in one cover. MSS. Department of State, the South American mission (the appendices included) and both are printed without the accompanying documents in the *National Intelligencer* of November 24, 1818; also they were published together in book form in London in 1819; they may likewise all be found in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV. 217-348. Bland's report was published in book form with some other material in Washington in 1818 and it and the report of Poinsett are published in *Annals*, 15 Cong., 1 sess., pp. 2104-2316.

<sup>71</sup> Manning, *op. cit.*, I. 510.

recognition of its independence.<sup>72</sup> An Argentine historian agrees in practically the same words.<sup>73</sup>

The report of Graham,<sup>74</sup> likewise presented November 5, differed from that of Rodney chiefly in that he gave comparatively more attention to separatist tendencies in regions claimed by the United Provinces; that he thought the provisional constitution in force very defective, and that not so much had been done for the cause of civil liberty as might have been expected. Its tone is much less favorable to the United Provinces than that of Rodney's report.

Bland's report,<sup>75</sup> dated November 2, is more voluminous, enclosures excepted, than any of the others. In form and in language it is superior to the others, and it gives the impression of being the product of more judicious thought. The writer describes the various provinces of the Plata region as to geography, extent, population, and relation of each to the central government. He then divides the entire country into three regions of each of which he describes the soil and products. He sketches the communication system—land and water. He then outlines colonial history, the causes and course of the revolution, and the form of government currently in operation, asserting that the last is a mere reorganization of the colonial viceroyalty. He declares there is no genuine freedom of the press. He points to the sections in open opposition to the rule of the government at Buenos Aires—the Banda Oriental del Uruguay, Entre Rios, Santa Fé, Córdoba—and practically justifies their position, saying, the ruling party of Buenos Ayres has managed the affairs of the Union in such a strain of domineering monopoly as to retard reform, delay the progress of the revolution, and to render the most patriotic provinces extremely dissatisfied.<sup>76</sup>

<sup>72</sup> *Historia jeneral de Chile* (Santiago, 1884-1902), XI. 545 n.

<sup>73</sup> Palomeque, *op. cit.*, I. 110.

<sup>74</sup> Manning, *op. cit.*, I. 486-494.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 382-439.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 433.

Altogether, he makes Buenos Aires, the province, appear domineering and selfish—as it doubtless was—and gives a picture of conditions which could not be reassuring to one looking for adequate grounds on which to justify recognition of the country's independence. Of the revolutionary union of provinces he says,

the present bonds which hold it together are temporary in name, and more so in their nature.<sup>77</sup>

One is inclined to agree with the Argentine historian who said of the report, "*Era triste la impresión que dejaba*".<sup>78</sup>

The report requested of Poinsett<sup>79</sup> came in under date of November 4. It is somewhat involved in form and badly organized as well as non-committal in substance. His description of Spanish colonial government is more detailed than that of any of the commissioners and he gives more attention to military developments. In a letter to Secretary Adams of even date,<sup>80</sup> however, he gives his opinion on recognition of the United Provinces. He does not believe the dissension between the Banda Oriental and Buenos Aires need be given much weight in considering recognition, but he believes that the general moral effect likely to be produced by recognition of the Spanish colonies has been greatly overrated. Great Britain, he believes, looms much larger and more important in the eyes of the Spanish Americans of the Rio de la Plata than does the United States. Although recognition of its revolted colonies would be no just cause of war with Spain, yet Spain is not always prudent and frequently acts from feeling. The sentiment of the letter conjoined with the official report is of a tone unfavorable to recognition.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>78</sup> Palomeque, *op. cit.*, I. 125.

<sup>79</sup> Manning, *op. cit.*, I. 444-486, being that portion of his report only which relates to the United Provinces. For the entire report see *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV. 323 ff.

<sup>80</sup> Manning, *op. cit.*, I. 439-443.



García Merou, an Argentine historian, writing in 1904, comments on the reports in these words:

The reading of the reports of Messrs. Rodney, Graham and Bland, and of their predecessor Poinsett, is today even of very great interest. They contain faithful and just general estimates on the character of the people of the United Provinces in the revolutionary period. In spite of inevitable errors of detail their impartiality is manifest as well as their sympathetic spirit for the cause of the patriots.<sup>81</sup>

Though Brackenridge made no official report it seems well to say a word of his literary activities on the subject of the Spanish American revolution. Even before the departure of the commission he had published (1817) in Washington an anonymous pamphlet of fifty-two pages entitled *South America: A Letter to James Monroe President of the United States on the Present State of that Country*. This was reprinted in England in 1819<sup>82</sup> and was translated into French by the Abbé de Pradt.<sup>83</sup> In this pamphlet the writer anticipated by some years the basic principle of the Monroe Doctrine when he wrote:

There may be in many things a common American continental interest, in opposition to an European interest<sup>84</sup> . . . the United States will be the natural head of the New World.<sup>85</sup>

He argued for the recognition of La Plata and Chile. In the course of his visit to South America with the commission, Brackenridge kept a journal and assiduously collected information on all he saw and on his return home prepared and published his findings and impressions in a two-volume work, *Voyage to South America, Performed by Order of the American Government in the Years 1817 and 1818 in the*

<sup>81</sup> *Historia de la Diplomacia Americana, etc.*, I. 280 n.

<sup>82</sup> *The Pamphleteer*, XIII. 36-83.

<sup>83</sup> Barros Arana, *op. cit.*, XI. 542, 543 n.

<sup>84</sup> *The Pamphleteer*, XIII. 65.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67.

*Frigate Congress*.<sup>86</sup> This work contains much material of interest and value and is of course strongly stamped with the author's enthusiasm for the South Americans. It is not impossible that it may have exerted a greater influence on the popular mind than the quartette of official reports.<sup>87</sup>

It remains to assess, as far as that is possible, the influence in various quarters exerted by the sending of the commission and the reports which its members prepared.

One of the commission has been quoted as declaring that the arrival of the group at Buenos Aires prevented the imminent overthrow of Supreme Director Pueyrredón. Though that individual remained in power for more than two years after the commission had visited his government<sup>88</sup> it would be extremely difficult to prove that his doing so resulted from this visit. It may be that the coming of a representative group from the great northern republic would tend to alleviate somewhat political factional strife for the time being, especially as it had been rumored that the group bore the recognition of the independence of the government which they were visiting, but the only fact which can be definitely established on the available evidence as to its influence at Buenos Aires is that it excited a distinct sensation among all classes of the population.

One of the tasks of the commissioners was to make representations to the governments visited concerning the ob-

<sup>86</sup> This work was the inspiration of the writer (Bland, as Brackenridge believed) of *Strictures on a Voyage to South America as Indited by the "Secretary to the (Late) Mission" to the La Plata, etc.* Published first as letters "By a Friend of Truth and Sound Policy", the material was issued in book form, 175 pages, in 1820. It was a bitter attack on Brackenridge and on his book as a historical work—"sheer romance on a subject of importance and notoriety".

<sup>87</sup> The work was first published in Baltimore in 1819, had a printing in London in the following year, and in 1821 was published in a German translation in Leipzig. Baron Humboldt, who himself knew South America, described it as "an extraordinary mass of information completed with philosophical observations". (Barros Arana, *op. cit.*, XI. 545 n).

<sup>88</sup> República Argentina, *Recopilación de las Leyes y Decretos promulgados en Buenos Aires, etc.*, (Buenos Aires, 1836), pp. XI-XV.

jectionable operations of privateers sailing under its flag. Bland's report shows that these representations were made at Buenos Aires and courteously received,<sup>89</sup> but the history of the succeeding three or four years does not show that they were effective.

From the courteous treatment shown the commissioners and the sentiments expressed by officials at Buenos Aires it may be concluded that the visit was received with much pleasure, the hope being, naturally, that such an impression might be made as would induce early recognition.<sup>90</sup> Argentine historians of a later period have expressed an appreciation of the commission. López remarks of the visit that "the result was fully satisfactory".<sup>91</sup> The incident indicated to the revolutionists that the United States government was sympathetically interested in them though determined to maintain an impartial neutrality in their struggle with Spain.

A Chilean historian<sup>92</sup> believed that the expedition, if it did not produce an immediate result in favor of the revolution, did contribute to increase its prestige in foreign parts, and facilitated the recognition of the independence of the new states. The report of the excitement among the foreign diplomats and the court at Rio de Janeiro when the commission stopped there indicates that it was a matter of considerable interest to foreign powers, but the assertion that the visit facilitated the recognition of the revolutionists is not easily accepted. In determining this point, since the example of the United States in first recognizing the new governments was influential in leading to recognition of them by other powers, it is necessary to determine whether or not the commission and its work had a positive influence on the step of

<sup>89</sup> Manning, *op. cit.*, I. 385, 386.

<sup>90</sup> Americans may easily appreciate the situation by imagining a French commission as visiting the United States in 1777.

<sup>91</sup> *Historia de la República Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1913, nueva edición), VII. 367.

<sup>92</sup> Barros Arana, *op. cit.*, XI, 542 n.



recognition when finally taken by the government of the United States.

The first fact to be noted is that the United States did not recognize the independence of any of the new governments until almost three and a half years after the return of the commissioners.<sup>93</sup> Furthermore, as an Argentine historian does not fail to note,<sup>94</sup> when the president's message immediately preceding recognition went to congress the only documents accompanying it to support the position of the administration were from the hand of John M. Forbes, then agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, and not the reports—or any part of them—of the commissioners to South America. To make the case still stronger we have Secretary Adams's account of a cabinet meeting when the question of recognition was under discussion shortly after the commission's return, when he said:

Although Mr. Rodney's report was a perpetual argument in favor of the recognition of Buenos Ayres, yet the facts disclosed in it, as well as the opinions of the other Commissioners, afforded ample reason for postponing the acknowledgment of the Government of Buenos Ayres.<sup>95</sup>

In his message to congress of December, 1818, the president alluded to the Spanish American revolutionists in these words:

There is good cause to be satisfied with the course heretofore pursued by the United States, in regard to this contest, and to conclude, that it is proper to adhere to it, especially in the present state of affairs.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>93</sup> The president's message to congress stating his purpose to take the step was dated March 8, 1822. See the message in Benton, *Abridgment, etc.*, VII. 171-173.

<sup>94</sup> Palomeque, *op. cit.*, I. 106, 107.

<sup>95</sup> *Memoirs*, entry of November 7, 1818, IV. 166, 167. In his account of this same cabinet meeting Adams makes a remark highly illuminating as to the real reason for sending the commission. He has mentioned a number of reasons for postponing recognition, of which he then says: "These were reasons more than sufficient to be substituted for that of waiting for the report of the Commissioners, which was used at the last session for postponement."

<sup>96</sup> *House Journal*, 15 Cong., 2 sess., p. 14.

The obvious conclusion from the evidence is that the South American commission did not hasten recognition of a South American government either by the United States or by any European government.

Can it be said that the commission influenced in any way the action of congress? No; unless negatively. In the spring of 1818, Clay endeavored to incorporate in the appropriation bill an item providing for an outfit and a year's salary for a minister to the United Provinces of South America,<sup>97</sup> trying thus to force the hand of the administration. His measure failed by a vote of 115 to 45, partly for the reason that it was thought desirable to await the return of the commissioners before taking action.<sup>98</sup> When Clay did succeed in getting through the house early in 1821 a resolution favorable to the recognition of the Spanish provinces<sup>99</sup> it was due to changes in the situation in South America and to Clay's own leadership, rather than to any influence emanating from the South American commission. The majority of congress preferred to follow the president in relations with the revolutionary governments and, as the reports influenced—or furnished an excuse for—delay on his part, they may be said to have had a similar effect on congress.

There is one sense in which the influence of the commission was positive. It did cause a great deal of newspaper comment—a symptom of public interest—in the latter part of 1817 and through 1818. The commission, too, resulted in much writing by its members on the state of Spanish America. So far as such writing inspired sympathy for the revolutionists and contributed to the development of a definite public sentiment in favor of their cause, the commission may be said to have had a result advantageous to them. It is be-

<sup>97</sup> *Annals*, 16 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 1071 ff.

<sup>98</sup> Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826* (Cambridge, 1927), pp. 46, 47.

<sup>99</sup> *Annals*, 16 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 1081-1092.

lieved that in this way the commission's influence was considerable.

How, in a word, may the influence of the commission to South America be described? The revolutionists of the Rio de la Plata region were pleased by the attention, perhaps somewhat encouraged by it. With the administration of the United States it was influential only as a cause for desirable delay. It has no real significance in any connection foreign to the South Americans and the United States. Its chief positive effect was that it occasioned on the part of a larger proportion of the people of the United States an accession of interest in the South American revolutionists.

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## THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND MEXICO

### I. FRENCH LITERATURE IN MEXICO

“Learn to read, to write and to say your prayers: this is all an American ought to know”.<sup>1</sup> Such are the words of Gil de Lemos, viceroy of Peru, who proposed to change the three “R’s” by substituting prayer for “rithmetic”. Branciforte, viceroy of Mexico, went so far as to declare that Americans should be taught only the catechism.<sup>2</sup> And Francisco de Miranda of Caracas, having studied in Mexico, informed President Stiles of Yale that there were “no great Literary characters in New Spain—or can be—for the Geniuses dare not *read* nor *think* nor *speak*, for fear of the Inquisition which keeps out all Books, lest it should effect sedition”.<sup>3</sup> Though these views may be somewhat exaggerated, they give an indication of the limitations and the tendency towards repressive measures in education.

Since the beginning of the Bourbon monarchy, Spain had been greatly influenced by France and French ideas. As the Flemish had been disliked when they came to Spain with Charles V. so the French were disliked when they came with Philip V. But in spite of the national antipathy there was a fascination and glamour about Paris, appealing to the Spanish mind. According to the popular phrase of the time, “a person was of little importance who had not spit in Paris, that is to say, who had not spent some time in the French capital”.<sup>4</sup> Those who had, were conspicuous figures, and in

<sup>1</sup> Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, *De la Colonisation chez les Peuples Modernes* (5th ed., 2 vols., Paris, 1902), I. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Lucas Alamán, *Historia de Méjico* (5 vols., Mexico, 1849-52), I. 27.

<sup>3</sup> Franklin B. Dexter, ed., *The Literary Diary of Ezra Stiles* (3 vols., New York, 1837), III. 131.

<sup>4</sup> Angel Salcedo Ruiz, *Historia de España* (Madrid, 1914), p. 431.

their evening gatherings would speak *sotto voce* of the newest ideas of the philosophers. Montesquieu's writings, followed by those of such bold and original thinkers as Voltaire, Rousseau, and Condillac, penetrated Spain where they found a following.<sup>5</sup> There was, however, considerable opposition to these "*Filósofos o novadores*", as they were called:<sup>6</sup> they were "looked upon by their compatriots as dangerous innovators, Voltaireans and Freemasons".<sup>7</sup> Having entered Spain it became extremely difficult to keep these modern ideas out of Mexico.

The French Revolution ushered in a busy season for the holy office of the inquisition. A Spanish American bishop forbade, under penalty of excommunication, the reading in any of the colleges of any work relative to this "deplorable event".<sup>8</sup> Then there began a detailed attack on individual works. *The Rights of Man* by Thomas Paine was prohibited for having seditious doctrines.<sup>9</sup> Another book dealing with the controversy between Paine and Burke, *El Desengaño del Hombre* by James Puglio,<sup>10</sup> a Spanish instructor in Philadelphia, was evidently intended for Spanish American consumption and created considerable stir in Mexico. It was reported that three hundred copies were to be sent into the country by way of New Orleans, after which the viceroy sent orders to the frontier officials to exert the greatest vigilance to prevent the introduction of this "extremely abominable book". He thought that since many Frenchmen were finding

<sup>5</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>6</sup> According to the census of 1791 there were 13,332 French heads of families in Spain, nearly half of the foreign population. Martin A. S. Hume, *Modern Spain, 1788-1798* (New York, 1900), p. 5, note 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> G. Desdèvises du Dezert, "L'Eglise Espagnole des Indes a la fin du XVIII<sup>e</sup> Siècle", in *Revue Hispanique*, XXXIX. 248.

<sup>9</sup> Jose T. Medina, *Historia del Tribunal del Santo Oficio de la Inquisicion en México* (Santiago de Chile, 1905), p. 438.

<sup>10</sup> Philadelphia, 1794. This edition may be found in the Library of Congress.

asylum in the United States, the book was probably "the work of these pernicious characters".<sup>11</sup>

An edict had been passed by the holy office of the inquisition on March 13, 1790, prohibiting the introduction of seditious books and papers which might excite the people to rebellion against the legitimate powers.<sup>12</sup> But books and pamphlets must have continued to come in, for it was necessary to publish new edicts from time to time to protect the innocent people from the new and spectacular ideas of the period. A *History of the French Revolution* was proscribed because it made scandalous, heretical, and blasphemous attacks on Divinity itself, and was injurious to the pope, to the clergy, and to the holy office of the inquisition.<sup>13</sup> On February 2, 1798, the *Gazeta de Mexico* published an edict,<sup>14</sup> largely a renewal of the one of 1790. One work was mentioned in particular, *Les Ruines, ou Meditations sur les revolutions des Empires*<sup>15</sup> by M. Volney, deputy to the national assembly. A few persons were given license to read certain prohibited books, but even to these this one was forbidden because it was a "summary of all the evil systems which the libertines of all times had invented and surpassed in maliciousness all the writings of Hobbes, Espinosa, Rousseau, Voltaire, and others"; and it was said to be founded on pure atheism, fatalism, naturalism, and materialism. It would not be unreasonable to believe that such a review would stir up considerable interest in the book.

Although most of the prohibited books were French, the list in the edict for July of the same year included *Letters of Lord Chesterfield to his Son*, translated into French by Pey-

<sup>11</sup> Branciforte to Alcudia, Mexico, October 3, 1794, Archivo General de las Indias, Seville (these archives will be referred to as A. I.), Estado, Mexico, Legajo 3.

<sup>12</sup> Medina, *Historia de la Inquisicion en México*, p. 440.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 443.

<sup>14</sup> *Gazeta de Mexico*, IX. 9-11.

<sup>15</sup> Published in Amsterdam, 1795.



ron. Other works included were *L'origine de tous les cultes* by Volney and *Persian Letters* by Montesquieu.<sup>16</sup> Though the latter's *Spirit of Laws* had been studied in the University of Mexico, according to Miranda,<sup>17</sup> his works were now challenged. Among others placed on the papal index were *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progress de l'esprit humain*, by Condorcet; *History of the Revolution*, by Servain Mereghal, for having "heretical and erroneous propositions, conducive to rebellion and anarchy"; and a three-volume work printed in Paris, 1789, called *Nouveau voyage en Espagne, ou tableau de l'état actual de cette monarchie*.<sup>18</sup> Another list published in the *Gazeta* on August 29, 1801, included general works, collected works, pamphlets, poems, and even almanacs, eighty titles in all.<sup>19</sup> Among the condemned works recorded on June 30, 1804, were: a new edition of the works of Corneille, with notes by Voltaire; the complete works of Mably, of which the volume *Des droits et devoirs du citoyen* had been prohibited in an edict of December 13, 1789; *Essai philosophique consernant l'entendement humain* by Locke, translated by Costi; and a number of others, many of which were anonymous.<sup>20</sup> Miranda told President Stiles of Yale that in Mexico he had been obliged to pay twenty dollars for two volumes of Locke's *Treatise on the Human Understanding* only to burn them as soon as he had read them, and that he had done the same with many other books.<sup>21</sup>

Moreover, Frenchmen entered Mexico and brought in their foreign ideas which were kept alive by books and letters. In the trial of a number of these Frenchmen in 1794 it was found that one of them boasted the possession of a book so rare that

<sup>16</sup> Medina, *Historia de la Inquisicion en México*, p. 443.

<sup>17</sup> Dixon, ed., *Diary of Ezra Stiles*, III. 132.

<sup>18</sup> By Jean François Bourgoing.

<sup>19</sup> *Gazeta de Mexico*, X. 315; *Suplemento* (to the same), 321 f.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, XII. 120, 129.

<sup>21</sup> Dixon, ed., *Diary of Ezra Stiles*, III. 132.

not even the viceroy had a copy.<sup>22</sup> Another, Estevan Morel, was accused of having two trunks full of French books.<sup>23</sup> Juan Abadi, who was devoted to the French Assembly, reported its activities to a coterie of friends who met in the inn of Juan Aroche in Mexico. Here they discussed the new ideas of republicanism and championed the French Revolution. An address by General Lafayette was also found in possession of one of the defendants.<sup>24</sup> Among the goods of Morel was discovered a letter from his nephew in France, saying that with the death of the king, the country was put under a better system. Other letters conveyed the same views which Morel was accused of spreading.<sup>25</sup>

The inquisition was assisted by the government in its effort to seal Mexico against revolutionary ideas; but still they filtered in. The authorities found evidence of considerable French propaganda and it is also possible that much eluded their vigilance. Branciforte, the viceroy, was particularly active in his efforts to save Mexico from the dangerous actions and ideas of the French. When he heard that two sets of pictorial playing cards, representing the last events in the life of Louis XVI. and his family, had been sent to Vera Cruz, he ordered that a set be procured for his inspection. After examining three or four of the eight pictures, depicting "the sacriligious and horrible execution of the King of France and of the Royal Family", he was overcome by sorrow and the tears came to his eyes—so he says—and he ordered the rest to be taken from his sight because such pictures ought to be destroyed if possible.<sup>26</sup> However, as Juan Vicente says, "To prevent the arrival of papers and letters is not only most

<sup>22</sup> Report of the trial by Caamaño, Mexico, September 28, 1794, A. I., Estado, Mexico, Legajo 3.

<sup>23</sup> Report by Valenzuela and Luzero, Mexico, August 9, 1795, *ibid.*, Legajo 4.

<sup>24</sup> Report by Caamaño, Mexico, September 28, 1794, *ibid.*, Legajo 3.

<sup>25</sup> Valenzuela and Luzero, Mexico, August 9, 1795, *ibid.*, Legajo 4.

<sup>26</sup> Branciforte to Principe de la Paz, Mexico, November 26, 1796, *ibid.*, Legajo 6.

difficult, but impossible''.<sup>27</sup> It would be difficult to examine all the letters, he added, and still more difficult to examine all the trunks and baggage that arrive every day. Even if this were feasible, those who knew what was going on would talk, especially those from Havana where they came in contact with foreigners from other islands of the West Indies. Many of the inhabitants of Mexico were poorly educated, he said, and knew little about the world, but they talked about the events in France as if most of the letters from Spain dealt with this subject.<sup>28</sup>

The office of the inquisition and the viceroy were frequently commended for their zeal in rooting out dangerous views, but they recognized the difficulty and even the impossibility of establishing a Chinese wall that would be idea-proof. The partisans of the French were also confident of their ability to penetrate the wall of exclusion, as witness this example of propaganda posted on a street corner of Mexico: "The most wise are the French; to follow their suggestions is not absurd. However much the laws may try, they can never stifle the cries that are inspired by nature."<sup>29</sup>

## II. FRANCE AND THE NOOTKA SOUND CONTROVERSY

Ideas of the French Revolution, whether carried by literature or other means, were preparing the Mexicans for their eventual struggle for independence. Nevertheless, European rivalries and conflicts frequently threatened to make Mexico independent and finally gave it the opportunity to secure its freedom from Spain. The outbreak of the French Revolution gave a new impetus to revolutionary projects. Floridablanca, Spanish prime minister, had favored French reforms but became frightened at the extreme measures of the assembly. Still he sought, through the Family Compact, the aid of

<sup>27</sup> Vicente to Florida Blanca, Mexico, September 30, 1791, *ibid.*, Legajo 1.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> Copied by Bonilla, Mexico, August 31, 1794, *ibid.*, Legajo 3.



France in Spain's threatened struggle with England over the Nootka Sound affair.<sup>30</sup>

England had often considered propositions for the liberation of Mexico in order to win the benefits of greater commercial opportunities; and liberation rather than conquest, an Englishman wrote, could be accomplished without arousing the "just envy of our neighbors".<sup>31</sup> The Nootka Sound Controversy gave Francisco de Miranda, "knight-errant of Spanish American independence", an excuse to propose to the British that they liberate Spanish America as a part of their program against Spain, if war should break out;<sup>32</sup> and the haughty attitude of the two governments seemed to make war inevitable. Miranda presented his papers to both Pitt and Grenville and the former showed sufficient interest to arouse the hopes that the project might be approved by the government.<sup>33</sup> The British sought information from other sources to verify Miranda's opinions and to form a basis for their plan of action. Other proposals for the liberation of Mexico were submitted,<sup>34</sup> and only a few of the correspondents considered the project as impracticable.<sup>35</sup> The outbreak of war would, no doubt, have led to the adoption of a revolutionary plan. Sir Home Popham declared later that, had hostilities begun in 1790, "an armament of considerable magnitude" would have been sent to Spanish America.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>30</sup> For a study of this subject see William R. Manning, "The Nootka Sound Controversy", in *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1904 (Washington, 1905).

<sup>31</sup> *American Historical Review*, IV, 325-328.

<sup>32</sup> For the activities of Miranda see William S. Robertson, "Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of Spanish America", in *Annual Report of American Historical Association*, 1907 (2 vols., Washington, 1908), I, 189-539.

<sup>33</sup> Manning, *Nootka Sound Controversy*, p. 384.

<sup>34</sup> See "English Policy toward America in 1790-1791" in *American Historical Review*, VII, 711, 716, 719 note 1, and 728-733; W. S. Robertson, *Francisco de Miranda*, pp. 276, 277.

<sup>35</sup> Sir Arthur Campbell to Pitt, October 28, 1790, in *American Historical Review*, VII, 716-717.

<sup>36</sup> Popham to York, November 26, 1803, Londonderry, ed., *Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh* (12 vols., London, 1848-1853), VII, 288-293.

War, then, was the condition necessary for the materialization of the revolutionary schemes, and France became the determining factor in Spain's choice for war or peace. France did not want Spain to increase its military power which might later be used to restore Louis XVI. to his former position. Furthermore, the Family Compact was not popular in France:<sup>37</sup> the French assembly was desirous of retaining allies but felt little obligation to uphold the agreement of monarchs. Certain stipulations were therefore added before support would be given to Spain in its pending struggle with England.<sup>38</sup> The Family Compact had served chiefly to get Spain into trouble, and now, when it might have proven of value, it was found useless. Spain's choice was simply to submit to England and accept a loss or undertake a war with the possibility of a greater loss. The French reservations made Spain decide to come to an agreement with England rather than to depend on its uncertain ally. The result was the settlement of the controversy in the Nootka Sound Convention in which Spain gave up its exclusive claims to the western coast of America, marking its first setback on the Pacific coast, as its retreat to Charleston in the treaty of 1670 had marked the first Spanish setback on the Atlantic coast.

### III. MIRANDA AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

Having failed to get England's support for his revolutionary projects, owing to the peaceful settlement of the Nootka Sound Controversy, Miranda turned to the new champion of liberty, France.<sup>39</sup> He thought that since France had helped the struggling colonies of England gain their independence, it might be willing to do as much for the Spanish colonies; and

<sup>37</sup> Francis P. Renault, *Le Pacte de Famille et L'Amérique* (Paris, 1922), p. 405; in general see pp. 497-409.

<sup>38</sup> Charles E. Chapman, *History of Spain* (New York, 1918), p. 400.

<sup>39</sup> In addition to the works on Miranda by Rojas and Robertson, a new work has been contributed by C. Parra-Pérez, *Miranda et la Révolution Française* (Paris, 1925).

he was not mistaken, for the French Revolution, whose ideas knew no boundaries, made its leaders consider the Spanish colonies a field for its activities. The Girondists, with Brissot at their head, were willing to take up the cause of Spanish American liberty. Shortly after he became foreign minister,<sup>40</sup> General Dumouriez tried to form an alliance with England to oppose despots.<sup>41</sup> With the aid of England, and possibly the United States, the Spanish colonies could be freed, the new world redivided, and its commerce opened to its liberators.<sup>42</sup> Like the English, the French sought their reward, and commercial advantages were always powerful incentives for championing the paradoxical cause of liberty and equality.

It was at this time that Miranda came to France, and his arrival stimulated the revolutionists to greater activities. He soon made the acquaintance of such men as Brissot, Dumouriez, Lebrun, and Pétion. On October 13, 1792, Brissot wrote to Miranda that the time had come to revolutionize the Spanish colonies.<sup>43</sup> Miranda, with headquarters at Santo Domingo, was to be the leader of the expedition. But there was still some doubt about the support of Dumouriez whom they knew had cherished the idea of being the liberator of the new world.<sup>44</sup> Towards the end of the month Miranda informed Pétion of the project, telling him about the attitude of the United States and England, and of the ex-Jesuits in Italy.<sup>45</sup> Not long after this Miranda wrote to General Knox that Colonel Smith would inform him "how things are coming to maturity", and "that those schemes our patriotism suggested to

<sup>40</sup> March 23, 1792, five days before Miranda arrived in Paris.

<sup>41</sup> Albert Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution Française* (7 vols., Paris, 1887-1904), II. 419, III. 19-21.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, II. 422, 423.

<sup>43</sup> Aristides Rojas, *Miranda dans la Révolution Française* (Caracas, 1889), p. 7.

<sup>44</sup> Miranda was serving in the French army under Dumouriez.

<sup>45</sup> Miranda to Pétion, October 26, 1792, Carlos A. Villanueva, *Napoleon y la Independencia de America* (Paris, 1911), pp. 64-69.



our minds in our Semposiums at Boston, are not far from being realized".<sup>46</sup>

Miranda had reason to be optimistic for the French were making plans to support him. Brissot reminded Dumouriez, November 28, 1792, of their old purpose to leave no Bourbon on a throne, a threat to the Spanish empire. Miranda, whose name was worth an army, was the one man who could bring success to the enterprise in America. He added: "I know well that this appointment will strike Spain with terror and confound Pitt with his poor, dilatory politics, but Spain is impotent and England will not move".<sup>47</sup> Dumouriez, combining his European and American policy, tried to keep England neutral or as an ally by making its "choose between a maritime war and the immense benefits which the emancipation of the Spanish colonies would give her".<sup>48</sup> To Lebrun he wrote on November 30, 1792: "Once masters of the Dutch navy, we shall be strong enough to crush England, especially by interesting the United States of America in sustaining our colonies and in executing a superb project of General Miranda."<sup>49</sup>

Admiral Kersaint had made a similar plan for the Spanish colonies, but he advocated the use of more allies; to England and the United States he added Holland, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark, all to share in the enterprise and the plunder. Each country was assigned its sphere of action and that of Mexico was to be the particular field of France and England.<sup>50</sup> It is possible that the admiral had been interested in such a project for some time, because, as early as March of that year, the Spanish government notified the vice-

<sup>46</sup> Quoted by Robertson, *Miranda*, pp. 290-291.

<sup>47</sup> Rojas, *Miranda dans la Révolution Française*, pp. 2-3.

<sup>48</sup> Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution Française*, III. 175.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> Robertson gives the date for this memoir as being in August, 1792, *Miranda*, p. 289; Villanueva refers to the same or a similar plan by Kersaint on October 1, *Napoleon y la Independencia*, p. 69.

roy of Mexico that six propagandists, headed by a Mr. Kersaint, were leaving Brest for New Spain to introduce the "maxims of independence".<sup>51</sup>

By December Miranda's enthusiasm for French aid had waned, and he informed Brissot that the plan was "really grand and magnificent", but he did not know if it could be executed with success, pleading his lack of knowledge of the proposed French base as a hindrance.<sup>52</sup> In fact, Miranda was becoming sceptical about spreading the influence of the French Revolution to America. However, he was still interested, and asked Brissot to examine the plans he had presented to Pitt in 1790, before undertaking any project.<sup>53</sup> Brissot, anticipating a war with England and Spain, went so far as to make an official proposal to the committee of public safety in January, 1793, for sending an expedition to the Spanish colonies.<sup>54</sup> But the French in France soon became too much occupied in European affairs to devote much time to America.<sup>55</sup>

#### IV. REVOLUTIONARY PLANS ON THE LOUISIANA BORDER

The French now turned their attention to Louisiana where many of the inhabitants were showing interest in and sympathy for the maxims and actions of the French Revolution. These views were endangering the Spanish possessions and the Spanish officials knew it. Gayoso de Lemos, governor at Natchez, said of the inhabitants of Louisiana that "the majority are fond of novelty, have communication with France and with their possessions in America, and hear with the greatest

<sup>51</sup> Revilla Gigedo to Aranda, Mexico, May 31, 1792, A. I., Estado, Mexico, Legajo 2.

<sup>52</sup> Miranda to Brissot, December 19, 1792, Rojas, *Miranda dans la Révolution Française*, p. 9.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> F. A. Aulard, *Recueil des Actes du Comité du Salut Public* (26 vols., Paris, 1889-1923), II. 10, III. 82.

<sup>55</sup> According to Robertson the French did not give up their designs of employing Miranda until the beginning of 1793, *Miranda*, p. 293, and note 2.

pleasure of the revolution in that kingdom''.<sup>56</sup> This was the fertile field in which Genêt was to sow the seeds of revolution. It promised more immediate prospects of success than the larger project of Miranda, and it might serve as an example to Mexico, or as a starting point for greater undertakings.

The suggestion of Lebrun to Dumouriez that they send Genêt on this revolutionary mission<sup>57</sup> was followed by a large number of proposals and schemes for the independence or the acquisition of Louisiana, and many of these contained provisions for the liberation of additional Spanish territory. In an elaborate plan drawn up in 1792, an anonymous author said that though it was a bit chimerical to include all the domain from New Mexico to Chile, he did not think this territory would remain forever under the yoke of Spain.<sup>58</sup> His reasons for anticipating success resemble those of the other revolutionists and give an idea of the views of the time. Ever since 1779 secret overtures had been made to the French minister at Philadelphia to get freedom from Spain.<sup>59</sup> Most of the inhabitants were French and Americans, needing only assurance of protection to carry out a revolt, since the "barbarous methods" of "Bloody O'Reilly" which established Spanish authority secured no more than apparent loyalty. The weak garrison at New Orleans was still composed largely of Frenchmen, and the Anglo-Americans were "friends of liberty", all well armed. One might add to this the opinion of the Spanish governor of Natchez: "I feared that if war were declared on France, we would find but few inhabitants of Lower Louisiana who would sincerely defend the country from any undertaking

<sup>56</sup> James A. Robertson, ed., *Louisiana under the rule of Spain, France, and the United States, 1785-1807* (2 vols., Cleveland, 1911), I. 283.

<sup>57</sup> November 6, 1792, Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution Française*, III. 157.

<sup>58</sup> "Plan proposé pour faire une revolution dans las Louisiane", in *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1896, I. 945-953.

<sup>59</sup> Ten years earlier, France had considered the possibility of setting up a republic in Louisiana, according to Villanueva, *Napoleon y la Independencia de América*, p. 29.



of that nation''.<sup>60</sup> Similar views were expressed by other Spanish officials, including the viceroy, Revilla Gigedo.<sup>61</sup>

The author of the above plan suggested that three or four agents be sent to Philadelphia to aid Genêt in setting the project in motion. One of these should seek support in New Orleans<sup>62</sup> and another the aid of the adventurous westerners. General Wilkinson was thought to be the most suitable man to act as the commander-in-chief. France might well consider this "consummate artist in treason" a likely leader for a revolutionary project, and a man who could serve two countries might also serve a third as well as himself. According to the plan, manifestos were to be spread in the name of the republic to urge the inhabitants to call assemblies, to declare their independence, and to form a government. All was to be done without the aid of the United States, because there was a possibility of getting the western states to separate from the union; and, furthermore, that country "no longer treated liberty as lovers but as husbands".

This did not exclude the individual Americans from serving, and there were many who were willing to participate in the liberation of the Spanish American colonies. Among these were George Rogers Clark, his brother-in-law, Dr. James O'Fallon, Daniel Clark, and Benjamin Logan in the United States; Thomas Paine, Gilbert Imlay, and Joel Barlow in Paris. Wherever there was a struggle for liberty against hereditary monarchs one could always enlist the support or sympathy of the champion of the "Rights of Man", the much maligned Thomas Paine.<sup>63</sup> He lived with a few English disciples in the old mansion of Madame Pompadour. "In the

<sup>60</sup> Robertson, *Louisiana*, I. 283.

<sup>61</sup> Mexico, April 30, 1793, A. I., Estado, Mexico, Legajo 2.

<sup>62</sup> De Pauw was in New Orleans in April, 1793, apparently encouraging revolutionary plans, *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1896, I. 1103.

<sup>63</sup> Thomas Paine had met Miranda in the United States and possibly in London, and must have been interested in his plan. See Robertson, *Miranda*, pp. 249, 286.

evenings they were joined by others, the Brissots (before the arrest), Nicholas Bonneville, Joel Barlow, Captain Imlay, Mary Wollstonecraft, the Rolands".<sup>64</sup> Even the great Miranda occasionally found his way into this fascinating circle.<sup>65</sup>

Gilbert Imlay, soldier of the American Revolution, western settler, writer, lover of Mary Wollstonecraft, and a member of the Paine circle, became an advocate for the emancipation of at least a part of Spanish America. In his "Observations"<sup>66</sup> he recommended the liberation of Louisiana, partly because it would be a blow to Spain who considered it the key to its possessions. Imlay had been introduced to several of the leading revolutionists and it seems likely that the French intended to use him in their enterprise in America.<sup>67</sup>

In the spring of 1793 it was suggested that four men be sent to Philadelphia to act as the nucleus of "a committee for the expedition of Louisiana and of that of the other Spanish colonies".<sup>68</sup> It is only reasonable to believe that Mexico was to be among "the other Spanish colonies". The revolutionary committee was to be composed of two Americans: Joel Barlow, our American poet-diplomat (Stephen Sayre, Princeton graduate, who became banker and sheriff in London, and later associated with Arthur Lee and Franklin) and two Frenchmen (Lyonnet, a former resident of New Orleans; and Beaupoils, a French military man).<sup>69</sup> These men were instructed, not only to seek means for overthrowing the Spanish colonies in America, both on the mainland and on the islands,

<sup>64</sup> Moncure D. Conway, *The Life of Thomas Paine* (3rd ed., 2 vols., N. Y. etc., 1893), II, 66.

<sup>65</sup> Ralph L. Rusk, "The Adventures of Gilbert Imlay", in *Indiana University Studies*, X, 18, note 61.

<sup>66</sup> Printed in *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1896, I, 953-954.

<sup>67</sup> Rusk, "The Adventures of Gilbert Imlay", in *Indiana University Studies*, X, 19.

<sup>68</sup> *American Historical Review*, III, 491-510.

<sup>69</sup> For the characterization of these men see Isaac J. Cox, "Louisiana-Texas Frontier", in *Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association*, X, 46.

but to initiate the revolution which was to be carried to completion by Miranda. There was also an indication that there might be coöperation between the proposed Louisiana expedition and revolutionists in Mexico.<sup>70</sup>

Sayre and Beaupoils together with Pereyrat contributed separate plans to the minister of foreign affairs.<sup>71</sup> They thought a war with Spain was inevitable, and not without reason, since war was declared within three days, March 9, 1793. The former plan of Dumouriez was considered with a few alterations to suit the changed conditions. The proposals of a certain general (possibly Miranda) were now too elaborate, because France, at war with England, Holland, and Spain, could not spare a fleet large enough to insure success.<sup>72</sup> Their own project was considered practicable because it needed no large force, "even though it had for its aim to take possession of Mexico and of stirring South America to revolt". If the taking of New Orleans did not seem important enough, the expedition could proceed down the southwest mouth of the Mississippi, along the coast of the Gulf to Panuco, where they could offer liberty to the ill-treated Indians. Then they could proceed to Mexico which "probably would not give as much resistance as when Cortes attacked it".<sup>73</sup>

Genêt, who was to be the chief actor in the proposed projects, was given his instructions in December, 1792.<sup>74</sup> The

<sup>70</sup> The document referred to a Mexican who had written to citizen Clavier, suggesting coöperation. Clavier, the minister of finance, was an intimate friend of Brissot with whom he had travelled in America, and with whom he had been joint author of *De la France et des Etats Unis* (London, 1787).

<sup>71</sup> Printed in *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1896, I. 954-957.

<sup>72</sup> They said that the republic could continue with the general's project whenever the occasion was suitable, *ibid.*, I. 955.

<sup>73</sup> Pierre Lyonnet, too, made suggestions for a revolutionary project, March, 1793, see *American Historical Review*, III. 496-500. For his "Additional Observations" see *ibid.*, III. 500-503.

<sup>74</sup> *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1896, I. 957-958 and 958-963.

threatened break with England and Spain was considered and the French minister was expected to get the support of the United States by suggesting that it was to the interest of the Americans to oppose the designs of George III. against liberty. He was to sow the seeds of the French Revolution and to encourage the principles of liberty and independence in Louisiana and other provinces bordering on the United States. By means of an agreement between the two nations they could extend the "empire of liberty", guarantee the sovereignty of the people, and by an attack on the powers which still maintained a colonial system and commercial exclusion, their efforts would soon lead to the liberation of Spanish America, and, "perhaps, of uniting to the American constellation the beautiful star of Canada".

George Rogers Clark, who had been suggested as the leader of a revolutionary expedition,<sup>75</sup> was willing to cast his fortunes with such a group, since the United States had been, as he said, "notoriously ungrateful" for his services.<sup>76</sup> In an intercepted letter of Dr. O'Fallon to Captain Herron, the former said of the proposed attack on Louisiana: "This plan was digested between General Clark and me last Christmas. I framed the whole of the correspondence in the General's name, and corroborated it by a private letter of my own to Mr. Thomas Paine".<sup>77</sup> According to Paine's reply from Passey, February 17, 1793,<sup>78</sup> the proposal had probably been presented recently to the provisory executive council of the republic through the medium of Genêt whose departure had been delayed until the last week in February.

<sup>75</sup> See Lyonnet's "Additional Observations", in *American Historical Review*, III. 500-503. Clark seems also to have offered his services to Spain in 1788 in return for a landgrant, see *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1896, I. 932.

<sup>76</sup> Clark to French minister, February 5, 1793, *ibid.*, I. 967-971.

<sup>77</sup> October 18, 1793, Conway, *Life of Thomas Paine*, II. 156.

<sup>78</sup> *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1896, I. 967, note 2.



Clark informed the French government in February that he was willing and able to lead an expedition against the Spanish. First he would capture St. Louis and New Orleans. "If further aided", he said, "I would capture Pensacola; and if Santa Fe and the rest of New Mexico were objects—I know their strength and every avenue leading to them, for conquest". He had long looked for an opportunity to give Spain "a vital blow" in this quarter, and added that "by conquering New Mexico and Louisiana, that of all Spanish America, with its mines, may, soon after, be easily atchieved".<sup>79</sup> According to Genêt, General Clark had friends in various cities of New Spain who kept him informed and who would be of great help to him in their proposed expedition. It was not until July 12 that Genêt informed Clark<sup>80</sup> that his plans had been adopted; and Michaux, who brought Genêt's letter, had now given up the scientific expedition of Jefferson to coöperate with Clark as an agent of the French republic. Clark's commission made him commander-in-chief of the "Independent and Revolutionary Legion of the Mississippi".

While the project was slowly taking form in America, events in Europe were rapidly approaching a climax. The proclamation of the French convention, November 19, 1792, promising "fraternity and aid to all peoples who wished to recover their liberty",<sup>81</sup> would certainly arouse revolutionary ideas among many, but would also provoke greater opposition from European monarchs. The execution of Louis Capet on January 21, 1793, increased the danger; and on February 1, England, and on March 9, Spain, were actually at war with France. The desire to attack Spain through its colonies became greater, but the opportunity to do so became less. It was, therefore, quite in keeping with the French policy to seek American aid against the Spanish colonies. The failure of

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, I. 967-971.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, I. 986.

<sup>81</sup> Shailer Mathews, *The French Revolution, 1789-1815* (New York, 1924), p. 224.

the United States to come to an agreement with Spain over the Mississippi question made many of the leading Americans anticipate a war with Spain.<sup>82</sup> Genêt, however, endangered the whole project by his unguarded procedure.

Colonel Smith, newly arrived from Paris, informed Jefferson of the French plans which had been made together with Miranda.<sup>83</sup> He knew that Genêt was coming to the United States to get its support, and he was also authorized by Lebrun to deliver a letter to the President and to communicate plans to him worthy of his "great mind". He informed Jefferson further that the French intended to begin their attack at the mouth of the Mississippi, "and sweep along the Bay of Mexico southwardly, and that they would have no objections to our incorporating into our government the two Floridas". Even before Napoleon, France dangled the Floridas before the eyes of the United States. Jefferson, nibbling, wrote to Carmichael and Short, commissioners in Spain, to leave the United States free to act according to circumstances.<sup>84</sup>

Genêt, however, had his difficulties, and Washington was not the least of these. The president's proclamation of neutrality had put an end to Genêt's prospects for governmental aid. "Old Washington had hindered his progress in a thousand ways," he wrote to Lebrun.<sup>85</sup> He next made Jefferson his confidant, but not as secretary of state,<sup>86</sup> since Jefferson had to be cautious because of the negotiations then going on for

<sup>82</sup> For the changing attitudes see George L. Rives, "Spain and the United States in 1795", in *American Historical Review*, IV. 62-79; also Samuel F. Bemis, *The Pinckney Treaty* (Baltimore, 1926), *passim*.

<sup>83</sup> February 20, 1793, Paul L. Ford, ed., *Works of Jefferson* (12 vols., New York, 1904-05), I. 253-256.

<sup>84</sup> March 23, 1793, *ibid.*, VII. 267.

<sup>85</sup> Frederick J. Turner, "Origin of Genet's Projected Attack on Louisiana and the Floridas", in *American Historical Review*, III. 650-671.

<sup>86</sup> "Jefferson's minute of conversation with Genet", in *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1896, I. 984-985.

a depot at New Orleans.<sup>87</sup> Others, such as Governor Moultrie of South Carolina and Senator Brown of Kentucky, seemed to favor the undertaking.<sup>88</sup> At Charleston Genêt had found an enthusiastic supporter in the French consul, Mangourit. Activities were begun on the Florida border where expeditions were being organized under the supervision of Major-General Daniel Clark and Colonel Samuel Hammond of Georgia and William Tate of South Carolina.<sup>89</sup>

During the summer the revolutionary agents took the initial steps in the western country, but they had no sooner begun than they were checked by the United States government. In response to Spain's complaints, Jefferson wrote to Governor Shelby of Kentucky to prevent any hostilities against their western neighbor.<sup>90</sup> Lack of support did not stop Genêt and he wrote on October 7, 1793, that he had begun and would continue alone to carry out this vast project, "for I have found in Washington's cabinet only cold men, incapable of seizing such a grand idea".<sup>91</sup> Lyonnet, in his instructions of March, 1793, had anticipated this attitude of the Americans and made provisions for overcoming it. "One will be obliged, for example", he said, "to spend much for drink, for the Americans do not speak of the affairs of war except vis-a-vis to a bowl".<sup>92</sup>

<sup>87</sup> This reason was later given to the westerners to prevent them from taking an active part in Genêt's project, Jefferson to Governor of Kentucky, August 29, 1793, *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, I, 455.

<sup>88</sup> Governor Moultrie supported the plan because he thought it would end the Indian wars on the border. Senator Brown had written a letter of introduction for Michaux. See Genêt's report of July 25, 1793, in *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1896, I, 987-990.

<sup>89</sup> For the Mangourit correspondence relative to Genêt's projected attack on Florida, see *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1897, 569-679.

<sup>90</sup> Jefferson to the Governor of Kentucky, November 6, 1793, *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, I, 455.

<sup>91</sup> Genêt to Minister, *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1896, I, 1010-1012.

<sup>92</sup> *American Historical Review*, III, 502.

Genêt might have continued in spite of the "cold men" of Washington's cabinet, but the fiery Jacobins were soon to prove an insurmountable obstacle. In June Brissot and his friends were arrested, and by the end of October the former had been guillotined. Genêt had already been criticized for violating the neutrality of the United States;<sup>23</sup> and Washington's request for his recall, together with the attitude of the "Mountain", dominated by Robespierre, marked his fall. Genêt was recalled, but, having no desire to follow his party to the guillotine, remained in the United States.

During this critical period the Spanish officials had listened to rumors, read reports, made complaints, begged for aid, and waited for the worst. Baron Carondelet, governor of Louisiana and West Florida, had the difficult task of countering the French influence. His report on the conditions in New Orleans indicates that the revolutionists had described conditions quite accurately.<sup>94</sup> Carondelet was faithful, and efforts had been made to strengthen the defense against Americans as well as against the "ill-disposed and fanatical citizens of this Capital, whose intercourse with France fills it incessantly with restless, and turbulent men, infatuated with Liberty and Equality".<sup>95</sup> He later expressed some doubt as to his ability to defend the Spanish possessions.<sup>96</sup> In October he was given full information regarding the French project,<sup>97</sup> and in turn continued to send alarming reports to the Duke of Alcudia. On October 28 he gave an account of a Jacobin society in Philadelphia which was spreading its "pernicious and atrocious ideas" by means of a

<sup>23</sup> Deforgue's letter of July 30, 1793, Turner, "Origin of Genet's Projected Attack on Louisiana and the Floridas", in *American Historical Review*, III. 670. For another view see *ibid.*, III. 505-507.

<sup>94</sup> De Pauw mentioned plans made at a dinner given in a house of Daniel Clark on April 20, 1793, three days before Carondelet's report (see *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1896, I. 1103).

<sup>95</sup> Carondelet to Alcudia, April 23, 1793, *ibid.*, I. 974-977.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, I. 997-999.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, I. 1002-1003, 1005-1006.



printed circular, headed "Liberty and Equality", from "The Freemen of France to their brothers of Louisiana".<sup>98</sup> It declared that France, having achieved its freedom, was now "ready to give her powerful assistance to those who may be disposed to follow her virtuous example. . . . The hour has struck, Frenchmen of Louisiana; hasten to profit by the great lesson you have received". The people of Louisiana were then urged to establish a republic and to form an alliance with France and the United States.<sup>99</sup> Carondelet promised to continue his vigilance against these ideas, since their "diffusion in this province, inhabited in great part by French settlers, might have the most fatal consequences, not only here but also in the old, inland provinces of the kingdom of New Spain".<sup>100</sup> The viceroy, too, had recognized the difficulty of holding Louisiana because of its French inhabitants who did not offer much assurance of love and loyalty to the king. He also considered the possibility of the Americans taking possession of New Orleans, and who would then "aspire to other conquests by land and sea against New Spain".<sup>101</sup> The dismissal of Genêt, the neutrality of the United States, and the military activities of Carondelet promised greater security for the border provinces.

Even before Fauchet came to replace Genêt, the revolutionary enterprise seemed to be dwindling, owing to interference and a lack of support. Hammond, Tate, and Elijah Clark, all said they had enough men ready but they could do nothing without funds. Nevertheless, the project, once considered, continued to occupy men's minds. Before the end of 1793, Joel Barlow, together with Leavenworth, wrote of the

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, I. 1016-1017. Carondelet also wrote to Gayoso, governor of Natchez, asking him to get Wilkinson to notify them of any plans "contrary to the interests in Spain", October 29, 1793, *ibid.*, I. 1019-1021.

<sup>99</sup> Charles Gayarré, *History of Louisiana* (3 vols., New York, 1866), II. 337-340.

<sup>100</sup> *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1896, I. 1016-1017.

<sup>101</sup> Branciforte to Alcudia, Mexico, October 3, 1794, A. I., Estado, Mexico, Legajo 3.

advantages of the liberation of Louisiana, which would also "give an excellent example to their neighbors in Mexico and Florida, an example which would soon banish the Spanish despotism from all of South America".<sup>102</sup>

When Fauchet restricted the French activities by his proclamation of March 4, 1794, it was mainly to disavow the actions of the Girondists whose representative had violated the neutrality of the United States, and not, by any means, to indicate that France had abandoned its interest in Louisiana.<sup>103</sup> Nor had France given up the idea of emancipating Spanish America, for Flassau, in the foreign service section of the committee of public safety, declared in 1794 that France, having helped the British colonies, could do no less for the Spanish, and it might gain an immense field for its commercial activities.<sup>104</sup> The directing force might have been removed with the dismissal of Genêt but the inflammatory material remained. Not knowing of his dismissal, George Rogers Clark wrote to Genêt on April 28, 1794, informing him of the preparations being made.<sup>105</sup> He had set "eavery wheele in motion" and the work of his agents in Louisiana had been done so well that

" . . . the appearance of a small force in that Country would cause a Genl. revolt and upwards of two thousand men have been waiting with impatience to penetrate into that Country declare them selves Citizens of France and Give freedom to their neighbors on the Mississipi, . . . ".

Perhaps they were not all ready for the invasion, but Clark probably knew that he could depend on approximately such a number. Governor Carondelet continued to recognize the danger and in a military report of November 24, 1794, he

<sup>102</sup> *American Historical Review*, III. 508-510.

<sup>103</sup> Frederick J. Turner, "Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley", in *American Historical Review*, X. 264.

<sup>104</sup> Villanueva, *Napoleon y la Independencia de América*, p. 75.

<sup>105</sup> *American Historical Review*, XVIII. 780-783.

declared: "A general revolution, in my opinion, threatens Spain in America, unless it apply a powerful and speedy remedy".<sup>106</sup>

The various treaties at this time tended to diminish the immediate danger. Jay's Treaty with England, November 19, 1794, the Treaty of Basle, July 22, 1795, and the Treaty of San Lorenzo, October 27, 1795, settled many problems and rearranged the contestants; but the Spanish possessions continued to be a powerful factor in the diplomacy of the time. France, who had just been promoting a revolution in Louisiana to deprive Spain of the "key to her possessions", now waxed eloquent in picturing the advantages Spain would derive by giving up this "key" to its recent enemy. The new danger was expected to come from the English and the liberty-loving Anglo-Americans who were by 1796 penetrating far into the interior of Louisiana.<sup>107</sup> Blount's Conspiracy gives a hint of the possibility of utilizing the revolutionary spirit on the border.

#### V. MEXICO LISTENS IN

The Mexican authorities also heard about revolutionists who were coming directly from France to apply their maxims and systems to New Spain. On December 3, 1791, Mr. Folney, an American, was reported to have embarked at Bordeaux for New York as an emissary of French revolutionists. From New York he was expected to go to Martinique and from there to Mexico with instructions relative to an uprising in that colony. He was characterized as "a madman, capable of the most dangerous and extravagant undertaking", because his enthusiasm for the new French ideas had turned his head. He spoke English and Spanish fluently, and not only rapidly, but freely, and had informed a number of persons of his commission, showing a lack of tact which ought to make it easy

<sup>106</sup> Robertson, *Louisiana*, I. 299.

<sup>107</sup> Carondolet to Branciforte, New Orleans, June 7, 1796, A. I., Estado, Mexico, Legajo 6.

to discover him. Then followed a complete description of Mr. Folney, telling about his black hair, his pock-marked face, his robust build, and his taste for drinks which excluded wines and favored water and certain kinds of liqueurs. He was well supplied with funds, having two letters of credit on Bordeaux, some on American banks, and three million Louis in gold.<sup>108</sup> The viceroy was ordered to make every effort to arrest Mr. Folney, but secretly if he could, and he was to warn other colonial governors. Thereupon Revilla Gigedo gave the strictest orders to the officials at the places where Mr. Folney might enter the country.<sup>109</sup> This new danger called for defense measures and in a letter to the home government the viceroy expressed the hope that his majesty would send him troops and officers for the preservation of his dominions.<sup>110</sup>

Four days after the sending of a report on Folney, March 3, a royal order was dispatched to the viceroy informing of the designs of six emissaries who were to embark from Brest with a number of "seductive" papers to convey the ideas of independence to Mexico.<sup>111</sup> At their head was Mr. Kersaint, probably the French admiral who advocated the building of a large navy to give strength to the revolutionary government. The viceroy expressed the opinion that by redoubling his efforts these enemies could be arrested and their papers discovered.<sup>112</sup> He appeared confident, but the French Revolution was beginning to create trouble for Spain in its colonies.

A new cause for disturbance came from El Guarico in Santo Domingo. The governor of the Spanish part of that island, as well as the governor of Cuba, informed the viceroy

<sup>108</sup> Instructions to Revilla Gigedo, Aranjuez, February 29, 1792, *ibid.*, Legajo 3.

<sup>109</sup> The governor of Vera Cruz informed the viceroy of his precautions, May 19, 1792, *ibid.*, Legajo 16.

<sup>110</sup> Revilla Gigedo to Aranda, Mexico, May 31, 1792, *ibid.*, Legajo 2.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.* Folney, too, had spoken of other revolutionary agents. See order to Revilla Gigedo of February 29, 1792, *ibid.*



of a revolutionary plot of Mateo Coste, a Frenchman, married in New Spain, and owner of the hacienda, "el Zapo", in the province of Oaxaca.<sup>113</sup> Don Mateo was by profession a surgeon, but his occupation was that of a contraband trader. He was reported to have been in El Guarico in July, together with two other Frenchmen from Mexico, plotting against New Spain. He assured his associates that the inhabitants were "oppressed by the Spanish government and by the ministers of the Catholic religion", and that they were much disposed to break the yoke of both. Possessed of maps of the country, he proposed a landing at Vera Cruz as the place most suitable for their project. The persons of Guarico to whom Coste and his companions confided their plan suggested sending to the coast of New Spain a number of negroes who had been expelled from Santo Domingo. Together with the French leaders and the negro auxiliaries were to go a few engineers and several missionary agents to introduce and spread the new doctrines and to prepare the way. Incidentally, they were to carry a large amount of contraband goods.<sup>114</sup>

The report, having come from a foreigner in Havana, seemed not to be accepted as entirely reliable by the governor;<sup>115</sup> but it was felt deserving of special care and action by the viceroy. He appointed Captain Ignacio Olaeta of the Coast Guard to go on a secret mission to San Martin de Acayucan to get all the information he could about the Frenchman, Coste; his associates; his ranch, "el Zapo"; and his whereabouts and occupation.<sup>116</sup> He was instructed to look for maps, plans, and letters to be sent immediately to the viceroy, and to make a complete list of illicit goods found. He was

<sup>113</sup> Revilla Gigedo to Florida Blanca, Mexico, March 31, 1792; report of the governor of Cuba, copied in Mexico, August 30, 1792; another letter from the governor, August 4, 1792, *ibid.*

<sup>114</sup> Another letter stated that only Coste was in El Guarico and that the other two Frenchmen were in Cuba, *ibid.*

<sup>115</sup> Las Casas to Revilla Gigedo, August 4, 1792; and Revilla Gigedo to Las Casas, copied in Mexico, August 30, 1792, *ibid.*

<sup>116</sup> Instructions to Olaeta, Mexico, August 27, 1792, *ibid.*

to be given every aid necessary for the apprehension of this dangerous Frenchman or any of his associates. Even though the reports were found to be untrue, Olaeta should arrest Coste or any other foreigner he found, for the mere fact of not being a Spaniard was cause for imprisonment.<sup>117</sup>

Obviously, the viceroy considered the project quite serious for he went to the extent of furnishing funds for Olaeta's mission in a manner contrary to royal orders. He gave instructions to the intendant of Oaxaca and the governor of Vera Cruz as well as to minor officials to give aid in men, money, or services to the captain. The expenditures should have been submitted to a superior junta of the real hacienda,<sup>118</sup> but the unusual circumstances and the need for secrecy made him act independently.<sup>119</sup> Furthermore, the viceroy was responsible for the preservation of the kingdom and considered his extra-legal procedure necessary. There was, however, no intention on the part of the viceroy to be extravagant, and he ordered Olaeta to do all with the greatest economy, for even saving the kingdom should be done economically. Owing to the immediate dangers to his dominions, the king soon approved the viceroy's arbitrary actions and advised him that he could continue to act independently in similar cases, being responsible only to the king.<sup>120</sup> In fact, he admitted that he was pleased with the prompt action of the viceroy in verifying the revolutionary reports.<sup>121</sup>

Captain Olaeta began his secret work at Acayucan in September, where he soon verified some of the reports about Coste,<sup>122</sup> but none of the suspects was there to be apprehended. From Juan Mendez, captain of the brigantine *Campechano*, he learned that Coste had departed on that vessel on March 19,

<sup>117</sup> " . . . pues solo con la calidad de no ser Español ha de ser preso", *ibid.*

<sup>118</sup> Aranjuez, February 27, 1793, *ibid.*

<sup>119</sup> Revilla Gigedo to Gardoqui, Mexico, August 30, 1792, *ibid.*

<sup>120</sup> Aranjuez, February 27, 1793, *ibid.*

<sup>121</sup> Report to Alcudia on the King's order, March 15, 1793, *ibid.*

<sup>122</sup> Summary of viceroy's reports, Aranjuez, February 27, 1793, *ibid.*

1790. Coste had said that he would return after four months to be married, but he had failed to do so, giving the Spaniards an idea as to what sort of Frenchman he was. It was expected, however, that Don Mateo would return to a place between Guazacoalcos and Alvarado with a ship-load of illicit commerce.<sup>123</sup> Since there seemed to be little opportunity to apprehend Coste at Acayucan, the viceroy ordered Captain Olaeta to return to Vera Cruz by spring and resume his command of two coast-guard vessels to watch for the Frenchman by sea.<sup>124</sup> Olaeta examined all the boats that entered Guazacoalcos and notified his superior; but neither in his report of May 31, nor of July 31, did the viceroy give any new information about Coste and his associates. Nevertheless, he ordered Olaeta to continue watching, not only for Coste, but to prevent any other project of similar purpose.<sup>125</sup>

El Guarico was now to take on a greater interest, for it served as a link between the project of Coste and the revolutionary schemes of Genêt. The French fleet which had been stationed at el Guarico was reported to have left to furnish naval aid for Genêt's undertaking. George Hammond, English minister to the United States, informed the governor of Cuba that the fleet had arrived and that Genêt was active in recruiting sailors, even securing Americans. It was believed that an attack would be made on the Spanish dominions within a few weeks. This report was substantiated by Ygnacio de Viar, Spanish representative in Philadelphia.<sup>126</sup> However, dissension among the commanders of the fleet gave the Spaniards some hope of safety, and the dismissal of Genêt must have been encouraging. Colonial officials continued to make

<sup>123</sup> Revilla Gigedo to Aranda, Mexico, January 12, 1793, *ibid.*

<sup>124</sup> Revilla Gigedo to Aranda, Mexico, March 31, 1793, *ibid.* This measure was also approved by the king, Aranjuez, April 27, 1793, *ibid.*

<sup>125</sup> Revilla Gigedo to Alcudia, *ibid.*

<sup>126</sup> Hammond to Las Casas, Philadelphia, August 14, 1793, with the viceroy's report, Mexico, November 6, 1793; Araoz to Las Casas, Havana, September 24, 1793, *ibid.*

efforts to check any new danger, and well they might, for in France, on the Mexican border, and in Mexico the ideas of the French Revolution were laying the foundation of the war for independence.

## VI. THE FRENCH IN MEXICO

Rigid laws against foreigners had not prevented the French from entering Mexico.<sup>127</sup> The establishment of the Bourbon king on the Spanish throne was followed by some degree of official leniency toward the French, although they were generally disliked by the Spaniards. After the cession of Louisiana to Spain quite a number of Frenchmen were employed in the Spanish colonial service.<sup>128</sup> Others drifted across the Louisiana border into Mexican territory and were tolerated, some came with Spanish officials as their servants and others came individually and unattached. Even the viceroys of Mexico brought French cooks to the land from which foreigners were excluded, as did several other officials. Juan Lausel (Locel), who was tried for sedition and accused of planning to poison his master, was the French cook of Revilla Gigedo;<sup>129</sup> Pedro Laborra came to Mexico as the cook of Bucareli; George Cap was for a long time in the service of Conde de Gálvez;<sup>130</sup> Nicolas Hos came as the majordomo of Cavallero de Croix; and Andres Courbiene and Nicolas Lemee had come to the Provincias Internas with Athanase de Mézières.<sup>131</sup> Governor Nava of the eastern provinces gave the

<sup>127</sup> For the evasion of the law against foreigners, see Lillian E. Fisher, *Viceroyal Administration in the Spanish-American Colonies* (Berkeley, 1926), 323-328.

<sup>128</sup> The drastic plan to punish by death any French trader found among the Indians was soon found impracticable, and toleration was followed by employment. Herbert E. Bolton, ed., *Athanase de Mézières and the Louisiana-Texas Frontier, 1768-1780* (2 vols., Cleveland, 1914), I. 88.

<sup>129</sup> Branciforte to Revilla Gigedo, Mexico, September 24, 1794; and report of the trial of Frenchmen by Caamaño, Mexico, September 28, 1794, A. I., Estado, Mexico, Legajo 3.

<sup>130</sup> Report of George Cap, October 4, 1796, *ibid.*, Legajo 5.

<sup>131</sup> Nava to Branciforte, Chihuahua, August 6, 1795, *ibid.*, Legajo 18.



names of several others who had come from Louisiana, most of whom he considered as being good citizens. In a trial of a group of Frenchmen, two were found to be doctors, some were cooks, but most of them were said to be barbers who had entered the country without license.<sup>132</sup> In addition to cooks and barbers, some served as military men, others served as traders, musicians, farmers, or miners.

Revilla Gigedo had been quite lenient towards the French in Mexico and had tried to apprehend only those who were suspected or accused of encouraging the overthrow of the Spanish power in Mexico. When Branciforte became viceroy, he sent a report to the home government in which he said that he admired the tolerance of his predecessor for permitting the residence of the French in Mexico, and then he proceeded to condemn him for the very tolerance which had aroused his admiration.<sup>133</sup> The war which Spain was then conducting against the French and their revolutionary ideas made it seem reasonable and necessary that the viceroy should carry on an investigation about these "fanatical and seductive men" whom he found living freely in Mexico, "diametrically opposed to the wise and just" provisions of the Spanish government.<sup>134</sup> Branciforte read reports about the French and he heard rumors of their assemblies and disputes, but decided to postpone action until he found definite evidence of their activities.

The occasion came when on the morning of August 24, 1794, a seditious paper was found posted in one of the most conspicuous of public places.<sup>135</sup> In the investigation that followed the author escaped detection, but a number of Frenchmen were arrested for holding views which favored the activities of the revolutionary assembly of France. On September 10 the viceroy sent a circular order to the intendants of

<sup>132</sup> Camaaño's report, September 28, 1794, *ibid.*, Legajo 3.

<sup>133</sup> Branciforte to Alcudia, Mexico, October 3, 1794, *ibid.*, Legajo 4.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*

Mexico, asking them to give him an exact account of all the foreigners residing in their respective districts. The conduct of each one was to be observed secretly and suspicious characters were to be arrested.<sup>136</sup> Some time elapsed before they could comply with this order, but enough suspects were soon found in Mexico to provide an interesting trial. A number of Frenchmen had been arrested at the inn of Juan Aroche where they had drunk to the health of Spain's enemy, France, and where they had played a prohibited game of cards, merely to amuse themselves by trying their luck, they said.

It was found that they were accustomed to meet in this inn and discuss the views and activities of the French assembly. They received letters from France, from the French islands of the West Indies, and from Philadelphia; and were thus kept fairly well informed. Juan Abadi had been especially active in bringing reports from France to add zest to their conversations. In addition to letters they obtained other revolutionary material, such as a speech by Lafayette brought by Pedro Lafarga. More dangerous, perhaps, was the presence of *La Marseillaise* with its stirring, revolutionary strains and its appeal "To arms!" Later the viceroy reported the introduction of a manuscript with this title: *Discurso pronunciado por Boissi d'Anglas, miembro de la Junta de Salud Publica en la Convencion de 30 de Enero de 1795*.<sup>137</sup> The startling information revealed by this investigation showed the need for greater vigilance.

A large number of the suspects were found to be partisans of the French assembly. Some of the more bold, such as Juan Malvert, had declared in public that "man was free and equal", that the king was different from others only in wearing a crown, that the fundamental tenets of the assembly ought to be followed by everyone, and, finally, that it was well

<sup>136</sup> Branciforte to Alcudia, Mexico, December 3, 1794, *ibid.*, Legajo 3.

<sup>137</sup> Branciforte to the Intendant of Puebla, Mexico, September 16, 1795, *ibid.*, Legajo 4.

that the sovereigns were guillotined. In justification of this he said that the queen had been a prostitute who had destroyed the kingdom, and that the king had been a tyrant. Similar statements had been made by Estevan Morel, a doctor, who added that king had been a drunkard.<sup>138</sup> These opinions, revolting to the Spanish rulers, were shared by a number of Malvert's associates.<sup>139</sup> Their views on religion were also investigated and found deficient. Again Malvert was discovered to be the most depraved of a depraved lot. He admitted that he had little or no religion except that of honesty and good relations with his fellowmen, a religion he had acquired from nature. He was also accused of not showing the proper respect and adoration when in the presence of the divine sacrament.

These radical views were not merely the idle philosophies of a few Frenchmen: they were being used for the overthrow of the *ancien régime* in New Spain. Revolutionary doctrines were preparing the way for the anticipated supremacy of French arms. Abadi had received a letter, according to a witness, informing him of the success of the French armies, of cities already captured, and that Cadiz and other Spanish cities would soon be taken in order to convert all to the French system. He had informed a woman that within a short time she would have French goods, and these, very cheaply. There were other evidences that France was expected to extend its control over Mexico; and not only Mexico, but, according to rumor, France was to become the mistress of the world and give liberty to all. A ship was expected to arrive in Mexico to bring "equality" to the people—a cargo that could easily stimulate the most extravagant ideas. Further investigation

<sup>138</sup> Report of the trial by Valenzuela and Luzero, August 9, 1795, *ibid.*

<sup>139</sup> Nicolas Bardel, Juan Durrúa, Manuel Guicar, Carlos del Mazo, Vicente Luye, Luis Lardo, Pedro Bonet, Juan Lausel, Pedro Lafarga, the surgeon Durrey, and Juan Savera. Two others who were not French were included, José Ximenes and Manuel Endrina. Report by Caamaño, Mexico, September 28, 1794, *ibid.*, Legajo 3.

showed that preparations were being made to help the world movement of the French. Pedro Bonet was accused of making armor for this purpose, although he declared that it was for the protection of travelers. The surgeon, Durrey, was thought to be receiving money from his countrymen to win the support of the army by filling vacancies with his own recruits. A similar charge was made against Juan Fournier.<sup>140</sup> In the trial of Guerrero it was testified that Durrey was active in spreading the doctrines of the French assembly among the common people, making them hate kings in general and their own king in particular. His efforts were directed towards securing help for the French when they should come to New Spain, as he assured the people they would.<sup>141</sup>

Juan Guerrero, a disgruntled Spaniard who had served as treasurer of a Manila ship, being down on his luck and lacking funds, decided to head a revolt in Mexico. He said that he had been influenced by French ideas and his chief accomplices were found to be French.<sup>142</sup> His undigested plot was ridiculed as being the work of one half mad. Considering his lack of means and the small number of associates, one can scarcely believe that he could have been serious; and yet there is a possibility that the French had convinced him that their nation was about to bring freedom and that it would be to his advantage to be among the leaders to reap the greater reward. Juan Vara, who had been imprisoned for listening to Guerrero, belittled the project, saying that the only support came from a barber without means and without friends.<sup>143</sup> Nevertheless, the trial led to the arrest of several persons, a few of

<sup>140</sup> The most complete report on the Frenchmen is by Caamaño, Mexico, September 28, 1794; supplemented by Valenzuela to Branciforte, Mexico, October 1, 1794; *ibid.*

<sup>141</sup> Valenzuela to Branciforte, Mexico, October 1, 1794, *ibid.*

<sup>142</sup> The viceroy, at least, held the French largely responsible, Branciforte to Alcudia, Mexico, October 3, 1794; see also report of the trial by Luzero, December 2, 1794, *ibid.*

<sup>143</sup> Report of Vara's petition for liberty, July 27, 1796, *ibid.*, Legajo 20.



whom were French. These may or may not have been associated with Guerrero in his plot, but in the report sent by Valenzuela, it was stated that Durrey, Mexanes, and Fournier had spoken of the tyranny of kings, and of the advantages of the assembly as being in conformity with the "natural liberty of man and the equality of all". Such were the doctrines which had destroyed the Bourbon government of France and now threatened the government of New Spain.

The inquisition played its part in the extermination of the French evil. Several of the defendants who had already been tried in the colonial courts found themselves confronted by additional charges from the holy office of the inquisition. The most prominent of these were Juan Lausel, the unfortunate cook of Revilla Gigedo, and Dr. Estevan Morel. In addition to being guilty of having favored the execution of the king of France, Lausel was found to be a member of the freemasons, as was also Morel, and it was reported that there were several others in the city. Morel had exalted the arms of France and had declared that the maxims of the assembly would soon be transplanted to Mexico, and he had spread other views, repugnant to both church and monarchy. Furthermore, he carried on a correspondence with relatives in France who were also supporters of the Revolution.<sup>144</sup> The archbishop of Mexico lauded the zeal and efficiency of the inquisition for having arrested many Frenchmen, and a few Europeans and creoles who were, "perhaps, infatuated by them".<sup>145</sup>

He also surveyed their "iniquitous projects" to destroy religion and "to establish in this country anarchy and the impious government of the French convention". They had planned, he thought, to gain control of the army, to liberate the prisoners, take possession of the treasury, depose the viceroy and the archbishop, and—a dreadful thought—"perhaps

<sup>144</sup> Report of the trial by Valenzuela and Luzero, August 9, 1795, *ibid.*, Legajo 4.

<sup>145</sup> Mexico, October 4, 1794, *ibid.*, Legajo 22.

kill them''. Revolution would be followed by the establishment of republican government. He was now thankful, however, that all had been saved by the timely intervention of God. Nevertheless, he feared that it would be difficult to restore the order and tranquility which had been disturbed by these "emissaries of Satan and others who have seduced and spread and sown the most perverse doctrines against the faith, the customs, and the dutiful obedience to H. M. and other superiors''. Precautious, he instructed the ecclesiastics, secular and regular, to be on the alert against the activities of the French and their accomplices. He took pride in stating that "up to the present" he did not know of any priest taking part in the foreign intrigues.<sup>146</sup>

It was evident from the discoveries made by Branciforte and his associates that there was reason to fear the French and that drastic measures were necessary to cleanse the country of their dangerous doctrines. The viceroy was pleased with his results so far, but was spurred on to greater activities in order to leave no trace of their seditious work. He would secure by every means possible "the public tranquility of these rich and precious dominions where flourish the most tender and true sentiments of religion, love, and loyalty to the King'', and to fulfill this high-sounding purpose he instructed the officials of the provinces to apprehend every Frenchman within their jurisdictions.<sup>147</sup>

In order to carry out this sweeping plan he sent detailed instructions to the provincial authorities. If a Frenchman were suspected he was to be arrested and put into prison, deprived of all communication, and his property was to be seized to pay the expenses of his trial and confinement. The same was to be done with other Frenchmen of whom there was no other suspicion than "that of being individuals of

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>147</sup> Aguilar, "*Sobre expulsion de Franceses de Nueva España, 1795 y 96*", *ibid.*, Legajo 5.

that revolutionary nation", although their imprisonment was not to be as harsh. There were a few to be excepted from this general arrest, such as those who had married Spaniards, or the few who had letters of naturalization, and men owning large estates, extensive businesses, or holding important offices. These, providing they had the public recommendation of irreprehensible conduct, were not to be apprehended, nor their property seized; but they were to be notified that they were to be confined in their haciendas or business places, giving security for their person or property, and a complete inventory was to be made of their possessions.<sup>148</sup> Spaniards who were found holding the views of the French during these turbulent times were also to be seized. To insure success the authorities were warned to proceed with the greatest secrecy; and, as had been done with the Jesuits before, the suspects were all to be apprehended on the morning of the same day. The date was set for January 1, 1795,<sup>149</sup> but the viceroy reported in his letter of January 15 that on that day had taken place the arrest of the French residents of Mexico.<sup>150</sup>

The viceroy had already written to Alcudia to explain and justify his action.<sup>151</sup> He did not have complete information on all the foreigners in Mexico, he said, but he thought he had enough on the French, who were the suspected ones, to proceed with a general arrest. Although no serious events had taken place yet, the danger from these restless persons was so great that they could no longer be tolerated in liberty. They were to be kept in the provincial prisons for greater economy and security; and they should be treated "with the humanity becoming to the noble and religious character of the Spanish nation", although the members of the nation "which

<sup>148</sup> Branciforte to the intendants of Vera Cruz, etc., Mexico, December 3, 1794, *ibid.*, Legajo 3.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>150</sup> Aguilar, "*Sobre expulsion de Franceses de Nueva España, 1795 y 96*", *ibid.*, Legajo 5.

<sup>151</sup> Mexico, December 3, 1794, *ibid.*, Legajo 3.

has overturned the system of the world with their fanaticism and their execrable crimes'' do not deserve it.<sup>152</sup>

Some difficulty was encountered in the Provincias Internas, owing to the large number of Frenchmen who had come there from Louisiana.<sup>153</sup> Pedro de Nava, the governor, suggested that special provisions ought to be made for several of these. By August, 1795, he had made a fairly long list of Frenchmen who were found in the five provinces of Nueva Vizcaya, Sonora, Coahuila, Texas, and New Mexico. This belated report included a classified description of each one with such items as: where they came from, when, their ages, and their occupations. A few had been liberated, especially those who came with De Mézières.<sup>154</sup> Later he acknowledged the receipt of the royal order of May 22 in which he was instructed to prevent the introduction of "the detestable and pernicious maxims of an ill-directed liberty", and said that he had renewed his orders for vigilance.<sup>155</sup> The viceroy, apparently quite satisfied with the work of the frontier officials, sent a favorable report to the Duke of Alcudia on August 31.<sup>156</sup>

The royal order of May 22, which the viceroy acknowledged on August 30, was largely a reiteration of Branciforte's former instructions for the apprehension of the French. Seditious persons were to be punished and those who were dangerous were to be sent to Spain, but those who were deserving of indulgence were to be tolerated and made to live in accordance with the laws of the Indies.<sup>157</sup> Finding his policy approved by the home government and his orders carried out in Mexico, the viceroy continued the persecution which had begun

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>153</sup> Nava to Alcudia, Chihuahua, February 5, 1795, *ibid.*, Legajo 18.

<sup>154</sup> Report of August 6, 1795, *ibid.* Athanase de Mézières, although French, had been retained by Governor O'Reilly in the Spanish service with the title of lieutenant-governor at Natchitoches, Bolton, ed., *Athanase de Mézières*, I. 79.

<sup>155</sup> Nava to Alcudia, Chihuahua, October 6, 1795, A. I., Estado, Mexico, Legajo 18.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, Legajo 4.

<sup>157</sup> Branciforte to Alcudia, Mexico, August 30, 1795, *ibid.*



so well. By the end of October he had twenty-one French prisoners ready for deportation.<sup>158</sup> This was, however, only a part of the undesirables, for the investigations lagged, and there were many yet who awaited the court's decision. One of these, Juan Fournier, died, but this interruption did not end his trial.<sup>159</sup> By December the viceroy reported that the investigations were nearly completed and that he was ready to enforce the punishments.<sup>160</sup> During the early part of the year 1796 the Frenchmen from the provinces were being gathered at Vera Cruz in preparation for deportation. On May 14 the governor of Vera Cruz informed Branciforte that two vessels, with twenty-one Frenchmen on the first and twenty on the second, had sailed for Cadiz.<sup>161</sup>

The viceroy's efforts to rid Mexico of the French menace had met with general approval and a fair measure of success. He has been criticized for his severe methods, but the French Revolution had made Frenchmen undesirable associates; and the war which broke out between France and Spain early in 1793, made it practically a measure of self-defense to change from an attitude of toleration to one of persecution. Branciforte had to enforce the old orders against foreigners to keep out revolutionary ideas which came mostly from the French; and secondly, he had to protect Mexico from the people of an enemy nation. The result of his investigations seem to warrant his zeal. However, before the work had been completed and the French expelled, the European war was ended by the Treaty of Basle in July, 1795. This removed only the second and perhaps the least important of the two dangers.

In the following year Spain, now allied with France, found it necessary to relax its severity against its neighbor's people. Adet, the French minister in Philadelphia, protested to Jaudenes, the Spanish minister, against the rigorous treat-

<sup>158</sup> Branciforte to Alcudia, Mexico, October 23, 1795, *ibid.*

<sup>159</sup> Branciforte to Alcudia, Mexico, September 26, 1795, *ibid.*

<sup>160</sup> Branciforte to Alcudia, Mexico, December 2, 1795, *ibid.*

<sup>161</sup> Branciforte to Principe de la Paz (Alcudia), Mexico, May 27, 1796, *ibid.*

ment of his countrymen in Mexico. He thought the Mexican clergy had contributed greatly to their distress. The victims of the persecution had written to Adet, declaring that their condition had not improved after the signing of the treaty of peace. Contrary to the agreement made with France in articles ten and eleven, they had not been given their liberty and property. Josef Ygnacio de Viar, another Spanish representative in the United States, declared that the reports from the French were not in keeping with the humanity and kindness of the treatment by the Spanish government; nevertheless, he did send Adet's letter to the viceroy who forwarded it to Godoy.<sup>162</sup>

The reaction then set in and the Spanish government began to comply with the French petitions for liberty and the restitution of property. Every case seemed to be handled individually and governmental machinery moved slowly. George Cap, who had lived in Mexico for twelve years and said that his only crime was that of being a foreigner, requested his freedom in October, 1796,<sup>163</sup> and received it in April, 1798.<sup>164</sup> During the latter year and for several years following, the viceroy's reports dealt with the royal orders for the release of Frenchmen.<sup>165</sup> Not all were granted their freedom, however. Durrey, one of the most prominent of the defendants, made repeated efforts to get permission to return to Mexico for a year to see his family and to make arrangements for his property. He was aided by the French ambassador who, between 1800 and 1805, made frequent petitions in his behalf, but

<sup>162</sup> Adet to Jaudenes, Philadelphia, 13 floreal An. 4e (copy signed by Viar); Viar to Adet, Philadelphia, May 7, 1796; Branciforte to Principe de la Paz, Mexico, September 26, 1796, *ibid.*, Legajo 6.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, Legajo 5.

<sup>164</sup> Report of Branciforte, April 29, 1798, *ibid.*, Legajo 8.

<sup>165</sup> Letters numbered 4-8, 28, 53, and 621-626 for the year 1798, *ibid.* Bancroft criticises Zamacois for supposing that property was restored to the French after their liberation but it would seem from the viceroy's reports that this was frequently done. Cf. Bancroft, *History of Mexico*, III. 487; and Nicete de Zamacois, *Historia de Méjico* (18 vols., Mexico, 1877-82), V. 705.

without success.<sup>166</sup> The Spanish government, having just rid Mexico of the most bold and dangerous propagandists, had no intention of turning them loose. Others who, like George Cap, were merely guilty of being foreigners were granted their liberty and given back their property.

The treaty of Basle in 1795 and the alliance with France in 1796 decreased the danger of French efforts to overthrow the old system in Mexico. Nevertheless, the French Revolution had already left its stamp on Mexico and would, no doubt, continue to exert its influence. However, as the French menace seemed to decrease, the real danger of revolutionary projects was transferred to Spain's new enemy, England.

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<sup>166</sup> Correspondence on Durrey, A. I., Estado, Mexico, Legajo 23.

## BOOK REVIEWS

*Nicaragua and the United States, 1909-1927.* By ISAAC JOSLIN COX. (Boston: World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, 1927, Vol. X., No. 7. Pp. 190.)

*American Policy in Nicaragua.* By HENRY L. STIMSON. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927. Pp. 129.)

*The Looting of Nicaragua.* By RAFAEL DE NOGALES. (New York: Robert M. McBride & Company, 1928. Pp. 304.)

*A Brief History of the Relations between the United States and Nicaragua, 1909-1928.* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1928. Pp. 77.)

These four small books dealing with the recent relations of the United States and Nicaragua have come from the press within the past few months. Since they supplement and sometimes contradict each other, it seems well to review them together. Dealing with such a contentious subject and one so liable to arouse intense partisanship, they naturally do not give the same interpretation to all the facts, yet by reading them all and making due allowances for the bias of the respective writers one may eventually arrive at a clear understanding of the truth of this difficult and much discussed problem.

The reader should begin by making himself familiar with the contents of the first book on the list, *Nicaragua and the United States* by Cox, for the reason that it is the work of a trained historian who tells the whole story in an impartial manner giving credit or blame to both sides whenever it becomes due, but generally stating the facts and leaving the reader to form his own conclusions. Another reason for reading this book first is that it begins the story far enough back to furnish a clear background for more recent events. In Chapter I, "The Background of Intervention" the "Land and the People" are described; "the Political Prelude" is played through and "the Overthrow of Zelaya" is related; Chapter II tells of the first "Fiscal and Military Intervention" by the United States down to 1924; Chapters III, "Intervention and Unionism" and IV, "The Renewal of the Washington Pact", tell how Nicaragua's insistence in upholding the



Bryan-Chamorro treaty blocked attempts to form a Central American union, and how at Washington in 1923 conventions were agreed upon for the establishment of a Central American tribunal of international commissions of inquiry, and for the limitation of armament, as well as for various economic purposes; Chapter V, "Civil Strife and the Second Intervention", resumes the story of events in Nicaragua and carries it down to Sandino's refusal to obey the orders of Moncada to surrender his arms and his resistance to the United States marines.

*Nicaragua and the United States* is an extremely accurate and timely book written in a lively style that holds the interest. This work gives evidence of exhaustive study, for the author substantiates his statements with frequent footnotes and with transcripts of the more important documents assembled in four appendices. In the front is a useful black and white sketch map of Nicaragua.

Professor Cox tells the difficult and complicated story of political and financial intrigues in a vivid and interesting way. He recounts the incidents of the American interventions, leaving the reader to decide for himself as to their wisdom or necessity. This book is the work of a scholar, a straight thinker, and an impartial historian who knows his field thoroughly. Having read it, one is prepared to discount the one-sidedness of the other books.

In 1927, Mr. Henry L. Stimson was sent by President Coolidge to Nicaragua to recommend measures for a settlement between the contending factions. Naturally one who makes recommendations must stand by them when they are adopted and one is bound to defend the policy of the administration which entrusts one with this duty. This Mr. Stimson has done ably and with apparent candor in his *American Policy in Nicaragua*. This book evidently was written in the sincere belief that the author had discovered the correct solution of an intricate problem, yet it also gives the impression of being an attempt to whitewash the administration at Washington. Viewed as such, it is well written and is interesting reading.

The author begins with a chapter on the "Historical Background" in which he brings the narrative down to March 1927 when Díaz, the conservative president, was in complete control of the western portion of Nicaragua, including Managua, the capital, while the revolutionists were in possession of the smaller towns on the Atlantic seaboard, and their army under General Moncada was in contact with the government forces in the interior not far from Matagalpa.

In Chapter II Mr. Stimson describes his own part in bringing about the "settlement of 1927" in which he pledged the United States to supervise a fair and free election in 1928 and the organization of a Nicaraguan constabulary, provided both sides would refrain from further fighting and would deliver their arms to American custody. This settlement has so far been successful with the exception of the refusal of the liberal, General Sandino, to recognize Moncada's orders directing him to surrender his arms and to cease fighting.

In the third and last chapter, "Landmarks of our Policy in the Future", Mr. Stimson summarizes the reasons for his estimate that the policy of the present administration in the United States has been correct. He calls attention to his belief that the Monroe Doctrine is "a solemn assertion of a duty on our part" toward our Hispanic American neighbors; he insists that the United States has repeatedly protected these nations from European interference, has aided them in settling their own disputes, and has helped them with advice in "matters of sanitation, finance, economic development and military instruction"; that the only cases in which the United States has exhibited an imperialistic policy—the Mexican war and William Walker's filibustering expedition to Nicaragua—were due to the influence of negro slavery, long since a dead issue in the United States; and that our real attitude toward the sovereignty of Hispanic-American nations has been shown by the liberality of our conduct in the successive Pan American conferences and the Pan American Union. Finally he declares that the necessity for protecting the Panama Canal, and thereby the safety of the United States itself, requires us to protect the Caribbean Sea from European encroachment and therefore to insure the stability of those countries which border on that area. He complains of fear that "a cry will be raised in this country that our government is going into 'dollar diplomacy' and that we are exploiting a helpless republic" and admits that our financial policy was obstructed by such an outcry seventeen years ago. He asserts his belief that in no way have we transgressed upon the sovereignty and independence of Nicaragua and that every step which we have taken has been at the earnest request of that government and concludes his book with an appeal that this policy of helpfulness may not be rendered ineffective by ignorant or partisan attacks in the United States.

Mr. Stimson, however, does not have the last word, for Rafael de Nogales takes up the cudgels in his *Looting of Nicaragua*. This author takes issue with those who believe Moncada a pure-minded patriot. Stimson stated that that general was willing to sacrifice personal ambitions and party interest to the higher welfare of his country. The author of *Looting of Nicaragua*, on the other hand, claims that Moncada is not a true representative of the liberal party but that he surrendered his army and betrayed his cause in order to seek the presidency for himself. Cox also notes the charge that Moncada so maneuvered his forces as to make surrender inevitable and that he was willing to sacrifice even the independence of his country to his own ambition to become chief of the liberal party and president of Nicaragua. It seems that Mr. Stimson in his eagerness to effect a settlement between the two parties may have misread the character of Moncada and accepted him too much at his own valuation. In that case, Mr. Stimson's visions of a satisfactory adjustment of the difficulties in Nicaragua may be long in realization and Rafael de Nogales may be right in claiming that Sandino, that so-called brigand at the head of a band of mercenaries, intent on violence and pillage, is the true patriot and the sincerest representative of liberal principles in Nicaragua.

There seems to be much of truth in *The Looting of Nicaragua*, although the bitterness with which it is brought out deprives it of much of its force. The author has indeed dipped his pen in vitriol to write about "dollar diplomacy" and Adolfo Díaz, its puppet president. The author's description of the destruction of the city of Chinandega by bombs dropped by American aviators would be too horrible for belief, were it not supported by photographs showing the ghastly results. The author closes this chapter with the question:

Is the slaughter of women in the interests of sordid business and sinister politics of no moment to them (American women in their various powerful organizations) because these poor, helpless victims are only Nicaraguan women?

Rafael de Nogales supports his accounts of atrocities committed by Americans, and of financial irregularities effected by both American and Nicaraguan agents of "dollar diplomacy", by numerous documents, some of which have the appearance of weight and validity, while others are mere ex-parte statements for the press. On this

score Mr. Stimson has shown that the revolutionists having control of the east coast with its cable communication, had furnished most of the political statements which reached the American public so that they had already warped the accuracy of our American news long before the reports of Díaz sympathizers, sent from the west coast by mail, could be received.

The sources of information on which *The Looting of Nicaragua* is based are enumerated in a four page bibliography at the end of the volume. The book comprises fifteen chapters describing the author's observations while traveling through Nicaragua and his deductions as to men and events. Rafael de Nogales, a Venezuelan, is bitterly opposed to American intervention, and is a strong sympathizer with the liberals in Nicaragua. The sixteen illustrations are made from photographs of men prominent in recent events in Nicaragua and of events which evidently came within the observation of the author. On the inside of the front and back covers are reproductions of sketch maps made by General Nogales during his stay in the Central-Nicaraguan jungles. Neither this nor any of the other three books covered by this review are provided with indices.

The fourth book under review is a pamphlet of seventy-seven pages published by the United States Government printing office and entitled *A Brief History of the Relations between the United States and Nicaragua, 1909-1928*. The name of the author is not given. Possibly this is a compilation as it is written in the dry and formal style of a departmental document. It is divided into paragraphs rather than chapters and contains three appendices listing the appeals for protection from American firms and individuals in Nicaragua, a resumé of principal engagements in which American marines have participated, and a transcript of the Bryan-Chamorro treaty.

This pamphlet must be regarded as a state department document. It naturally puts the best interpretation on all the acts of the United States government and of the conservative regime in Nicaragua. Furthermore it is not entirely free from sins of omission. As a source for facts, however, it will be useful to the historian.

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*Mexico Past and Present.* By GEORGE B. WINTON. (Nashville: The Cokesbury Press, 1928.)

It is a noteworthy fact that the important books of the past decade on Mexico written in the United States have been sympathetic accounts of the current revolution. Most of them have come out during the past five years. The striking thing about them all has been the moderate tone they have employed, not merely in describing and espousing the ideals of the revolution, but in pointing out its defects in conception and execution. They have served, inasmuch as they are widely read in both republics, to educate Americans and Mexicans alike in the principles and perils of free government. Probably they have wielded a potent influence in shaping the political activity and in truth the social destiny of Mexico. For, however much the Mexicans may suspect and dislike American imperialism, they are tremendously concerned with what liberal Americans think about them, and anxious with a perfectly human and understandable psychology to win approval for what they do. Undoubtedly the current stream of American writings on Mexico has been no negligible factor in helping that country to pass, for the moment at least, with dignity and safety through the crisis of Obregón's assassination and the political uncertainty thereby created.

Dr. Winton's years of life in Mexico have given him vision and the right to interpret the country to us. His interpretation takes the form of historical narrative though he protests that his work is not a history. There are few bibliographical references in the work. It flows smoothly from Cortes to Calles, and, given the character of the book, contains little for the historian to correct. The only danger is that the average reader, to whom the book is addressed, will absorb the idea that Mexican history and conditions are wonderfully simple, whereas they are in fact as complex as those of the French or the Russian revolution.

It is a pleasure to record here that a Methodist missionary in Mexico does not hesitate to say that the early religious zeal of the Spanish priests, supplanting the native religions, took away something it was not capable of replacing. The interpretation of religion as an outgrowth of a culture, rather than as a divine imposition upon society, brings us to a common basis of understanding and an opportunity to build up from what we have. It leans upon human resources

as the directing power, instead of overtaxing providence with movements for which providence is in no wise responsible.

Dr. Winton is a conservative liberal. He thinks gentle things about Porfirio Díaz, taking that very astute person as an objective manifestation, not as the angel of darkness he is usually painted. In truth Díaz was only one step, one idea—that of material development and order—in Mexico's evolution. Of Carranza the author speaks more kindly than most liberals or conservatives have done. His successors have each in turn stood for one idea, without capacity to stand for many more. The narrative account of events during the rule of Carranza and his successors contains much information not easily accessible elsewhere, and it is to be regretted that the author has not given more ample space to recent years, and has not documented his material systematically in order that his treatment of this complex period might win readily the reputation for authenticity which it deserves.

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*México ante el mundo. Ideología del Presidente Plutarco Elías Calles.*

Compilación hecha por . . . ESPERANZA VELÁZQUEZ BRINGAS. 2nd. Ed. (Barcelona: Editorial Cervantes, 1927. Without Pagination.)

From this interesting compilation, which has also been translated into English, the public may obtain materials upon which to base its estimates of one of the most virile characters in current Mexican political life. The book contains those public addresses and other documents which, while not of strictly administrative type, have been of significance in portraying the Calles idea of the revolution and of the chief executive's part in it. There are declarations addressed to many American newspapers, American visitors, to diplomats received from various countries; they relate to all phases of the problems to which Calles has addressed himself with so much vigor during his tenure of the presidency. From them all in conjunction one derives the impression of a courageous executive, thoroughly imbued with a purely Mexican point of view and a sympathy for his yet unemancipated people. Calles has throughout maintained his character as the hard fighting puritanic zealot for proletarian rights. His place in

history is assured as that of the champion of labor and education; his good judgment is revealed in his renunciation of further pretense to political preference by his people.

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*Sails and Swords; being the Golden Adventures of Balboa and his intrepid Company, Freebooters all, Discoverers of the Pacific.* By ARTHUR STRAWN. (New York: Brentano's, 1928. Pp. 341. \$3.50.)

Mr. Strawn has entered the lists of the historical biographers as many other newspaper men have been doing recently; his interest has been to supply in popular form a needed work in English of one of the greatest and best known of the early Spanish conquerors. Vasco Núñez de Balboa has fired the imagination of every American schoolboy for generations, but until now no one has undertaken to tell his colorful story as a unit.

The Spaniards have, however, done Balboa fairly ample justice, beginning with the favorable account by Oviedo, who had good reason to hate Pedrarias Dávila, the nemesis of the great adelantado and his official superior. There are also the early documents by Navarrete, and the later documentation and analysis by Angel Altolaguirre and José Toribio Medina. Balboa stands with Columbus and Magellan in a group almost alone for foresight and courage in making the sea-ways of the early sixteenth century known. It is surprising that Balboa should have waited so long for an English biography.

Mr. Strawn shows some lack of orientation when he conceals his hero under this anodyne title. Balboa needs no introduction, and the title could apply to thousands of other adventurers of America. This, and a certain writing down noticeable at times make it seem that the author meant to appeal to adolescent readers chiefly. Otherwise, as to treatment and use of sources, the book is commendable for use as collateral reading in Hispanic American history. There are some good amplifying, though few corroborative, notes, the bibliography is adequate; the illustrations are from the early imaginative prints, some of them accredited to the source, and the end-pieces are maps of historic interest.

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## NOTES AND COMMENT

### THE OLDEST UNIVERSITY IN SOUTH AMERICA

In January, 1535, Francisco Pizarro founded, under the name of the Cuidad de los Reyes, what was to be the capital of the Peruvian viceroyalty, built by the Spanish conquerors on the ruins of the ancient empire of the Incas. Fifteen years later, the cabildo, that is, an assembly made up of all the residents of Lima and charged with the administration of the interests of the newly born city, asked Charles V., through the prior of the Dominicans, Tomás de San Martín, for the establishment in the colony of a "General Studium" after the model of the Salamanca cloister; and on May 12, 1551, there was issued in Madrid the royal decree which gave rise to the oldest university of the South American continent.

It suffices to recall the organization and tendencies of the great medieval universities to gain a true image of the San Marcos of colonial days: a seminary of clergymen and a center of general culture.

Along the lines of the Paris University—a type reproduced by Salamanca—the "General Studium" instituted by the king and queen of Spain for the purpose of "doing away with the shadows of ignorance", consisted of four schools or faculties: arts, to a certain degree preparatory to other more advanced studies, and theology, law, and medicine. According also to its models, the faculty of arts or philosophy was the nucleus and heart of all university activities.

The fact that the University of Lima was founded in the middle of the sixteenth century, and that the friars of the convent of San Domingo took upon themselves the support of the professorships, points to its fundamentally religious character. It is true that in 1571 Philip II. converted the "General Studium" into a secular establishment endowing it with an independent income derived from certain *repartimientos*, but this all-important change did not mean that the institution was to be free from any ecclesiastical element. Far from it, for from its very beginning as an autonomous body, its religious character was clearly evident.



By September, 1574, it was resolved to christen the university, and the names of nearly all the saints of the catholic calendar were presented as the most becoming for the prospective patronage. Professors, alumni, and students, sided at once with the candidates of their liking; a heated and hard-fought campaign was started and the atmosphere became so much surcharged with bitterness that, when the hour of election struck, a deadlock developed because all voters—faculty members as well as alumni—proved obstinate and clung obdurately to their choice. It seemed that there was no way out of the difficulty and that the university was doomed to live a heretical life for ever and ever. Fortunately, the ladies of Lima had also come to the front supporting the candidacy of Saint Mark, and the office of viceroy of Peru was at the time in charge of a wise and gallant official. So, in order to cut the gordian knot the suggestion was made of casting lots, and the representative of the Spanish king volunteered to have one of his kinsmen—a five-year-old boy—draw from the amphora the name of the saint to be adopted as patron. Needless to say, fate was as attentive to the ladies as the viceroy was, and ever since the university has carried on its functions under the name and protection of Saint Mark.

This religious tendency was not, however, a peculiarity of higher education in Spanish America, as the universal conception of the times assigned to the universities as their leading rôle the training of learned and orthodox men. It was, indeed, in keeping with this principle that, while in Lima and Mexico the study of theology and canon law absorbed almost all of university thought, in the North American English colonies the colleges (founded much later and modeled on the Cambridge type) devoted themselves to the fostering of the religious sentiment.

But San Marcos did apply its activities to something more than the teaching of the doctrines of St. Thomas and of the scholastic philosophy of Aristotle. Up to 1784 the native language was taught so that the Indians "might be kept in peace and enlightenment"; and the study of mathematics, anatomy, and the method of Galien was also a part of the curriculum. In reply to the supreme council of Castille, the University of Salamanca declared in 1711

that it could not turn away from the peripatetic system; that the systems of Newton, Gassendi, and Descartes were not consistent with revealed truth; and that it did not dare to adopt new methods.

On the other hand, in Lima, at about the same period, Cartesian philosophy had already begun to be taught and revolutionary theories of physics were discussed. All this must account for the fact that by the end of the eighteenth century, the University of San Marcos had thirty-seven chairs and an enrollment of over twelve hundred students. To its lecture-halls repaired the youth of Chile, Alto Peru (Bolivia), Quito, and Panama.

The prestige of San Marcos was greatly enhanced by the importance assigned to teaching in the university and by the strict requirements to which the students were held. The position of professor was considered incompatible with the exercise of any other ecclesiastical, administrative, or judicial function, in order to provide the instructor with the time needed for a careful and thorough preparation of his courses; and the student was supposed to master every subject connected with the theological and philosophical knowledge of the period. To test this knowledge, examinations held over two consecutive days were taken at the end of the course, and the severity in them was reputed as so essential to the success of the whole educational system, that the university recognized only the diplomas and degrees issued by the Universities of Salamanca, Alcalá, Valladolid, Avila, and Bologna "because"—so reads the royal decree—"in those universities examinations are rigorous".

In this connection it might be of interest to note that elaborate religious formalities attended the conferring of the doctor's degree. After the celebration of a mass, a spectacular procession was organized in which students and instructors took part, and then the candidate, escorted by a large following, was led to the chapel of the Virgin in the cathedral where he had to swear allegiance to the mystery of the immaculate conception and pledge himself to abhorrence of "the execrable doctrines of tyrannicide and regicide". Thereupon, the dean of the school conferred on him the degree, and the sponsor bestowed upon him the appropriate insignia.

The performance of all these acts did not put an end, however, to the most pompous and picturesque ceremony of the Spanish American university of colonial times. A still harder ordeal was to be met by the spirited young fellow who had been fortunate enough to pass unscathed through the critical moments of examinations and oaths.

Custom required that the successful candidate for a doctor's degree should give ninety reals to each member of the faculty in his own department, fifty to each of those of the other departments, a larger amount to the president, and other amounts to the dean of the school, the sponsors in the ceremony, and other officials. Moreover, it was incumbent on the graduate to present every student with a silk cap if he was a layman, and with a biretta if he was a cleric; and in addition to this, a gift of four pounds of food and six hens had to be made by the new doctor to each one of his classmates. All these expenses, plus the cost of a bullfight which he was obliged to give in the central square of Lima, and of a banquet, which he had to offer to professors, students, and friends, entailed a disbursement of several thousand pesos. To stop such enormous extravagance, the directing body of the university decreed on May 9, 1743, that the payment to the treasury of two thousand pesos would free the graduate from further responsibilities.

The Spanish monarch and his representatives in America did not fail to lend the University of San Marcos authority and fame. At the request of the court, Pope Pius V. issued a bull of July 25, 1571, whereby the "General Studium" was officially recognized by the church and acquired an international standing. Besides that, successive royal orders which were enacted granting franchises and immunities of all sorts placed the university on the same footing as the most celebrated ones of its time.

It may be said that the instructors and students of San Marcos constituted a state within a state. Inasmuch as they were exempted from any tax payment and submitted to a special jurisdiction according to which the rector or president was even empowered to decide on any criminal case, without any other restriction than that arising from the right of the parties to appeal from his sentence to the court, they led a really privileged life. Not even the terrible and all-powerful tribunal of the inquisition could extend its functions within the walls of the university. The "claustro", namely, an assembly made up of professors, alumni, and representatives of the student body, was the supreme authority on all educational and administrative matters, and among its main privileges was that of electing, after a public contest had been held, the members of the faculty. The rector was also chosen by following the same democratic methods.

Unfortunately, Spanish American colonial education could not avoid the tyrannical influence of the then world-wide pedagogical ideas. It must be borne in mind that we are referring to an epoch in which were still in force the regulations of the University of Paris prescribing that the teacher should speak to the students so rapidly that it would be impossible for them to take written notes of his lecture; and that all educational work was at the time founded on deductions and syllogisms. The ideal seemed to be the formation of mere dialecticians and sophists, as the development of the mental aptitudes of the pupil was entirely overlooked.

Against these unwise methods a vigorous campaign was started in the University of San Marcos, a campaign which was responsible for the founding in Lima of the Medical College of San Fernando in 1811, and for the publishing of *El Mercurio Peruano*, a famous periodical which unreservedly fought for new ideas in the scientific field and for the enlightenment of public opinion. This period marks the beginning of South American political independence, and was also the occasion for great changes in the intellectual life.

Up to that time Spain had given the colonies the best of its scholastic models. Thereafter, South America, now free from the tutelage of Spain, but lacking the elements needed to constitute an original university system, was to turn to other sources for inspiration and guidance; and it was from France that the young republics to the south borrowed their new educational standards.

The charm of the French spirit has been and still is very strong in Spanish and Portuguese America. Our idealism, our artistic temperament, our natural inclination to all general ideas, have always led us to seek in the glorious history of France, in its wonderful literature, in the purity and clearness of French thought, the most appropriate examples for the organization of our institutions and for the moulding of our individual and collective mentality. Yielding, therefore, to the spell of this attraction, we abandoned what was good in our colonial university to replace it by something which did not give us what we most urgently needed: a broad foundation of liberal culture, capable of enabling us to meet the political, social, and economic problems incidental to the setting up of the republican government.



The medieval French university had been destroyed by the revolution which established the so-called "Écoles Spéciales". Shortly afterward appeared the Napoleonic university organized along geometrical lines, subjected to military discipline, and assigned, in accordance with Napoleon's plan, to support his imperialistic régime, through the control of political and moral opinions. Here, the ancient faculty of philosophy or arts, the very soul of all universities since their origin, was replaced by the independent departments of letters and sciences; the other faculties, dispersed, turned into technical schools looking toward the professional training of their students; and all tendency toward scientific research was put aside, because it was contended that any effort of this sort was incumbent on the academy, while the task of giving a general culture should be in charge of the high-school. To issue certificates, credentials, and diplomas seemed to be, as it were, the only *raison d'être* of the French university.

Some years ago the president of the University of La Plata remarked that the Argentine university had been undermined by a separatist propensity, by an interior isolation destructive of the idea of *universitas*, which means unity of life and coöperative action. This holds true with respect to other Hispanic American universities, some of which, as those of Brazil and Mexico, went so far as to lose the name of university.

In Peru, the University of San Marcos survived, but every tie between its component elements was absent. The colonial faculty of arts gave way, as its model had done, to the separate departments of letters and sciences, and the other departments—law, medicine, theology, engineering—became autonomous professional bodies. It may well be stated that during the nineteenth century our university was also a "factory of diplomas" and that these only bore witness to an incomplete and mutilated knowledge in a given line of human learning.

Furthermore, as all serious laboratory work was regarded as outside the scope of university tasks, it would not be too bold to conclude that our conception of higher education coincided with that of the intellectualist university described by a well known Spanish pedagogue—Dr. Giner de los Ríos—

as an organ whose leading function in society consisted of making a mechanical distribution of a quantity of ready-made, close, and conclusive doctrine that the pupil had only to understand and assimilate.

It is not suggested that San Marcos was unable to produce for a long time highly qualified professional men. By no means. However, it is a well known fact that the man who has been trained to be a lawyer or a physician and has not received a solid foundation of general culture, is bound to have an incomplete outlook on life and to be lacking in understanding. The history of Peru, like that of all Spanish American countries, points to a weakness in the character of our leading classes, which lies in the fact that education has failed to awaken in them the sentiment of tolerance, a feeling which only germinates in the minds of persons who have acquired, through the study of science and the humanities, a comprehensive conception of things.

A wave of powerful reaction against such a university is spreading nowadays from one end to the other of Spanish America. In Peru the reform was started some twenty-five years ago, and it may be said that at this time a new spirit animates the old "claustró" of San Marcos. Now, according to the provisions of the law, all students are required to spend two years in the faculties of letters and sciences previous to admission to the departments of professional specialization. By following this system the boy or girl who comes from a high-school where he or she has obtained a rather elementary instruction, has to concentrate on the study of physical and social sciences and on the learning of modern languages before applying for enrollment to the other and higher departments of the university. Moreover, the teaching of such matters is in charge of well-trained instructors who must not lose sight of the fact that the true aim of education is not, as was believed in bygone days, to develop the purely receptive faculties of the pupil but, on the contrary, to stimulate in him his active powers, his initiative, his independent thinking, in short, all that which may help to the building up of his character and of his personality.

But the Peruvian university has cared for something other than this. It has realized that it is its duty to promote an interest in scientific research—that deep interest which is one of the most merited glories of the German university. Of course, we lack the large means

which are needed to do extensive work in this unlimited field, but we have thought that at least we could study our geography, our population, our history, our institutions, etc.

With this end in view, a number of the professors of San Marcos devote their time to the teaching of advanced specialized subjects which demand preparatory research, while the instructors are chiefly in charge of the general work; several seminar courses have been created; and the writing of theses for the doctor's degree touching upon topics connected with our own problems is greatly encouraged.

A peculiar feature of the University of Lima, throughout its existence of nearly four centuries, has always been its absolute autonomy in government. This situation has of late been changed by an Executive decree, dated May 19, 1928, whereby the president of the university and the deans of the various schools are to be appointed by the "Consejo Nacional de Enseñanza Universitaria", a board which is under the control of the administration. The national council has also been given the power to suspend or dismiss those professors who do not fulfill their duties and obligations.

The faculty retains, however, a share in the election of the authorities of the university, as the rector or president is chosen from among ten candidates proposed by the faculty itself; and the deans are selected from a double list of three names each submitted to the national council by the members of the respective school.

Upon the university board—consisting of the rector, the deans, a delegate from each department of the university, a representative of the student body, and a representative of the alumni—devolves the privilege of appointing the professors of San Marcos. These appointments are valid for ten years, and are confirmed, after the lapse of such a period, only in case that the professor has accomplished in the meanwhile a certain amount of research work. It is also the duty of every professor to have at the beginning of his second year of teaching a detailed program of his course published, and to have his lessons published before the end of the fifth year after his appointment.

At present the University of San Marcos consists of the departments of theology, law, medicine, letters, sciences, and economics; and it is expected that the schools of engineering, agriculture, and education, which now have an independent organization, will soon become integral parts of San Marcos.

CARLOS CONCHA.

The Spanish Club of Goucher College has adopted for this year a Santiago, Chile, normal school as a "sister" school, and has sent a gift of books in English to its library. The plan of the club is to have a sister school of a different Hispanic American country each year, and during the year to give special emphasis to a study of the country in connection with club programs and Spanish composition work in the college classes.



## BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SECTION

### HUGO WAST, ARGENTINA'S MOST POPULAR NOVELIST

With the publication in 1910 of his third novel, *Flor de Durazno*, Gustavo Martínez Zuviría adopted the foreign sounding pseudonym of Hugo Wast, which he admits was for the purpose of attracting the attention of the Argentine public. *Flor de Durazno* did, indeed, establish Huga Wast's fame as an author, and today it seems incredible that there ever was a time when his novels were not well known. By means of his fourteen subsequent novels, his collection of short stories called *Sangre en el Umbral* and the collection of autobiographical material entitled *Las Espigas de Ruth*, he has gained such widespread popularity that, when visiting Europe and the United States last spring, he was acclaimed by thousands of admirers.

Hugo Wast's popularity is substantiated by the large number of sales of his books. One hundred and thirteen thousand copies of *Flor de Durazno*<sup>1</sup> and one hundred and five thousand copies of *La Casa de los Cuervos*<sup>1</sup> have already been published, which means, of course, that the novels have been read by several times that number of people. The well-known Argentine critic, Juan José Soiza Reilly, says of Wast:

He is the best seller of all the Argentine novelists. Martínez Zuviría has not only won readers for his own books, but it can be stated that his books have conquered a public for other Argentine novels.<sup>2</sup>

Besides Soiza Reilly, such distinguished critics as José María Samperio, Manuel Gálvez, and E. M. S. Danero have favorably reviewed the novels in his own land, while such scholars of Spanish-American literature as Dr. Herman Hespelt of Columbia University have written and lectured on Hugo Wast in the United States.

Wast is the recipient of several prizes, both at home and abroad. In 1923, his novel *La que no Perdonó*, received in Argentina part of a third prize granted to the "best literary or scientific production of

<sup>1</sup> See back cover of his latest novel, *Tierra de Jaguares*.

<sup>2</sup> Juan José Soiza Reilly, "Un Gran Novelista Argentino", in *Caras y Caretas*, Buenos Aires, January 15, 1921.

the year".<sup>3</sup> In 1926, *Desierto de Piedra* received first prize.<sup>4</sup> Special recognition from abroad came to him through the Spanish Royal Academy's prize granted in 1924 for *Valle Negro*, considered one of the best books published in the five-year period, 1918-1922.<sup>5</sup> Hugo Wast has also the honor of being one of the corresponding members in Argentina of the Spanish Royal Academy.

Since Hugo Wast is undoubtedly the best-seller of all the Argentine novelists, and since his books have received such favorable criticism as well as important prizes, it is worth our while to find out to what qualities he owes such success.

Perhaps the prime cause of Wast's success lies in the carefully planned plots through which there hovers an atmosphere of mystery and adventure, thus keeping the reader guessing as to the outcome of the story. This sense of the mysterious is especially intriguing in *Fuente Sellada*. María Teresa refuses to marry Juan Manuel, telling him that her life is destined for a different purpose, but not until nearly the end of the book is it disclosed that she had a lover, upon whom she seeks revenge for having deserted her and for having married her own sister. Acting upon María Teresa's insinuations, a devoted peón kills the dissolute and faithless husband of her sister. Thus the complications in the plot are simplified, for the sister is left free to marry Juan Manuel, the two having been in love with each other since childhood, while María Teresa spends the rest of her life in seclusion and penitence. Such hidden pasts of Wast's characters keep the reader guessing as to when and how the mysteries of their lives will be revealed, and when the disclosure does come, the denouement of the plot is often quite unexpected.

These carefully worked out plots are composed of scenes filled with action. In most cases the heroes and heroines of Wast lead quite the antithesis of a drab Main Street life. They have to fight their way through hurricanes, fires, shipwrecks, murders, and revolutions, and whether they are successful or not, they always put up a most praiseworthy struggle. This rapid action draws the reader's full attention to the story. He follows breathlessly one exciting event after the other, feeling that he is being transported into a land of romance and adventure.

<sup>3</sup> *Nosotros*, Buenos Aires, December, 1924, p. 522.

<sup>4</sup> Letter from Hugo Wast, written December 15, 1924.

<sup>5</sup> *La Prensa*, New York, June 28, 1928.

Hugo Wast's novels are also interesting because of his heroines who are responsible for his fame as a sympathetic creator of feminine protagonists. In a country where men characters are usually given the leading rôle in fiction, it is somewhat unique to find fifteen novels, in each of which a woman leads.

Although these female protagonists vary considerably in the different novels, there are certain characteristics common to them. First of all, many have a common physical background. They have spent at least their childhood in the country. This free, outdoor life has inculcated in them a love of independence and the ability to rely on their own resources, qualities which are useful to them later in life. Influenced by the barrenness of the scenery, the heroines living in the mountains have grown sad and melancholy and are, consequently, the prey of deep emotions and passions. These women are well trained in youth for the active rôles they play in the novels.

Although neither educated nor well-read, these feminine characters have much natural intelligence and a keen sense of judgment, which they are often called upon to use. Full of poise in society, and cool-headed in the face of the many dangers that beset them, they are true heroines of the active life depicted in the novels. Whether from the rugged Cordoban Mountains, the marshy lands of the Paraná, the provincial cities teeming with political intrigues and still clinging to the conservatism of bygone days, or from the turbulent life of the capital, they all seem to be representative of a certain type of Argentine women.

Among the many feminine protagonists, Myriam, the heroine of the last three novels of Wast—*El Jinete de Fuego*; *Myriam, la Conspiradora*; and *Tierra de Jaguares*—is perhaps the best exponent of the above mentioned qualities. Myriam is an expert sailor, who navigates her own boat along the banks of the Río de la Plata. In *Tierra de Jaguares*, she is fleeing before the Argentine forces and also searching for her father, who had barely escaped execution for having conspired for the return of the Spanish troops. The vicissitudes which lie in her path could only be found in such a wild region as that through which she wanders. With unfailing courage she encounters hurricanes, wild cattle stampedes, attacks by Indians and fierce jaguars, while one night her boat is invaded by a regiment of enormous serpents. She has complete control over her will and actions, and

never despairs in the face of these dangers. At one time her fate seems hopeless when she and her family are captured by the republican soldiers. But through her own valor and ingenuity and the aid of loyal friends, every hardship is conquered, all are freed, and her father is pardoned by means of the mediation of a young Argentine captain, who is in love with Myriam. Yet, with all Myriam's heroic qualities she is extremely feminine and appealing. She loves and suffers with all the patience and fatalism of her sex. From the very beginning the reader is drawn to her and heartily rejoices when she overcomes so many seemingly unsurmountable difficulties.

The special attention that Hugo Wast pays to his women characters signifies merely lack of interest in heroes rather than inability to present them. The excellent sketch of Francisco Insúa in *La Casa de los Cuervos* offers sufficient proof of the author's ability to create a strong male protagonist. This clever, fearless youth, trembling before the supernatural, an audacious lover, yet supersensitive and delicate in his relations with his sweetheart, is the typical, dashing revolutionary hero who always thrills the reader. However, other leading male characters in Wast's novels are either by nature insignificant, or appear to be so beside the strong character of the heroines.

With these colorless male protagonists must not be confused the many male characters of minor importance who are clearly and cleverly depicted. What they lack in importance they gain in vividness. They are often middle-aged men—a father, an uncle, a school teacher, a priest—or they are young peons and mountaineers. The author has undoubtedly met the originals in his wanderings through country and city. He has studied them with affectionate understanding and presents them in realistic personality sketches that charm the reader.

Among these realistic characters of secondary importance special attention should be given to the *gaucho* type, without whom the Argentine novel of country life would lose much of its picturesqueness. In the author's historical novels the gaucho himself appears acting as *baqueano* (tracker) or as *payador* (improviser of songs) and serving as a willing recruit for revolutionary armies. In the novels of modern country life the gaucho's descendant has settled down on a farm as peón, yet he is still a gaucho, deeply versed in the lore of nature, serious and melancholy as he goes about his work, shy, but to be feared when angry, an enemy of restraint and an inveterate lover of liberty.



In *Tierra de Jaguares*, the last of the historical novels describing Argentina about 1812, Hugo Wast has introduced along with his gaucho characters another American type not so commonly found in the novel, that is, the Indian. He presents a band of savage Indians carrying off the booty taken in a recent raid, among which are several young girls, who will never again see their civilized homes. Myriam and her family barely escape a similar fate at their hands. There are also peaceful Indians, the family of the Guaraní, Yahur, with whom Myriam has made friends. She has also obtained the loyalty of the Guaycurú, Ñahircán, who succeeds in finding her father. But the most interesting character of all is the handsome young servant, Viviana, who left her native tribe, the Guaycurús, at an early age and who had, according to outward appearances, become entirely civilized by the many years she had spent in the city. But upon living once again in the woods, the memories of her childhood rush in upon her and transform her whole character. Myriam says of her:

How she has changed! Previously, she was offended if some one called her an Indian, but now she is charmed with all that bears the flavor of the race and the land which she knew as a child; before, her eyes were sparkling and vivacious, and she was always talkative; but now she is silent and taciturn.\*

Invoking her native versatility and knowledge of nature, she saves Myriam and her family from various calamities. At the end of the story she slips away in the canoe of her lover, Ñahircán, to live forever in the bosom of that beautiful country which the reader has seen and learned to love through her eyes.

These national types move in a masterfully depicted setting of Argentine life. Hugo Wast is truly a regionalistic writer, confining his stories to a small area—Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Santa Fé and the surrounding country. Although his descriptions of Buenos Aires in *Ciudad Turbulenta*, *Ciudad Alegre*, and *Los Ojos Vendados* are good, he excels in scenes of country life, as in *Fuente Sellada*, *Flor de Durazno*, *Valle Negro*, *La que no Perdonó*, *La Casa de los Cuervos*, and *Desierto de Piedra*. It is not only the beautiful scenery and landscape but the typical occupations and pastimes, such as milking, cattle branding, fishing, and country dances, which the author describes so vividly. He is fond of showing the life inside the home, describing

\* *Tierra de Jaguares*, p. 217.

the decorations of the rooms and the food served at the table, and he presents with special skill the subtle family relationship, either harmonious or otherwise, between father and children or between brother and sister. Through Wast's pictures the whole atmosphere of ranch life is brought before the reader's eyes.

Such a presentation of Argentine life would not be complete without discussing some of the social problems common to the nation—gambling in *Novia de Vacaciones*, the difficulties that beset a girl who tries to earn her own living in a large city seen in *Los Ojos Vendados*, prostitution in *Flor de Durazno*, the importance of politics in society, especially treated in the historical novels, and the situation caused by the coming of the gringo, whose ambition and toil have won for him the lands belonging to the backward and shiftless natives, seen in *Desierto de Piedra*.

With the publication of his last three novels, the serial group called *El Jinete de Fuego*; *Myriam, la Conspiradora*; and *Tierra de Jaguares*, Hugo Wast has returned to the historical field, in which he had already won success with *La Casa de los Cuervos* and *La Corbata Celeste*. All of these novels contain events and scenes, as well as some of the characters, of Argentina's past. The three recent books describe the stormy years around 1812 when the republic was yet new, *La Corbata Celeste* presents the tyranny under Juan Manuel Rosas, a period which has attracted the attention of many writers, including the famous novelist, José Mármol, while *La Casa de los Cuervos* describes revolutionary intrigues in the provinces during the year 1877. In each of these novels the political situation of that special period is clearly and extensively discussed, not with a biased presentation like that of the above-mentioned Mármol, but with a broad survey of conditions.

With his great interest in people, Hugo Wast could never write a novel filled only with politics. His characters play as important a rôle in these novels as in any of the author's works. Whether historical or fictitious, they seem very real, having the joys and fears, the love and hatred typical of their times. They move in a social life which forms an excellent background for the stories, giving the reader a concrete idea of how people lived at that time. Thus, with his ability to humanize everything, to give life and interest to historical events, Hugo Wast makes his stories of Argentina's past unusually picturesque and fascinating.

Due to this ability to make his picture of Argentine life intensely interesting to the popular reader, who may or may not be acquainted with the region described, his stories are more readable than those of many of the contemporary regional novelists of that nation. Unlike such writers as Ricardo Güiraldes and Benito Lynch, who fill their pages with so many gaucho words and so much peón talk that it is difficult for one who has not lived in the region to understand the conversations, Hugo Wast uses regional speech with sobriety. In reading his novels one does not have the feeling that he is "wading through" dialectical conversation, rather, he reads along easily, soon reaching the next point of action of the story.

Wast also uses moderation in his descriptions, which never encumber the action of the story. They are comparatively brief and simple. Soiza Reilly says, "With two adjectives Hugo Wast lays before our eyes a whole soul".<sup>7</sup> The short sentences and paragraphs in which the novels are arranged help to accentuate this impression of brevity. Nevertheless, his descriptions are vivid, and the characters and events stand out clearly in the mind of the reader, as though he himself had seen them. There are detailed descriptions, but detail is used skilfully, to give a more accurate knowledge of the background and to clarify the story.

Comparing Hugo Wast once again with the numerous contemporary regionalistic novelists of Argentina, whose productions are reaching the Spanish-reading public of the United States, we see that he not only writes more interesting stories but that there is a stronger universal appeal to his works. This explains to a large extent his great popularity among all classes of his own country and justifies especially his fame abroad.

Novels that touch the reader's emotions are usually popular the world over. This is unquestionably true with every one of Wast's stories. The author takes us into the intimacy of the joys and sorrows of the characters. Each of his heroines struggles valiantly with misfortune, some finding happiness in the end, as Evangelina in *Fuente Sellada* and Myriam in *Tierra de Jaguares*, while others find only sorrow, as Flavia in *Valle Negro* and Merceditas in *La que no Perdonó*, others being relieved from their sad fate by death, as Rina

<sup>7</sup>"Un Gran Novelista Argentino", in *Caras y Caretas*, Buenos Aires, January 15, 1921.

in *Flor de Durazno* and Angelina in *Novia de Vacaciones*. The fatalistic tone throughout all of the novels announces in advance the sad ending, and the reader, curious to know how this will come about, reads on, fascinated by the tragedy.

The skilful use of this fatalistic touch testifies to a certain artistic sense which is characteristic of Wast's style. He has the ability to see the high and noble in the actions and character of those around him, no matter how humble or poor they may be, and he succeeds in getting the reader to appreciate what is beautiful in the character of the people that he has portrayed in his books. The favorite novel of the Argentines, *Flor de Durazno*, stands out as his masterpiece from the artistic point of view. One feels the beauty of Rina's love, and her character harmonizes well with the beauties of nature so well described. Over the whole book there hovers a breath of the poetic which denotes the work of an artist.

This artistic touch, as well as certain other characteristics of his style, are direct reflections of the author's personality. As seen through his novels, one pictures Hugo Wast as a straight-forward, sincere man, keenly interested in his fellow countrymen, and blessed with an unusual ability to understand and to sympathize with them. There are also glimpses of the quiet spirit of humility of the author, who claims himself unworthy of the praise heaped upon him and who expresses surprise to learn that his fame has reached foreign shores.

The reader also pictures a man with a keen sense of humor, for the author of *Pata de Zorra*, one of the wittiest of all Argentine novels, could not be otherwise. *Pata de Zorra* is an account of the adventures in love and the intricacies of Roman law of the young student, Belisario Carillo. Belisario is one of the most indolent students in don Triboniano's class of Roman law, but must pass the course. He decides that the only way he can do this is by making love to the professor's old-maid sister, Maclovia. Don Triboniano, having learned much by previous experience with students who had similar plans, exacts that the marriage shall take place before the law examination. Pleading the pressure of studies, instead of visiting his fiancée every day, Belisario courts her by sending a package of sweets hidden under the seat of the professor's buggy. When the carriage is carefully shut in the carriage house, Maclovia



would arrive, dressed in flowing white garments like those of an operatic virgin, fanning her face, which was crimson with the blushes of modesty, by means of a branch of perfumed flowers. She would slip stealthily into the shed, which smelled of dry alfalfa, and put her hand into the hiding place. It seemed to her that the impenetrable mystery by which the sweets and the letters reached her greatly increased their loving meaning.<sup>8</sup>

Thinking that she might cut her apparent age in half and thus bring it a little nearer that of her fiancé, Maclovía bobs her hair. But, alas, the desired effect was not produced, for her hair was

straight and forlorn-looking, as bedraggled as the foliage of a weeping willow in early winter. Her hair seemed like the little streams of water that trickle down over a baby's face from the sponge squeezed over his head in the bath.<sup>9</sup>

Perhaps the most aggravating habit of the old maid was that of calling her sweetheart all manner of strange, affectionate names. "Little kitten", "my adorable little fox", "my chick", and "duckie" were the most natural ways for her to address Belisario, although he

had told her a thousand times that he did not like her comparisons with animals inside and outside of the hen house.<sup>10</sup>

The situation grows more complicated with the arrival of Don Triboniano's beautiful young daughter, who has just spent four years away at boarding school. Beatriz and Belisario are constantly thrown together, even from the first when, on the station platform, embracing each one of her relatives in turn,

she threw herself into the arms of the person who was standing at the side of her aunt and gave him a kiss on each cheek. And that person was Belisario, who, at the moment of the distribution of kisses, placed himself close beside the relatives, in case any should be left over. He returned the embrace whole heartedly, making it last as long as possible, and he gave the girl two of the loudest kisses of the day.<sup>11</sup>

In order that her father may be appointed president of the university, Beatriz promises to marry the influential senator, Balmaceda.

He was a rich widower, quite advanced in years. He was short and fat, and looked like a sheep lying down. His head, covered with little, tight gray balls of

<sup>8</sup> *Pata de Zorra*, p. 46.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 98.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 180.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 74.

hair, and his long face with a tender expression in his eyes added to the comparison.<sup>12</sup>

Beatriz and Belisario are madly in love with each other, but fate seems to be against them, for the date is already set for a double wedding. The day before the wedding Maclovía suddenly expresses the desire to visit Pata de Zorra, the fortune teller. Pata de Zorra had previously been consulted separately by Don Triboniano, Beatriz, and Belisario, and upon seeing the whole family enter, she sizes up the situation. In telling Beatriz's fortune, she says:

She will become a widow soon, after six months . . . but she will marry again, and she and her second husband will live a hundred years, at least.

"I want to be your second husband", exclaimed Balmaceda.

"No one will want to be the first husband", said the sentimental Maclovía with horror and sincere compassion.

But the hypocritical voice of Belisario, who was affecting deep emotion, was heard, "I wish to save this girl from her terrible destiny. I will sacrifice myself. I will be her first husband".

"No, no. You will not sacrifice yourself, my sweet parrot", said Maclovía.

"Yes, I will sacrifice myself", repeated Belisario firmly.

"You are going to die, adorable little orangoutang".

"But I shall save her from her sad destiny".

"And I shall lose you, little donkey of my soul".

"You will resign yourself to this. I shall sacrifice myself, you will sacrifice yourself, and they will be happy".<sup>13</sup>

After waiting fifteen years, without signs of Belisario's sacrifice being consummated by death, Maclovía and Balmaceda decide that, after all, it is each other they love, and hasten to get married.

This same keen sense of humor which makes *Pata de Zorra* one long laugh from beginning to end is characteristic of almost all of Wast's novels. He is a master at picking out the idiosyncrasies of a middle-aged person, and takes special boyish pleasure in characterizing old maids like Maclovía and schoolmasters like Don Triboniano. Wast does not poke fun in a bitter, sarcastic way; he just has a good hearty laugh at them all. This comic presentation of characters and scenes is done with such a genuine sense of humor that it can not fail to be contagious. In Spanish-American literature, which is generally permeated with a tendency toward sadness and fatalism, a comic novel really well written, such as *Pata de Zorra*, holds a unique place.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>13</sup> *Pata de Zorra*, p. 210.

Thus, reflecting his own personality—a keen sense of humor, a certain humility of manner and a feeling for the poetic in life—the novels have a convincing atmosphere of genuineness and sincerity. The regional characters and scenes, both of Argentina's past and present, are depicted with a picturesqueness and charm that fill one with a desire to see the regions described. The special ability of the author to tell a good story, relating exciting events, scenes of rapid action and varied emotions occurring in the life of a true heroine, have a strong appeal for the general reader.

Hugo Wast's popularity has spread even beyond the scope of his original seventeen novels. Three of his novels, *La Casa de los Cuervos*, *Flor de Durazno*, and *Valle Negro*, have been adapted to the stage in Argentina, while the first two have also been put on the screen. Outside of his own country his renown has spread through translations into German, French, Italian, Portuguese, Hungarian, and Russian, while English translations are not lagging far behind. *The House of the Ravens* was published some years ago in England, while *Black Valley* came into the hands of the United States public last year. Other novels of the author are now in process of translation in this country. When others of his best novels, such as *Flor de Durazno*, *La que no Perdonó*, *Pata de Zorra*, and *Fuente Sellada*, are available in English, undoubtedly many readers in the United States will be charmed with these fascinating tales of Argentine life.

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## NOTES

In its mimeographed "Novedades Bibliográficas Mexicanas" for October, 1928, the section of bibliography and reviews of the department of libraries of the secretariat of public education of Mexico notes the following titles:

- Andrade, Raúl: American Tourist's Guidebook to the States of Yucatan and Campeche. Merida, Yucatan. Pp. 171; 3 plans.
- Landa, Diego de: Relation des Choses de Yucatan. Vol. I. Paris, "Les Editions Genet". Pp. 245. Spanish text with French translation. Annotations by Jean Genet. This book forms part of the collection of texts relative to the ancient civilizations of México and Central America.
- Rojas, Luis Manuel: La Culpa de Henry Lane Wilson en el gran Desastre de Mexico. Vol. I. Compañía Editora "La Verdad", S. A., 1928. Pp. 372.
- Saenz, Moisés: Reseña de la Educación pública en México en 1927. Mexico: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1928. Pp. 76 (bibliography, pp. 71-76). [Publications of the Secretaría de Educación Pública, Tomo XVIII. núm. 13.]

The number for November announces the following:

- Alegatos que presenta la Sucesión del Señor Licenciado Fernando Ancira, patrocinada por el Señor Licenciado Rodolfo Brito Foucher ante L.H. Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación. México, Editorial "Cultura", 1928. Pp. 126.
- Exposición preliminar del Mensaje presidencial presentado por Escrito a las Camaras Federales, y Discurso político del Señor Presidente de la República ante el Congreso Nacional el primero de Septiembre de mil novecientos veintiocho. México, 1928. Pp. 19.
- Guía oficial de Ferrocarriles y Vapores de la República Mexicana. Published monthly by the Compañía de la Guía Oficial Mexicana, S.A., Mexico.
- Informe del C. Presidente de la República al H. Congreso de la Unión, en la Parte relativa al Ramo de Educación Pública. México, Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1928. Pp. 22. [Publications of the Secretaría de Educación Pública, Tomo XVIII. núm. 19.]
- Inman, Samuel Guy: Church and State in Mexico. Reprinted for private circulation from *The Journal of Religion*, VII.
- León, Juan: Reforma de la Lengua Castellana. México. Pp. 36.
- Mercadillo Lamieq, Manuel; and José Tomás Cohoca: Archivo general. Manual de Instrucciones para los Encargados de Archivos de esta Secretaría. México, Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1928. Pp. 117. [Publications of the Secretaría de Educación Pública.]
- Roel, Faustino: Segundo Congreso nacional de Caminos. La Preparación del primer Congreso nacional de Caminos. México, Imprenta Núñez. Pp. 20.



The American Jewish Historical Society (New York) has published numerous papers relative to the Jews in Spain and America. Arthur Bab of Riviera, Argentina, has an article in German on "The Spanish-speaking Jews, 1492-1916: The Jews in Peru and neighboring Countries" in the *Jahrbuch für jüdische Geschichte und Literatur* (Berlin, 1927). An earlier article on the same subject was published by the same author in *Jahrbuch* for 1925.

Dr. Julio C. Salas, a Venezuelan scientist who has devoted his life to the investigation of Indian history and linguistics was in the United States recently for a short visit. Dr. Salas has completed a comprehensive work on "Comparative Indian Languages" which it is hoped will soon be published. He has accomplished a tremendous task and has arrived at some interesting and valuable results.

The *Revista Mexicana de Estudios Históricos* (Mexico) has completed its first volume. The six numbers contain the following articles:

- No. 1.—Palabras Preliminares.—German Beyer, La Cifra Diez en el Simbolismo Maya.—Alfonso Caso, El Vaso de Jade de la Colección Plancarte.—Pablo González Casanova.—El Tapachulteca No. 2 sin relación conocida.—Manuel Toussaint, Pintura Colonial. Notas sobre Andrés de la Concha.—Federico Gómez de Orozco, Monasterios de la Orden de San Agustín, en Nueva España. Siglo XVI.
- No. 2.—Ramón Mena y Porfirio Aguirre, La Nueva Zona Arqueológica.—Antonio Caso, La Solidaridad Política.—Victoriano Salado Alvarez, El Diario de un Amigo de México (John Quincy Adams).—Manuel Toussaint, Folklore histórico. La Canción de Mambrú.
- No. 3.—Germán Beyer, Dos fechas del Palacio de Palenque.—Miguel O. de Mendizábal, Los Otomíes no fueron los primeros pobladores del Valle de México.—Joaquín Fernández de Lizardi, Testamento Político del Pensador Mexicano. Primera Parte.
- No. 4.—Alfonso Caso, Las Ruinas de Tizatlán. Tlaxcala.—Manuel Toussaint, Un templo cristiano sobre el Palacio de Xicotencatl.—Luis Castillo Ledón, Una Disertación de Hildalgo.—Joaquín Fernández de Lizardi, Testamento Político del Pensador Mexicano. Segunda Parte y Conclusión.
- No. 5.—Nicolás León, La Relación de Michuacán. Nota Bibliográfica y Crítica.—Carlos Diez de Sollano, Cuadros de Costumbres. Las Fiestas de San Miguel.

- No. 6.—José de J. Núñez y Domínguez, Los métodos modernos en la enseñanza de la Historia.—Federico K. G. Müllerried, El llamado Planchón de las figuras en el Estado de Chiapas.—Alfonso Caso, Una Pintura desconocida de Mitla.—Dorothy Schons, Dos documentos inéditos relativos a Sigüenza.—Enrique A. Cervantes, Carta de Examen de un maestro herrero.

In appendix form have been published the following:

- Descripción de la Ciudad de México, por Antonio de León y Gama. Con nota preliminar de Federico Gómez de Orozco.  
 Descripción del Lienzo de Tlaxcala, por Nicolás Faustino Maziheatzin. Con nota preliminar de Federico Gómez de Orozco.  
 Descripción del Obispado de Michuacán, por Antonio de León y Gama. Con nota preliminar de Manuel Toussaint.  
 El libro perdido de las Pláticas o Coloquios de los Doce primeros Misioneros de México. Con prólogo y notas de Zelia Nuttall.  
 Relaciones de Cholula, por Gabriel de Rojas, de Culhuacán, por Gonzalo Gallegos, y de Teotzacocalco y de Amoltepeque, por Hernando de Cervantes. Con nota preliminar de Federico Gómez de Orozco.

During the years 1886-1928, Mrs. Zelia Nuttall has published forty-five books and articles relating to Mexican archeology and related subjects. Of special interest and importance are the articles relating to early American calendars.

*The Journal of Economic and Business History* made its initial appearance in November, 1928. Under the editorship of Professor Edwin F. Gay, and judging from the first number, the new quarterly will not delay in taking front rank among historical periodical literature. N. S. B. Gras is the managing editor. The editorial board consists of C. Brinkmann, J. C. Clapham, A. H. Cole, H. Hauser, E. Lipson, W. C. Mitchell, U. B. Phillips, M. Rostovzeff, A. M. Schlesinger, and Owen D. Young. The November issue contains an article entitled "American Treasure and Andalusian Prices, 1503-1660". THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW welcomes this newest entrant into the historical field. It has an unique rôle to play and has long been needed.

